


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HUMAN PERSONALITY



*Its Historical Emergence in India,
China, and Israel*

BY

H. C. E. ZACHARIAS, PH.D.

B. HERDER BOOK CO.

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TO

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF PEKING
*which provided both the incentive and the
opportunity for writing this book*

Notes on the System Employed for Transliteration

In general the international rule for transliteration has been observed; that all vowels should be sounded as in Italian and all consonants as in English.

For Sanscrit

long â (as in *father*), long î (as in *machine*), and long û (as in *loom*), have been marked by a circumflex (^).

ř is vocalic r, pronounced somewhat like ry in “rhythm” or like the French *rue*.

The two *sh* sounds have been distinguished, the dental as ç and the palatal as š.

The *ch* sound in “church” is given as č, and *ksh* has been simplified into x.

Palatal ʈ, ɖ, and ɳ are distinguished, by a dot below, from their dental equivalents.

ñ is the *ny* sound of the Spanish “señor”; jñ is sounded like *dny* (in *Dnyepr*).

For Greek

η and ω have been transliterated ê and ô respectively. υ, in accordance with Modern Greek pronunciation, is

shown either as *y* as in *hybris*, or as *v* as in *basileus*, or as *u* in *toutos*.

For Chinese

A phonetic representation has been attempted of the sounds as of the Peking dialect.

ε represents the sound of *u* in *cur* or of *i* in *girl*.

é is the French accented *é* as in *béret*.

å is sounded as in Swedish and represents the sound of the English word *awe*.

A distinction is made between *ch* (as in *church*) and *ty* (as in *hit you*); likewise between *j* (in *jar*) and *dy* (as in *schedule*).

zh is a sound halfway between *r* and the French *j* in a word like *jardin*.

To avoid further complication, the tones have not been indicated.

Notes

Additional notes were necessitated by the impossibility of communicating with the author while he was in China. They were received after the book was ready for the press and will now be found at the end of the volume, on pages 342 ff.

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CHAPTER I

The Emergence in History of the Human Person

CASTING a retrospective glance at the history of which the pages of our *Protohistory* have tried to give an account, we can discern two distinct successive stages. The first is wholly anonymous: our account of it is entirely concerned with human society and its development; it deals exclusively with man in his social aspect: the clans, families, tribes to which he belonged; the traditions, civilizations, and ideologies to which he was subject. The nature of our records certainly precludes the possibility of taking cognizance of individual efforts and achievements. Even so, it is most likely that the individual remained really quite as much submerged in the society of which he formed part, as our account has seemed to indicate. Even today people that have not yet reached the level of a high civilization, present to us the picture of a tribal life in which "it never enters the heads of people to see themselves as contrasted with the society they belong to, and as capable either of sacrifice for the general interest or of the pursuit of some advantage in disregard of the general interest: in tribalism there is no conscious conflict between egoism and altruism." ¹

¹ Norman Leys, *Kenya* (London, 1924), pp. 251 f.

In a subsequent stage this social aspect of man still preponderates, but with Ur-nina and Menes names of individuals make their appearance. These individuals, however, are largely hypostatizations of man's social relationships, whether political, economic, or religious. The hieratic kingship with which they are vested is what matters supremely: their individuality is a factor that counts for so little that their very statues refrain from expressing it; not because the artist's technique was incapable of doing so, but because his sole task was to depict the office, not the incumbent, a "universal" and not a "singular." It is only in the second millenium that a change takes place in this and that we get the beginnings of portraiture. Especially in Egypt it is no longer the king who as such monopolizes all the records that have come down to us: other individuals, in humbler stations of life, now also begin to tell posterity about their own individual achievements and aspirations.

Thus the stage was set for an emergence of the human person: a phenomenon which, as we shall see, will provide the leitmotiv of the period to be treated in the present volume.

But where and when was tribalism first outgrown? Certainly not in the highly complicated and sophisticated Egypt of the second millenium. There is a general trend to individualism in the venatorial type of civilization, just as there is a trend to collectivism in the agriculturist type. But here we are not concerned with the contrast between individualism and collectivism, but between tribalism and personalism.

Let us first get clear the distinction between the individual and the person, a distinction which has been analyzed, worked out, and formulated in a remarkable manner by William van Opstal.² Following his brilliant exposition, I would therefore say that the individual stands for existential distinction from others. In potential reality there are no individuals: individuation is a metaphysical function of existence. In actual reality a substance is necessarily individual: God therefore is an individual, and to such an extent that He is unique. In spiritual beings (like the angels) individual and specific differences coincide; in corporeo-spiritual beings (as man), differences *inter se* are not specific, but due solely to their existential separation through the division of quantity: their individuation is a function of matter. Individuation therefore confers purely somatic differences: it implies a limitation, an imperfection of the individual as compared to its species.

The person, on the other hand, stands for the subsistence of an intellectual being in the existential order. It is what it is and what it chooses to make of itself. Thus God has the most perfect personality because He is perfectly independent and resting in Himself and is the pure act of existence. In created persons, potentiality enters, and the more it does, the less is its subject independent, self-satisfiable, and personal. The angel, being a subsistent form, exhausts all the possibilities of his essence and therefore ranks next to God, to whom, however, he has been in potentiality as re-

² In his great work, *Human Personality*, which I have had the privilege of reading in manuscript and to which I am more indebted than I can say.

gards existence. Man, a creature of matter and form, is the actualization of a single possibility of his form (which is that of a whole species, individuated by matter) and therefore ranks next, and indeed lowest, in the hierarchy of intellectual beings. He depends for his existence not only on God, as the First Cause, but in addition also on the secondary cause of his progenitors. Moreover, being individually distinct from what he is specifically, he depends on others of the species for the development and enrichment, or impoverishment, of his personality. But within these limits, divine and social, man dominates the actualization of his potentialities and is master of his becoming.

Whereas the individual is a mere material reproduction, the person is an intellectual composition. The person's knowingly undertaken and freely willed activity toward self-completion is an inexhaustible source of joyfully experienced vital energy and restful inner peace. But that self-completion obviously requires self-consciousness as a psychological precedent condition. The child's primitive happiness is a *joie de vivre*, which is turned into the happiness of being a person by self-consciousness, and the self-analysis, self-education, and self-approval that go with introspection.

Now introspection is an acquired art and until that art is acquired, man, individually or collectively, remains at the mental age of a child. Not of course as if man could ever be or have been anything but a person. A new-born babe also is a person, but his personality is still undeveloped and latent rather than patent and full-fledged: it is only at the

age of discretion that personality passes from potency to act. Similarly in human history, the social aspect for untold millenia altogether dwarfs the personal aspect of man and renders its manifestation difficult, if not impossible. Man's personality is the result of his peculiar relationship to God, expressed by his endowment with moral freedom: therefore it is only with his realization of this inner freedom and its far-reaching consequences that man can rise superior to his environment, to society and to tradition. With the discovery of his own self emerges man's critical faculty, and it is only then that, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, man leaves the stage of childhood.

We may therefore legitimately speak of "child-races": but their mind is not, as Levy-Bruhl thought, "alogical." It does not differ specifically from the mind of their modern Occidental observers, but it does indeed lack the knowledge which we have gained through introspection and through the habit of self-consciousness. In this stage man has not yet learned to differentiate between himself and his fellow-creatures: he is merely part of a group, and all his achievements bear the quite impersonal marks of that group. This tribal or herd mentality is, of course, not the characteristic of primitives alone, properly so called. All people, of whatever time or space, who have not become fully self-conscious, are subject to it, however high their material civilization. The point of first-rate historical importance is to ascertain when, where, and how man first learned to discover his own inner life and became fully and habitually self-conscious.

In this respect, as we shall see, all indications point to India and to India alone. There the intoxication and self-induced trances characteristic of the agriculturist type of civilization of the Dravidians were elaborated and given a new turn through that contact of Dravidians with Asianics which produced the Indus civilization. The impetus to this momentous new development was furnished by the inquisitive mind of outsiders, the Asianics, who had not grown up in the cultural milieu of the fertility cult of the Dravidians and therefore did not take it for granted, but felt the necessity of explaining it to themselves. Thus the first conscious distinction between man and the society to which he belongs was made in India: and with this the purely tribal or collective mentality of the individual was transcended, and a new and necessarily critical attitude of mind was created. If hitherto the individual had seemed to be merely a "function" of society, the person now claimed a superiority which relegated society to a position of mere means to his own personal ends. Of course, the issue at the start was not as clear-cut as we have just stated it. The two attitudes continued side by side, the personalist one being restricted to a small elite. Indian thought, in fact, has never tried to reconcile the two standpoints, but has always considered them mutually exclusive: if man elects to remain "in the world," he has to subordinate himself to society and be satisfied with the role of a cog in it. But there is an alternative, continues Indian wisdom: flee the world, and you gain the complete freedom of personality.

Unfortunately for India (and for the world), Indians tried to develop their newly discovered interior life by exterior methods. They forced introspection upon the neophyte by making him concentrate attention and will power upon hitherto involuntary muscular action (as of breathing, etc.). Thus preternaturally cultivating the habit of self-consciousness, they sought to enrich the content of their inner life by stimulating the imagination through drugs and sexual debauch. By thus inverting the normal process, which is that of stimulating and developing the moral and spiritual faculties first and the body and sense life through them afterward, Indian yoga came to invert the natural hierarchy of values. Instead of realizing the importance of the body as a normal means of the soul's self-expression, the body became to them at best a mere scaffolding to be discarded as soon as the building of the interior castle was complete: indeed everything bodily and material came to be looked upon as a mere obstruction of the original beauty and ultimate deliverance of the soul and as a mere kaleidoscopic illusion (*mâyâ*) of the senses. As a further consequence, all activity came to be mistaken for mere becoming and, therefore also, pure potentiality for the ultimate reality, an amazing *tour de force* which, for all its perversion, held the field undisputedly, until, as we shall show in due course, Aristotle's mastermind liberated philosophy from this *damnosa hereditas*.

But if this Indian method of calling man to self-consciousness is perverse, what, we may well ask, is the normal way? Though in India the call to self-realization

originally came to man only in middle life, there is, to begin with, no reason to assume that normally the time for it is not rather the transition period from childhood to adolescence. Biologically this is marked by the phenomenon of puberty; psychologically, by that of self-consciousness; morally, by the realization of responsibility for one's own acts. With all this the paradisiac stage of innocence is left behind, and the bewildered adolescent finds himself beset by them on all sides in a world of "problems," the working out of which makes or mars his newly won personality. Perhaps one may hazard the guess that in a state of justice the child of God would have been awakened to self-consciousness directly by the voice of his heavenly Father speaking to him in his inner self, and calling him to a new life of personally known and willed existence. The new experience of God and of his own self would have synchronized and with it would have come the self-conscious love of God and the will to be guided entirely by Him in the further development of his own awakened personality. Into this delicate piece of mental machinery the Fall evidently threw a spanner, causing an interior disorder which came near to wrecking all humanity. Since then the awakening of man's self-consciousness has been largely inhibited, and in any case an experience which, like childbirth, ought to have been gloriously easy and unalloyedly joyful, has been rendered curiously difficult and painful. Fallen man has become ashamed of meeting God in the self-conscious nakedness of his soul and has developed an inhibition, due apparently to a subconscious

shrinking from his state of confusion and sin, coupled with the disordered desire of going on sinning, without giving an account of it to one's own God-illuminated consciousness, feeling that "where ignorance is bliss, 'twere folly to be wise."

The essentially religious nature of coming to conscious selfhood still persists. In a child and a milieu, sanctified by grace, the process may take place unobtrusively, softly: but usually it goes with a psychic shock, often of a sexual nature. But always it is linked with moral, if not purely religious, problems. At the outset in India the latter aspect was in fact the only one considered: in a civilization grounded in magic the importance of God, however, was soon overlaid by the importance of the technique employed. And there the originally religious attitude thus became one of definite atheism; in that atmosphere ethical problems obviously had no place. Hence we see that the Indian experiment with human consciousness and personality has in every respect only led to self-stultification.

An entirely different answer to the problem of human personality was given in a milieu which was blissfully ignorant of the fact that there was a problem at all, and which one should say rather accepted the solution than produced it: we mean Israel. In Israel human personality did not gropingly reach out to an other-worldly realm for its emancipation, as was the case in Indian thought, but rather was seized by a hand thrust out from the world beyond and taught to substitute guidance by that hand

for guidance by society, while remaining a member of the latter.

In Israel, God trained man to discern sin and battle with it: the obvious task after the Fall. There man was not only being called upon to realize his own self, but also its fundamental sinfulness. In Israel, God created also a specific social environment, in which man could grow up to personal God-consciousness and self-consciousness, without being estopped by the inhibitions and spurious short cuts of an alien tribal mentality and tradition. Hence the calling of Thare out of Ur and of Abraham out of Haran; hence the rigid segregation of Isaac and Jacob; hence the calling out of Egypt of the latter's children and their rigid segregation, first in the desert, later in Canaan. But when eventually there flowered forth in this specially prepared seed-plot of Israel the Virgin's divine Son, God's chosen people had so much fallen short of their destined goal as to have become themselves a prey to externalized traditionalism. Hence Christ's recall of His people from the letter that killeth to the spirit that vivifies; from an external observance of the law to the internal intention of faith, hope, and charity, which alone give acts a lasting value; from purely exterior conformity with human social standards to those of a kingdom of heaven that cannot be entered unless one is born anew.

The following pages are intended to enlarge upon this general theme and to provide the reader with the necessary historical particulars. Before engaging upon this task, however, there is another point, preliminary to and inherent

in the line of historical explanation, which we are taking: we mean the difficulty felt by modern man, who is loath to admit the possibility of such a supernatural intervention in the course of history, as that of a divine pedagogue of Israel. This difficulty is a very real one and is even legitimate, inasmuch as it represents a reaction against the tendency, predominant in the "age of faith," of eliminating secondary causes and substituting everywhere a *deus ex machina*. But two blacks do not make one white, and the medieval rush to the extreme of eliminating the human element does not justify our modern rush to the other extreme of eliminating God. For the historian the only correct attitude surely is, not to prejudge such a matter on a priori grounds, but to weigh the evidence. This, the only scientific attitude, does not start with a theory and then try to fit the facts to it, but on the contrary takes the facts as they are and then tries to discover what explanation best fits them.

Now in the case of Israel the evidence for an intervention on the part of God seems truly overwhelming. The whole history of the "peculiar" people is so peculiar indeed that it must remain quite inexplicable if we rule out the supernatural element in it,³ which consists not of the occurrence of a single, miraculous, event, but rather of a sustained millennial contact between God and a people which He created and directed for a peculiar purpose of His own, to wit, the incarnation of the Christ. Either we

³ One is reminded of the anecdote, according to which Frederick II of Prussia once asked one of his Court chaplains to prove to him in two words the existence of God; whereupon he got the reply: "The Jews."

accept the biblical evidence, in which case the history of Israel makes sense, and indeed very good sense; or else we reject it, in which case that history remains from start to finish a riddle, which forces us to abandon all hope of ever understanding it. If as historians we look without *partis pris* at the evidence, we can only say that all the evidence available tallies perfectly with the account supernaturally revealed. Why then should we rule it out?

On our part we shall certainly not reject this only reasonable and adequate explanation merely because it runs counter to some preconceived, deistic or atheistic, notions. We shall not stultify ourselves by refusing light on a historical problem merely because that light is shed by theology. On the other hand, we can and must insist that historical events fall within the purview of the historian, whose task, however humble and subsidiary to that of the theologian, is distinct from it and has an importance of its own. Readily admitting a divine intervention, where the evidence seems to demand it, we cannot forget that such intervention does not take place *in vacuo*, but in history, and that the divine efficient cause acts upon the matter of existing human civilizations, though again for a divine purpose, i.e., the Incarnation.


In Israel both the intervention and its purpose were supernatural; but the consequences worked themselves out in the natural sphere and caused there, not only supernatural but natural reactions. One of these concerns human personality, which in itself is a natural endowment of man, but which in the event was supernaturally saved

by the Incarnation. As already mentioned by us, however, this divine rescue was preceded in India by a purely human attempt, to win and save man's personality by his own unaided efforts. This attempt led to the emergence of a new, and until then quite unknown, branch of human knowledge: philosophy. That such first attempt should have been rather crude and inchoate, is natural. Nor should it surprise anyone, aware of the disorder caused in human nature by original sin, that it missed the truth and indeed grievously perverted it, since to counteract all of which was exactly the purpose of the Incarnation.

The historical facts, then, as we read them, are that, whereas India experimented with God, God experimented with Israel, and that both experiments are fundamental to the subsequent development of human thought. The task of history is to describe both these currents in their proper setting and then to trace their working out in the milieu of Hellas and Rome, which they so powerfully impinged upon as to raise them in turn to become new and unique centers of human development: philosophical, moral, political, aesthetic.

PART I

INDIA (750-184 B.C.)



CHAPTER II

The Political Background

ABOUT the year 750 B.C. the Indo-Aryans had settled in the Panjâb and Doâb, and had abandoned their original religion and ideology, those of Vedism, for which they gradually had substituted those of Brahmanism. Of the rest of India, outside this little Aryanized corner in the northwest, we know nothing after the destruction of the Indus civilization 2,000 years earlier. Even when we reach the seventh century B.C., we get no information about the great mass of India outside the Ganges valley, although obviously “the solid South” must have carried on its Dravidian civilization in the meantime, not merely unruffled by, but even quite ignorant of, the barbarian invasions in the north of the continent. But no report of their history has come down to us except through sources, nearly or remotely, connected with the Aryan invaders. But the spectacular discovery of the Indus valley civilization should be a ceaseless reminder to us, not to treat the unknown as if it were the non-existent, but rather to hope that archaeology will yet one day clearly reveal to us what so far we can only attain by vague inferences.

The first time that Indian chronology touches firm ground is with the Persian annexation of the Indus valley by Darius I (521–486): for what went on before this time,

even in the Ganges valley, we depend entirely on allusions in the tradition and literature of Indo-Aryan provenance. In the seventh century we thus hear of two prominent kingdoms: Kosala, the capital of which, Kosalâ, is the later Ayodhyâ; and Videha (the modern Tirhut), with its capital Mithilâ, both already outside the Doâb and situate between Himâlaya and Ganges, and both of Dravidian culture and Aryan domination. Farther east the country seems to have been still innocent of Aryan predominance: in its stead we hear of sixteen Mahâjēna padas,¹ which seem to have been little peasant republics, strongly reminiscent in their organization of the autonomy, or at most loose confederation, of Sumerian cities. These small states still preserved to the full the original Dravidian civilization of India, but were rapidly learning, willy nilly, the noble art of self-defense against their warrior neighbors. The rest of India was still undisturbedly Dravidian: Anga-Vangas in the Ganges delta; Avantis (capital, the modern Ujjain) in the valleys of the southern tributaries of the Jamna; Kalingas in that of the Mahânadî; Andhras astride the river system of the Godâverî right into the western Ghâts, the coastal strip of which was occupied by the Saurastras (Surastra-Surat, i.e., "the fair country"); farthest south, the Čolas, Pândyas, and Keralas, occupying the triangular tip of the continent, bounded by the Malabar coast in the west, the Coromandel² coast in the east, and the Kistna³ river system in the north.

¹ Literally "home of many people."

² Really the *Čola mandala*, the Čola District.

³ I.e., Křřṇa.

With the sixth century the Nordic tendency of aggressiveness and domineering becomes discernible in Dravidic India. One of the Mahâjena padas comes to the fore: Magâdha, lying to the south of the Ganges, begins to exert a suzerain power over the little states bordering it. Warlords arise and make themselves absolute rulers after the manner only too familiar to us from a study of the power kingdoms succeeding the archaic civilization elsewhere. In Magadha a Çaiśunâga⁴ dynasty establishes itself ca. 600 B.C., lasting until 420: and with it a conventional "history" of at least this part of India begins. Evidently it can hardly be fortuitous that at this very time a fresh contact was made between India and western invaders. Arrian tells us that Assyrian suzerainty extended into what today we call Afghanistan.⁵ His is the only authority for this statement, which may well be incorrect as it stands and yet correctly refer to some fresh push toward India by aggressors coming from the west. At all events it is agreed that it was during the seventh century that a modified Aramean script, the so-called Brâhmî, was introduced into northwestern India, whence it spread throughout the country, becoming known there as Devanâgarî: with the general use of which the period of written records may be said to begin in India. That the culture contact of this period is quite distinct from and anterior to that of the

⁴ "Offspring" (çeśas) "of snakes" (nâga)? Cf. name of snake, Çeśa, supporting Viśnu in Hindu mythology. The totemist origin is evident in any case.

⁵ His *Indikê* begins: "All the territory that lies west of the river Indus up to the river Kabul is inhabited by Indian tribes who, long ago, were subject to the Assyrians; then to the Medes, and so they became subject to the Persians and paid tribute to Cyrus."

Persian period, is evidenced by the fact that another script, Kharoshtî, was subsequently introduced by the Aramean clerks employed by the Achaemenids, a script, however, which could make no popular headway against the already firmly established Brâhmî.

The Persian period in India begins with the establishment of a world empire by Cyrus II (558-529), who incorporated into it during his eastern campaigns, which lasted from 545 to 539, the whole territory comprised in modern Turkestan and Afghanistan (i.e., the provinces of Bactria, Margiana, Sogdiana, Seistan, and Gedrosia) as well as that lying between the Kabul and Indus rivers, i.e., Gândhâra. Darius I (521-486) added in 518 to these conquests that of the whole Indus valley, his general Skylax sailing down the Indus from Gândhâra to its mouth in 517; and we are told that the Indus provinces were so rich that they paid as much as one third of all the tribute obtained from the rest of the Asiatic provinces.⁶ That, moreover, Persian rule in her Indian dominions was anything but nominal is evidenced by the fact that Indian contingents under Persian commanders regularly took part in the campaigns of the Persian sovereign, from that of Xerxes I (486-465) against Greece to that of Darius III (335-330) against Alexander the Great.

Now is it fortuitous that into this Persian period there falls the beginning of Buddhism and Jainism, and is it pure chance that Çâkyamuni (563-483) and Vardhamân

⁶ Cf. "the satraps under King Darius in 127 provinces, from India to Ethiopia" mentioned by I Esdras 3:1 b.: a formula repeated by Esther 1:1, and applied to Assuerus (i.e., Xerxes I).

(540-468) were contemporaries of Darius and Xerxes? Being somewhat incredulous regarding "the long arm of coincidence" in history, we shall look elsewhere for an explanation. Let us in the meantime stress the fact that the three Çaiṣunâga kings, who are most famous in history and about whom we know most, are those prominently connected with the two great religious teachers, who founded respectively Buddhism and (modern) Jainism. These were Bimbisâra, Ajâtaçatru, and Udayin, who acceded to the throne of Magadha in 530, 515, and 500 respectively, as fifth, sixth, and seventh member of their dynasty. Bimbisâra's capital was still Râjagṛha, and it was only Udayin who founded Pâṭaliputra (the modern Patna), situate at the ancient confluence of Soné and Ganges, the city which was to become so famous as a cultural center throughout the East.⁷ Bimbisâra added Vanga and part of Kâçî (Benares) to his dominions, Ajâtaçatru Kosala and Videha; while Udayin attempted a westward expansion toward Avanti, which cost him his life. Magadha by this time had become a large and powerful realm. Obviously a country of old Dravidian culture,⁸ there was now added to it all such splendor as successful military exploits can produce. The military art flourished: Ajâtaçatru, for instance, used in his wars catapults and chariots, on whose axle-hubs were fixed revolving scythelike blades; and the Indian war-elephant added a new feature to all

⁷ It was known to the Greeks as Palibothra.

⁸ The Yajur Veda mentions it already and calls it a land of minstrelsy. It also connects human sacrifices with it, both facts pointing to a high, un-Aryan, civilization, which however by long isolation may have begun to degenerate.

subsequent wars of antiquity. From the literature of the time a fair picture can be gained of the high material civilization, and indeed luxury, prevailing in these Indian kingdoms, and of the elaboration of their social organization into king and aristocracy; priests and ascetics (belonging to acrimoniously differing schools); merchants (*setthi*) and craftsmen in their distinct guilds; and a peasantry, upon whose patient industry the whole edifice of dazzling grandeur ultimately rested.

Did these rulers of Magadha model themselves, with much greater natural resources than their prototypes, after the "Great Kings" of Persepolis? One certainly gets in Pâtaliputra the impression of a civilization of the Mohenjo Daro type informed by an altogether new spirit, not at all unlike that of the Persian world empire. The process begun by the Çaiśunâgas was certainly made quite manifest and reached its fruition under the Maurya dynasty: but between the two there falls the reign of the Nandas, whose very reaction seems only to bear out the reality of the new, foreign spirit of their predecessors. The Nandas (420-320) were evidently a native dynasty of çûdras,⁹ who established themselves in open revolt against the previously ruling caste of xatryas, whom—so the Purânas narrate—they ruthlessly exterminated. What seems equally significant is that the century of Nanda rule synchronizes with the increasing weakness of the Persian central government, owing to the endemic rebellions of

⁹ Later reports sneeringly call the founder the son of a barber and of a dancing girl.

their peripheral satraps. Materials on which to base our knowledge of this period of Indian history are scarce: as they naturally would be if the successors of the Nandas were the very people against whose influence their reign had been a protest.

And these successors were the illustrious Mauryas (320–184), under whose dynasty India was destined to reach the peak of its greatness. The turning point came with Alexander's Indian campaign (327–325), which re-established the successor of the Achaemenids in the possession of their Indus provinces and reasserted Western domination. But with the death of Alexander the Great in 323 and the dividing of the spoils, his world empire, among his own successors, there came a chance which a brilliant Indian prince, Čandragupta, was not slow to take advantage of. Who he really was, we do not know: the suggestion that the Mauryans were hailing from Merv ¹⁰ evidently cannot be maintained, but that Čandragupta was simply Magadha general of the last Nanda, against whom he was made to revolt by a Brahmán counsellor of his "crooked" ¹¹ Čânakya, does evidently not fit all the facts either. Čânakya is said to have hailed from Gândhâra: Čandragupta, whoever he was, apparently was in the Panjâb when Alexander died, and made himself master of it within two years of that event. He obviously was well versed in Persian military methods and thus able quickly to extend his conquests from the Panjâb not only to Sindh,

¹⁰ D. B. Spooner's theory: cf. J. R. As. Soc. f. 1915.

¹¹ Kauṭilya, his eponym, means literally "deceitfulness" and by extension "diplomacy."

but to the Ganges and over the whole Magadhan kingdom, the diplomacy of his adviser Čânakya no doubt helping him a good deal in this enterprise. But that his interest remained fixed on the northwest frontier is evident from his wars there which gained him all the eastern provinces of the now defunct Persian world-empire. The fact is that the Seleucid successors of Alexander the Great treated Čandragupta as one of their own: Seleucus I Nicator (321-281) ¹² made a pact of amity with him, which confirmed him in the possession of the whole of modern Afghanistan, thus making Čandragupta ruler of the greatest empire of the time, one reaching from Herat to the Ganges delta and from the Himalayas to the high plateau of the Deccan.

Čandragupta seems to us clearly to have been an Indian, but one thoroughly Persianized; perhaps he was a Magadhan by descent, but one born in the Panjâb. At all events there can no longer be any doubt ¹³ about the Persian influences prevailing in Čandragupta's Pâtaliputra. His palaces were, both in design and execution, Persian: in fact the art of building in dressed stone came to India through the Persian masons, employed by the Mauryas. Before the Persian influence made itself felt, Indian architecture, like that of China, employed wood only. The very "palaces supported by a thousand columns," sung by the Mahâbhârata, breathe the spirit of Persian architecture.

¹² An ambassador of his, Megasthenês, resided for some time at the court of "Sarnrakottos" at Palibothra.

¹³ For D. B. Spooner's excavations, cf. his "Zoroastrian Period of Indian History" in J. R. As. Soc. f. 1915.

Grünwedel ¹⁴ maintains that all ancient Indian monuments show an undoubted Persian style, and Spooner ¹⁵ that all the sculpture of early Buddhism is Zoroastrian sculpture, with Buddha substituted for Zoroaster. Certain it is that the person of Buddha himself was never represented in these early sculptures: an artistic convention which changed only with the subsequent arrival in Gândhâra of Greek sculptors, who of course suffered from no traditional inhibition against the making of idols. Again, Indian weights and measures have been proved to be based on those of Persia and to correspond to those imposed by the Persian Empire on Egypt. Indian coins similarly derive from contact with Persia: the introduction into India of a gold and silver coinage also falling into this period, the oldest "punch-marked" coins showing a striking resemblance to the *sigloi* of Lycia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, and Cyprus. Čandragupta most obviously followed Persian customs, not only in his public works, but in his court ceremonial ¹⁶ and even in his penal institutions. His empire was the first on record in India to have enjoyed a centralized and scientifically administered government, clearly modeled on that of the Persian Empire. Indeed we know that one of Čandragupta's satraps in the western marches was a Persian, one Tušaspa. We must certainly never forget that his empire stretched almost as far to the west of the Indus valley as it did to the east of it.

¹⁴ *Buddhistische Kunst in Indien*. 1893.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*

¹⁶ E.g., the royal robe of the Mauryas was that of the Achaemenids and quite un-Indian.

Due proportion between the two halves of this empire became upset only as Greek kingdoms became established. In Central Asia this occurred about the year 206, and in Western India proper in 180. This rule, which spelt the downfall of the Mauryas, was preluded by the division of the Mauryan empire on the death of Čandragupta's famous grandson, Açoka, into three parts, which in their separation were no longer able to withstand the pressure of Western aggressors. Čandragupta, according to tradition, abdicated at the age of fifty, feeling that he had done his part as a "householder" in this world of vanities and had now better concentrate on the world of reality, into which he is said to have entered after the Jain fashion by starving himself to death in a forest solitude of the Deccan.

His son Bindusâra (297-271) continued the general policy of his illustrious father and kept up friendly relations with the Hellenist world in the persons of both Antiochus Soter (281-261) and Ptolemy Philadelphus (283-246). But his wars with the southern Deccan and his ultimate conquest of it puts a rather different complexion on the circumstances attending his father's death there from the one of the Jain tradition just mentioned.

Bindusâra's son and successor Açoka (271-232) has become world-famous, if only through the eulogies which Buddhist writers have bestowed on him in gratitude for his great benevolence toward their faith. It is generally believed that Açoka himself became a Buddhist: he certainly was liberal in his benefactions, but does not seem to have restricted them to Buddhist institutions. The names by

which he is usually known—Priyadarçin (the gracious one) and Devânâmpriya (dear to the gods)—seem to have well described his character, and perhaps he was really as açoka (“free from sorrow”) as his other name would indicate and as is humanly possible. He enjoined strict morality, public as well as private, on all people dwelling in his vast empire, which, apart from a war waged against the Kalingas at the outset of his reign, enjoyed under him a remarkable period of peace and prosperity. His evident endeavor was to turn it into a model state. Açoka certainly stands out as the one great ruler of antiquity who placed spiritual above material values and who ruled as he preached. These preachments of his have come down to us in thirty-five “edicts” by him, engraved on rocks or stone pillars and containing copious quotations from the sayings of Buddha. These edicts¹⁷ are of the greatest historical value, since the Buddhist quotations constitute the oldest Buddhist texts available: no less interesting to us in the present connection is the fact that they are closely modeled on the analogous edicts which Darius the Great caused to be incised on such rocks as the famous one at Behistun, and that the lion-capitals of Açokan columns are exact copies of those found in Persepolis.

With Açoka, India reached the real greatness of a spiritual as well as a material order, such as it probably has never enjoyed since. As already mentioned, the unity of the empire was broken up at Açoka’s death, when of his

¹⁷ The name used for them by Açoka himself is “dhamma dipi” or “dhamma-lipi”: *dharma* of course is Sanscrit, but *lipi* or *dipi* is Old Persian.

three sons Jaloka became ruler of Kaçmîr, and Vîrasena of Gândhâra, the remainder going to Kunâla. Two grandsons of Açoka are known to us, Daçaratha ruling in the Panjâb, and Samprati ¹⁸ in Magadha: the latter is claimed as one of their own by the Jains as fervently as Açoka is by the Buddhists. With them the Maurya dynasty was nearing its end. The illustrious line stops in 184, when the last Maurya, Bṛhadratha, was killed and Magadha was annexed by a king of Avanti, one Puşyamitra, whose zeal for Brahmanism made him a violent persecutor of Buddhists.

¹⁸ The word means literally "exactly opposite."

CHAPTER III

The Origin of Philosophy

WITH this we may bring our survey of the political history of India between the eighth and second centuries B.C. to a close. Short and meager as this account has been, we cannot but have been struck by the fact that the whole of these external events seems to constitute merely a background for the spiritual struggles and achievements, which completely dominate and preoccupy the minds of the period. The violent currents and cross-currents of Indian spirituality that were to produce not only philosophy as such, but also some of the most remarkable religious developments in human history, will therefore form the main theme of the succeeding pages.

1. YOGA

To trace these developments, we shall have to go back to the spiritual experiences of the people of the Indus civilization which we adumbrated on a previous occasion: ¹ experiences, common to and arising out of the magic rites of the fertility cult, wherein the *shaman* originally impersonates the lover of the Great Mother (in India styled Mahâdevî). These artificially induced trances of a magician, however, developed in India already in the third

¹ See the author's *Protohistory*, pp. 153 ff.

millennium into experiments with a psychological method of escaping from the sterility and boredom of a sacral collectivism and its endless treadmill of existence. That the source of both types of spiritual experiences should be erotic, cannot surprise us when we realize that all *ek-stasis* after all is an endeavor of getting outside of oneself, "a breaking down of the barriers and limitations of individual selfhood and a sharing in the lives of others."² This highest spiritual endeavor of man naturally produces also a bodily reflex in him, a duality of effects in which the sensuous was originally and naturally intended to subserve and second the spiritual, whereas after the Fall the tendency has rather become that of a rebellious body, trying to impose its instincts on man's will and intellect. Again, on the spiritual plane these tensions offer a dual opportunity for either the merely preternatural or the genuinely supernatural, by way of mere magic or of true asceticism.³

The magician necessarily remains in the world and

² Dom Aelred Graham, *The Love of God* (London, 1939), p. 36. Because God is love, there is in God Himself an *ekstasis*, a procession of persons; because God is love, He created; because He is love, He became incarnate. Therefore in us also, His creatures, love is paramount. Therefore we also yearn for an *ekstasis*; therefore we also have "the natural impulse for union with something other than self, and ultimately with a Being who can satiate every desire" (p. 20). Small wonder then that in the religions derived from the cult of the Mother Goddess eroticism should play such a large part. But the modern tendency is, not thus to explain eroticism by divinity, but rather divinity by eroticism, i.e., the Greater by the lesser, and "man's natural worship of truth, goodness and beauty, man's longing for the vision of God rooted in his heart, as a manifestation of the *pan-sexualism* which allegedly motivates all his actions" (p. 20).

³ In Sanscrit two terms are used to denote ascetic endeavors: *tapas* and *yoga*, of which the former originally means getting sexually "on heat," while the latter means "harnessing," scil., all man's hidden faculties to some spiritual task.

forms part of a society, which demands his services; the ascetic flees the world in an antisocial revolt against its soul-destroying routine and in a noble, if egotistic and para-social endeavor of transcending his selfhood in the contemplation of an unchanging and unchangeable Reality which remains ordinarily hidden beneath the unending flux of evanescent phenomena. These experiences were in India artificially produced by methods known already two or three thousand years before they became formulated by Patanjali in the second century B.C. as a separate philosophical system, called the *Yoga Darśana*. The latter, however, has only systematized and therefore, fortunately for the historian, preserved an account of practices reaching back to the times of the Indus civilization. Of these practices, two, quite specifically Indian, are those of *āsana* ("sitting posture") and *prāṇāyāma* ("suspension of breath"): both aim at a control of the psychical by physical means; the former by bringing under the conscious control of the will muscles which ordinarily are unconsciously moved, and thus concentrating attention on oneself and shutting out other sense stimuli; the latter by similarly bringing under conscious regulation by the will ⁴ the respirational process which normally functions automatically and un-

⁴ The ultimate aim of *prāṇāyāma* is by way of breath control to bring also the beating of the heart under control of the will. It is claimed that by constant practice breathing can be stopped for hours and even weeks, the action of the heart becoming practically imperceptible, as in hibernating animals. The practice is greatly assisted by a—likewise artificially—elongated tongue, which can be rolled up in the throat to close this passage: cf. the possession of a preternaturally long tongue as one of the corporeal marks of a Buddha in Buddhist tradition, and the spectacular display given still today by "fakirs" who allow themselves to be buried for days and even weeks.

consciously. The Indus seal ⁵ depicts very clearly a yogin in his artificial *âsana* posture, such as may be studied to this very day in India: yoga practices, therefore, have manifestly been resorted to in the Dravidian civilization sphere without interruption from that time to this, both by magician and by ascetic.

The use of drugs ⁶ to produce hallucinations can be traced to Yoga treatises composed a couple of thousand years ago; although it cannot be strictly proved to go back to archaic times yet, by inference the conclusion seems inescapable. Their modern use is of course notorious. Now the hallucinations produced by such drugs are clinically well known and include such subjective sensations as that of making oneself quite small (to vanishing point) or immensely tall (so that one can touch the moon with one's fingertips); light as a feather or heavier than lead; of displacing oneself anywhere or obtaining anything without effort by merely wishing it; and the like. Subjective only as such hallucinations are, their objectivity of course seems quite certain to the victims of such trances, who rationalize them by ascribing their occurrence to "occult" powers acquired by themselves: witness the perfect epidemic of "witchcraft" which raged in Europe for centuries, based on the firm belief in the possession of such powers, of which the witches openly boasted: powers which largely went back to the use of henbane and thorn apple decoctions in the "witches' cauldron."

⁵ Cf. *Protohistory*, p. 155. For illustration see *infra*, p. 128.

⁶ Such as *dhattūra* (*Datura alba*), henbane (*Hyoscyamus niger*) and *bhāṅg* or *hashish* (*Cannabis indica*).



Buddha



Modern Jain ascetic

2. MÂYÂ

The point for our inquiry about all such habitual trances, however induced (whether by auto-suggestion, control of the senses, or the help of drugs), is that they obviously tend to obliterate the distinction between what is real and what imaginary; and thus tend to give rise to the concept of a world of magic, *mâyâ*, which the profane take to be the real world, while the initiated realize the inverse to be true. This I think gives us a clue to the origin of a tenet fundamental to all Indian philosophy, a tenet perfectly true of course, if only implying a distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal world, but false and indeed pathological if all reality is denied to the phenomenal world, as is habitually done in Indian thought. Wedded to it already in archaic times, Indians tried to rationalize the self-consciousness of trances produced originally in connection with fertility magic: and they thus incidentally discovered—with the distinction between subjective *being* and objective *becoming*—philosophy itself. The progress from magician to philosopher, we further suggest, is observable only in India, because there the purely material high civilization of the Indus Asianics was sufficiently alien to produce in the Dravidian civilization, upon which it was grafted, the feeling of monotony and *taedium vitae* indispensable for evoking so profound a reaction to it, as to result in the Indian pessimistic philosophies of succeeding ages. This reaction was quite impossible, for instance, in Egypt and in Sumer, whose

people had little by little grown up into a civilization which they had themselves produced and had thus gradually got habituated to. The presence in India of a felt shock of novelty, strong enough to act as a psychological stimulus, was further seconded there by venatorial reactions against the matriarchal civilization of the Dravidians, reactions which had prepared the way for an esoteric opposition of the male against the social preponderance of the female.

This origin and development out of magic explains, and it seems to us explains alone, how it is that all Indian philosophy has ever remained a subjective *gnosis*, a *jñâna*, by which, as L. de la Vallée Poussin has so penetratingly shown, "one must not understand a notion of the logical order, but the intuition one gets during an ecstasy of a reality, superior to man's ordinary and natural faculty of knowing. Besides, myths and magic remain in all the psychology, the physics, and the metaphysics of this *jñâna marga*, even in those of the six classical systems of Indian philosophy. These systems pretend to use a terminology of the utmost rigor: for all that, they give one always the impression of castles in the air, of a city of Gandharvas ("fairies"). The logic of these *darśanas* (systems) is closely reasoned, all its parts fit perfectly together: but this logic is entirely intrinsic and refuses all reference to what is extrinsic to it." ⁷ The matter has never been put better.

⁷ *L'Inde jusqu'à 300 av. J.C.* Paris, 1936.

3. METEMPSYCHOSIS

Beside this first and fundamental tenet of a world of *mâyâ* ("appearance" or "trickery"), which the sage transcends to rid himself of all the suffering connected with existence in that world, a second is common and equally fundamental to all Indian philosophy: and that is belief in metempsychosis. This belief is still taken as axiomatic, so much has it become part and parcel of all Indian thought. Now transmigration of souls seems to originate in totemism, in its belief that there exists an intimate connection, first between man and the animal he hunts, secondly between man and the animal world in general, and finally between man and all creatures. This intimate connection is of course a primitive rationalization of the fact that the whole civilization, and indeed existence, of the hunters' clan depends on the success of their hunting and therefore, in the last instance, on their prey rather than on themselves. This mental subordination of themselves to the animal is mythologically expressed by their traditions of bodily descent from it, as from the clan's ancestor. It also underlies the European's belief in werewolves and the Malay's in were-tigers, and thus provides the mentality for which the body is a mere vesture which can be slipped on and off at will. It is apparent how such ideas, common to all venatorial civilizations, would be powerfully stimulated and modified by the magic trances of the yogin. Moreover, these ideas would provide the matrix out of which, fertilized by the thought of an un-

ending cycle of life and death, there would be born belief in the transmigration of all souls. The idea of punishment (and reward), we suggest, would be first imparted by the curses of the magician, transforming an enemy into some noisome animal—if not at once, at least after death, in another life.

That this picture of the results of venatorial-agricultural culture contact in India is not fanciful, is evidenced again by the facts of the Indus civilization, and particularly by the seals, which represent nude male figures sitting in the typical yoga posture.⁸ For in all these representations the yogin is shown as connected with and master of the animal world: in one he wears the unmistakably totemistic emblem of horns as a head dress, and is served by two deer, an elephant, tiger, rhinoceros, and buffalo; in two others, by snakes.

4. EGOCENTRICITY

The complete nudity of the yogin in these seals is also highly significant, seeing that it is a feature not peculiar to the Indus civilization but one remarked upon 2,500 years later by Greek observers as still typical of the India of their own day. It was indeed evidenced by Indian sculpture⁹ of the time, as well as by the unbroken tradition of Jainism, for the Digambara¹⁰ sect, in which complete nudity

⁸ Cf. Plates 12, 17; 116, 29; and 118, 11 of Sir John Marshall's *Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Civilization* (London, 1931).

⁹ See, e.g., the Jina in the Mathura sculpture (dated first century), reproduced on plate facing p. 255 of C. J. Shah's *Jainism in North India* (London, 1932).

¹⁰ From *ambara* ("garment") and *diç* ("space"). The Greek for these "naked philosophers of India" (as Liddell-Scott translate the term) is *gymnosophistai*.

is still a major requirement of the perfect ascetic. This nudity of course, so far from being sensuous or lascivious, stands for, and indeed conveys forcibly the idea of, complete detachment from and renunciation of everything mundane in the para-social existence of the Indian ascetic.¹¹

One more point to emphasize is, that the yogin depicted on the Indus seals is a male: and that in all Indian tradition yoga has remained to this day the exclusive prerogative of men. This, of course, tallies perfectly with our derivation of it from a hunter-peasant culture contact, the hunters of which were jungle folk on a lower rung of material civilization, who would and indeed could not question the matriarchal order of the materially higher peasant society. But what they did was to inject into that society the inferiority complex of the male, who by reaction pretends to a secret lore transcending the humdrum existence of a workaday world ruled over by woman. This feature, common to every venatorial civilization, expressed itself *inter alia* under Indian conditions in the yoga practices, which consist of a concentration upon one's ego, which obviously tends to make its devotees self-centered and spiritually proud: thus turning the original complex of inferiority into one of superiority.

With this comes quite naturally the feeling of the yogin's complete self-sufficiency and self-importance, based

¹¹ H. Zimmer (on p. 81 of his *Indische Sphären*, Zurich, 1935) analyzes very well this nudity as not intended "to exhibit the ravishing beauty and strength of the human form, but to express the bareness of the relationless, the transparency of the completely purified, the intangibility of the utterly tieless."

on an exaggeration of his own powers, which is often pathological. Hence the definite trend to atheism, inherent already in an animism, which, "derived from the matrilineal agrarian culture, made possible the idea of pure spirit, divorced from matter; but also of pure matter, divorced from spirit."¹² Therefore also there is to be found at the very start of all Indian philosophizing an atheistic and materialistic bias, as freely acknowledged by Orientalists as left unexplained by them. This primitive atheism and materialism have on the one hand been turned into an atheistic religion, Jainism, and on the other into a materialistic philosophy, Sâmkhya, both systems preserving faithfully a spiritual outlook, which seems to go back to the age of Mohenjo Daro, the vast city in the ruins of which so far not a single temple for public worship has been found. Both Jainism and Sâmkhya contrast matter and spirit; both postulate a monadism of individual souls, which leaves no room for God; and both teach a way of self-deliverance of spirit out of the meshes of matter into which it has got entangled, both assuming fundamentally that all existence is dolorous, since these entanglements produce only everlasting cycles of evolution and involution, lacking as much a purpose as a beginning.

Such was the ideological milieu in which the Dravidian civilization of India must have been functioning, from the time it received the impetus at the hands of Asianic immigrants in the Indus valley, to that of its own absorption or displacement by the brahmanical ideology of the

¹² W. Schmidt: *Ursprung und Werden der Religion* (Münster, 1930), p. 83.

Aryan invaders in the Gangetic plains. This Dravidian ideology, as sketched, was at first esoteric in its nature and was, even when the leading ideas had become generally accepted axioms, their logical and practical working out remained a prerogative of a spiritual elite which so “exerted itself” (Sanscr., *çram*) that its members were called *çramaṇas*, a term which in Sanscrit describes all non-Brahmán ascetics. Kings and nobility also shared in this “esoteric” knowledge, without being *çramaṇas* (as is evidenced by the Upaniṣadic literature, some of which we shall quote presently). These males of the upper classes appear to have stood in the relationship of “associates” or “tertiaries” to the whole-time *çramaṇas*, a relationship that was soon to become part of organized Jainism and Buddhism. In contrast to both *çramaṇas* and their princely patrons, stood the vulgar crowd who were being catered for by the sacrificial priests and fertility magicians. It was these latter whom the Aryan invaders had first come to know and to such good purpose that their own original religion, Vedism, had become completely transmogrified into the altogether different religion of Brahmanism, the only remaining feature common to both being the predominance of the Brahmáns. Obviously it could be but a question of time for Brahmanism also having to meet the challenge of the esoteric doctrines of native good society, after having so completely come to terms with the exoteric practices and beliefs of the broad masses of Dravidian India.

CHAPTER IV

The Evolution of Philosophy in Brahmanism

LITTLE knowledge of Vedas and Brâhmaṇas is needed to realize their incongruity and utter incompatibility with what has become the fundamental dogma of Hinduism: belief in a *samsâra*,¹ a perpetual cycle of rebirths, which is essentially sorrowful, so that the principal preoccupation of every wise man must be how to find a way of escape out of it. The Vedas are full of the joy of life and considered a long life of “a hundred autumns” the greatest boon and, when death comes, as it must, they look hopefully for a continuation in *pitṛloka*, in the world of the ancestors, of the sort of life led by the warrior here on earth. How did that optimistic, joyous, faith turn, as it has done, into the pessimistic, negative, philosophy that permeates the whole of Hindu thought since the time of the first Âraṇyakas and Upaniṣads,² say about 750 B.C.?

1. THE LITERATURE

Let us see first of all what this literature consists of. The word Âraṇyaka (from *araṇya*-“forest”) means “forest

¹ From *sam* = “with” and *sṛ* = “to flow.” *Panta rhei* would be a good translation of *samsâra*.

² The word *upaniṣad* is derived from *upa* (near) and *niṣad* (sitting down, scil., at the teacher’s feet); it is a synonym for *rahasya* (esoteric doctrine). A handy edition in English of the basic Hindu Scriptures is the collection made by Dr. Nicol Macnicol for *Everyman’s Library* (London, 1928).

treatise": i.e., a treatise composed by a "dweller in the forest," *vânâprastha*, as they are usually called (Strabo's *hylobioi*), originally no doubt just the old people, for whom society had no further use. This, as the other age-classes (*âçramas*) still nominally preserved in Brahmanical tradition, goes obviously back to contact with a hunters' civilization, thus also the *brahmaçarya* stage of unmarried adolescents, preparatory to the *gṛhastha* stage of married householders, to venatorial puberty rites. With growing contact between Aryans and Dravidians there would now, however, come an approximation between the compulsory cast-off of the former and the voluntary recluse of the latter civilization. While the essential feature of the *çramaṇas* was their homelessness, the brahmán *vânâprasthas* habitually went in married couples to take their abode in the forests. There some of the latter now came to adopt the former's meditations and to experiment with their (esoteric) doctrines: and thus the first upaniṣad of theirs would take the form of a "forest treatise." In the event a new kind of *gurūçiṣya* (teacher-disciple) class would develop, issuing in the type of lifelong, brahmán ascetics, the *samnyâsin*, who, quite unknown before 750 B.C., in the age of the sūtras (from 500 B.C. onward) had become so common that the latter legislate for them and begin to add "samnyâsis" as a fourth stage to the three age-classes (*âçramas*) of the original Aryan tradition; *brahmaçarya*, *gṛhastha*, and *vânâprastha*, a syncretism which we must regard logically as no less nonsensical than it is historically revealing.

Coming back now to the “*âraṇyakas*,” four of them are enumerated. All of them are more recent than the Brâhmaṇas, whose theme they continue, and more ancient than the Upaniṣads, to whose esoteric doctrines they form as it were a bridge. The Brâhmaṇas were commentaries on the Vedas, composed for the use of the sacrificial priest. Hence they deal principally with ceremonial (*kalpa*): but to explain it, we also get a good deal of mythology (*purâṇa*), with some epic stories or legends of heroes (*itihâsa*) mixed up with it. Of the latter two kinds of literature there have subsequently been composed numberless independent Purâṇas properly so called; while the *itihâsas* have been collected, expanded, and added to in the vast epic of the Mahâbhârata. As regards ceremonial, its exegesis was carried further in the so-called Sûtras (a word meaning originally a thread, hence metaphorically an aphorism which enables one not to lose the thread of a story). The Sûtras, then, are collections of epigrams, of information in tabloid form, composed mnemotechnically in telegraph style. They are either *Çrauta Sûtras*, dealing with rules for the due performance of sacrifice; or *Gṛhya Sûtras*, dealing with the ceremonies connected with the life of the individual; or *Dharma Sûtras*, laying down rules for the social relations of man.

Now, whereas the Sûtras simply carry on the spirit as well as the matter of the Brâhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads take up that matter right enough, but inform it with the spirit of a completely novel speculation. Of these upaniṣads one may count today more than 200, the last one, the Allah

Upaniṣad, dating from Akbar's time (ca. A.D. 1600). The oldest and most important ones, however, number only fourteen, which Indian tradition has attached to the four Vedic schools which are supposed to have produced in turn Brâhmaṇas, Âraṇyakas, Upaniṣads, and Sûtras. A synopsis of this rather unhistorical arrangement is given on the next page. It shows at all events how solicitous the brahmâns were to establish a connection, even though artificial, of all subsequent literature and ideologies with the Vedas however incongruous in reality that connection was; the mantle of "secret doctrine" serving to cover up the multitude of contradictions. Modern scholarship, on the other hand, distinguishes three periods of time even regarding the fourteen major upaniṣads: six of them are written in an archaic prose, and in them the new doctrine is put forward in the form of dialogues, as if still controversial. They seem to be collections of sayings rather than compositions by single authors. Obviously they are the most ancient. The group next in time contains five upaniṣads, all metrical and teaching the new doctrine as if established and not admitting of any uncertainty. The last group of three upaniṣads is distinguished by the classical prose Sanscrit in which they are written.³ None of those of the first group can be earlier than 750 B.C. nor more recent

³ Chronologically arranged the 14 major upaniṣads are as follows: Group I: 1. Bṛhadâraṇyaka; 2. Āchāndogya ("archaic"); 3. Taittirīya ("partridges"); 4. Aitareya ("other"); 5. Kauṣītaki (a bird); 6. Kena ("by whom"); Group II: 7. Kâhaka (founder of Yajur Veda); 8. Īṣa ("lord"); 9. Çvetâçvatara ("white mules"); 10. Muṇḍaka ("bald pate"); 11. Mahânârâyana ("man's"); Group III: 12. Praçna ("question"); 13. Maitrâyaṇīya ("of Mitra"); 14. Mândūkya ("frogs").

than 500 B.C., since there is no reference to any Buddhistic doctrine. The sūtras are all subsequent in date to 500 B.C.

Veda	Brāhmaṇa	Aranyaka	Upaniṣad	Sūtra
Ṛg	1. Aitareya 2. Kauṣītaki	1. Aitareya 2. Kauṣītaki	1. Aitareya 2. Kauṣītaki	1. Açvalāyana 2a. Çāṅkhāyana
Sāman	3. Tāṇḍya Mahā 4. 5. Jaiminiya		4. Çhandogya 5. Kena	3a. Lātâyāyana 3b. Gobhila 3c. Khādīra 3d. Gautama
Black Yajur	6. Taittiriya 7. 8.	6. Taittiriya	6a. Taittiriya 6b. Mahānārāyana 7. Kāthaka 8a. Maitrāyāniya 8b. Çvetāçvatara	6a. Baudhāyana 6b. Apastamba 6c. Hiranyakeçin 6d. Bhāradvāja 7a. Kāthaka 8a. Mānava
White Yajur	9. Çatapatha	9. Bṛhad	9a. Bṛhadāranyaka 9b. Iça	9a. Kātyāyana 9b. Pāraskara
Atharva	10. Gopatha		10a. Muṇḍaka 10b. Praçna 10c. Māndūkya	10a. Kauçika 10b. Vaitāna

Ç r u t i

S m ṛ t i

2. PAÑČĀGNIVIDYĀ

When we now ask what this novel secret doctrine is which the upaniṣads teach, we are somewhat taken aback on discovering that it all boils down to the commonplaces of Dravidian ideology: *samsāra* and a way out of it. But of course these were not commonplaces to men brought up in the Vedic tradition; they constituted nothing less than a complete spiritual revolution for them, and lesser men than these brahmāns would have gone down before it, their places to be taken by the çramaṇas of a victorious rival weltanschauung. As it was, the keen, if undisciplined, intellect of the brahmāns set to work and expressed the novel and quite alien doctrine in the sacrificial jargon of

their own Brâhmaṇas. The oldest upaniṣads ⁴ indeed have with great faithfulness preserved the manner in which this doctrine was first taught by mere Xatriya princes to famous brahmán teachers who were put to shame before their own sons and pupils for not being able to answer questions which taunting princes had asked them in order to take their overweening pride out of them, using for the purpose the sacrificial phraseology common to both of them.

The chief point which naturally puzzled anyone imbued with purely Vedic concepts, was how a corpse, burnt up on the funeral pyre, could be reborn again. That the dead man should continue a spirit-existence in a spirit world was taken for granted: but how and why should he reappear on earth as a babe out of another mother's womb, or even as an animal or a plant? The "how," to take this point first, was answered by a labored extension of sacrificial magic, first to the dead body's cremation, which became a "fire sacrifice": the body was offered up and by the magic of the divine mediator, Agni, turned into something else, to wit, *çrâddha*,⁵ "an oblation to the Manes" of the departed, a funeral rite and feast. This *çrâddha* itself was then said to be offered up again as a "fire sacrifice" (by way of a mere metaphor, taken to be an analogy)

⁴ The story of Âruṇi begging King Pravâhana to instruct him so that he in turn may satisfy the curiosity of his son Çvetaketu (*alias* Yâjñavalkya), is told both in the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Up. 6.2 and in Ćhandogya Up. 5.10 in almost identical words. The latter passage is followed (Ćchand. Up. 5.11) by the story of six of the most renowned brahmáns going to King Aṅvapati Kaikeya to get instruction in the doctrine of the *âtman*.

⁵ From *çrâ* ("to cook") and *dhâ* ("to place").

and thus to become "moonshine" (*soma*).⁶ Now it is in *soma* ("the moon") that the ancestors were believed to lead after death a soma-like ("nectar-like") existence: but, whereas in the Vedas this life is everlasting, it is now limited, limited by the good works of the individual concerned. (The "why" will presently be explained.) The "moon existence," therefore, is gradually consumed and thus becomes another "fire sacrifice," whereby the moonbeams (*soma*) are turned into a raincloud (*parjanya*); by a third fire sacrifice this rain becomes food (*anna*).⁷ "Then is man born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesame and beans. Thence the escape is beset with most difficulties. For whoever the persons may be that eat the food and beget offspring, he henceforth becomes like unto them. Those whose conduct has been good, will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a brahmán, xatriya, or vaiçya. But those whose conduct has been evil, will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog or pig or Čandâla."⁸ After such plant and animal existence a fourth "fire sacrifice" of the food produces the *semen virile* in man; and a fifth and last "fire sacrifice" of the *semen virile* in a woman "on heat," the human being who thus once more enters upon a stage of human existence. One cycle of the three stages of moon existence, plant-and-animal existence, and human

⁶ *Soma* from *su* ("press out"), means literally "a drop"; either of distilled liquor or in the sky, and therefore the Soma (juice and deity) or the Moon. The reader will forgive the double meaning in our rendering the word by "moonshine."

⁷ Significantly enough the original meaning of *anna* is "rice," the southern, Dravidian, food par excellence.

⁸ Chand. Up. 5.10.6-7. *Čandâla* = member of the lowest stratum of society. For a parallel description, see Bř. Ār. Up. 6.2.

existence has thus come to an end and a new cycle been begun; the "how" of these cycles of rebirth being explained by the magic ⁹ of the *Pañčâgnividyâ*, the five fire sacrifices.¹⁰

"Fantastic" is hardly sufficient to characterize such "explanation"; but we must not forget that to people enmeshed in the subtleties and fancies of sacrificial magic, such labored ingenuity did not seem fantastic at all, but a very profound explanation indeed. What is of the utmost historical importance, is the fact that this quite unvedic and unbrahmanic doctrine here in the oldest upanišads already appears like Pallas Athene fully panoplied out of the brow of Zeus, complete in all its details and as clear-cut as it ever will be in Hinduism, without the hint of any previous evolutionary stage. We therefore can but conclude that the passages of the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniśad quoted (and others like them) do indeed furnish us the actual facts of the matter and that Yâjñavalka may well have been the first brahmán sage to have resolutely adopted the alien ideology of the Dravidians and acclimatized it in the brahmanic milieu.

It is true that Indians speak of "redeath" (*punarmṛtyu*) rather than of "rebirth" (*punarjanman*) and that the former term appears in the Brâhmaṇas. But it is not a germ to which the doctrine of metempsychosis can be traced: *punarmṛtyu* concerns an altogether different matter. In the Brâhmaṇas the departed *pitarāḥ* ("patres") are as-

⁹ *Vidyâ* means both "knowledge" and "magic."

¹⁰ There are of course really six, but the funeral pyre being taboo, it is not counted: besides, six is not a sacred or magically propitious number.

sumed to gain "beyond the sun" a new life: but their vigor lasts only as long as their food lasts; and this food is made available to them by the funerary food offerings of the proper funerary rites. But should a *pitṛ* be so unfortunate as to have no son to offer these rites, his celestial life ceases: for, though the life-principle is indestructible, it fails through inanition,¹¹ and he is then assailed again and again by death. Such *punarmṛtyu* thus merely expresses the ghost or shadowlike existence of a discarnate spirit, such as the Greeks depicted in Hades and the Hebrews in Sheol: there is no hint of the *pitarah* ever returning to this world from the great Beyond. With L. de la Vallée Poussin we therefore must repeat that, however much the phraseology of both brâhmaṇas and upaniṣads is identical,¹² the formal elements animating them are contradictory and mutually exclusive.

3. MOXA

Let us now proceed to the "why" of the *samsâra* and to the answer which the upaniṣads give to this question. "Then Yâṇavalkya said to Ârtabhâga: 'Take my hand, my friend. We two alone shall know of this; let this question of ours not be discussed in public. Then these two went out and argued, and what they said was *karman*, what they praised was *karman*.'" ¹³ Now "karman" means "action"

¹¹ "For death (*mṛtyu*) is hunger," says Bṛ. Up. 1.2.1.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 267: "Les upaniṣads sont comme baignées dans l'idéologie et nomenclature des brâhmaṇas: même jargon, mêmes identifications incohérentes, mêmes entités divines, cosmiques ou psychologiques, confondues, distinguées, apparées en de multiples combinaisons."

¹³ Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 3.2.13.

and the doctrine of *karman* therefore is simply the natural law of cause and effect and the moral law of reward and punishment applied to the idea of transmigration. As we have seen already, the pleasures of the moon stage last only as long as the good actions of the human existence have not exhausted their effects; and the vicissitudes of the plant and animal stage similarly are qualitatively and quantitatively conditioned by the actions wrought in the previous human existence. This question of *karman* is very little elaborated in the upanišads: they speak of men "drinking their reward in the world of their own actions";¹⁴ they say that "action clings to a man."¹⁵ But there is nothing beyond such metaphors, no detailed description or explanation of the mode of transmission of *karman*, such as we shall find in Jainism,¹⁶ for instance. Causality is taken for granted: it is the *raison d'être* of *samsâra* and therefore aroused no special interest. Interest on the contrary was riveted on the way of escaping from it.

The Vedic Aryans had believed that the manes of their ancestors were forever enjoying life in the Beyond in the company of the gods, in Valhalla, as Germanic Aryans would put it. Now however with the coming of the upanišads this *devaloka* is distinguished from the *pitṛloka*, and a *devayâna* from the *pitṛyâna*.¹⁷ This latter "course of the fathers" is now identified with *samsâra*: the escape from it now becomes "the course of the gods." The bifur-

¹⁴ Kâtha Up. 1.3.2.

¹⁵ Īça Upan. 2.

¹⁶ Which teaches that *karman* is a subtle matter staining the soul.

¹⁷ *Loka* = "world"; *yâna* = "course."

cation of the two roads is now said to begin on the very pyre where the body is cremated: those who are delivered from the everlasting cycle of rebirths go to the flame of the pyre, the others to its smoke; those from the flame to day, summer, *devaloka*, sun; these from the smoke to night, winter, *pitṛloka*, moon. The further course of the latter from moon to food, etc., we have already described; for those engaged on the *devayâna* the course is now said to lead from sun "to the place of lightning." There they meet "a man produced by mind who leads them into the *Brahmaloka*, where they dwell in the highest distances: for such there is no return." ¹⁸ Thus there begins now also to be made the distinction between the Absolute, Brâhman, and the gods, Devah (of which more anon): "the highest distances" is an expression recalling the region high above the universe, where the *kevalin* of Jain tradition is said to dwell.

The point now is, how to gain the *devayâna* leading to *brahmaloka*? The reply is simplicity itself: "He who possesses the *pañcâgnividyâ* is not defiled by sin, even though he associates with the very worst of sinners. He who knows this, is pure, clean, and obtains the world of the blessed; yea, he obtains the world of the blessed." ¹⁹ *Vidyâ* thus is the key, and *vidyâ* is the magic of knowledge, and not knowledge in general: *jñâna* similarly is not so much "wisdom," as "gnosis." ²⁰ "To know" a thing is tantamount to

¹⁸ Bṛh. Up. 6.2.15.

¹⁹ Chand. Up. 5.10.10.

²⁰ *Jñânin*, for instance, in Sanscrit denotes "a wise man," but also "a fortune-teller."

mastering it. "To know" thus means to pierce through some disguise, as of a man posing as an official: if I can call the impostor's bluff by my superior knowledge, he loses all power to overawe me. Once I realize that this startling thing is not a snake, but only a coiled rope, it loses its power over me. Thus also, it is argued, if I "know" the magic of these *pañcāgnayah*, their power of forcing me to tread the round of the *pitṛyāna* is gone. Thus it is no longer the magic of sacrifice (*yajña*) that matters supremely, but the magic of gnosis (*jñāna*); the highest task of a brahmān is no longer perfect training in, and performance of, magic rites for others, but training of his mind for himself, i.e., for deliverance from *samsāra*.

His mind; and with this arises naturally the question: Is this mind which attains *jñāna* the *suppositum* (to use a scholastic term) which persists throughout all the vicissitudes of both *pitṛyāna* and *devayāna*? And what is this "mind"?

In the Indo-Iranian concept, man's *suppositum* or "ego" is called *manaska*, the little *manas*,²¹ which dwells dwarf-like in the heart or in the pupil of the eye, whence death fetches it. With the upanišads, this term is relegated to a subordinate position: for there now comes into use, as expressing the soul's experience of itself in contemplation and ecstasy, the reflective pronoun *ātman*,²² "self";²³ and

²¹ I.e., "mind"; cf. Lat. *mens*.

²² Really *ā-ta-man*: viz., *ā* (= *aham*), "I"; *ta*, "this"; i.e., "this ego which reflects."

²³ In the pre-upanišadic, Dravidian, ideology preserved in the *sāmkhya* system of philosophy, the human *persona* was called *puruṣa*: the supersession of this term by *ātman* is thus referred to in Bṛ. Up. 1.4.1.: "In the beginning

manas becomes merely the instrument, the brain-power, whereby the self, *âtman*, thinks. What is this *âtman*? asks Çvetaketu of his father.²⁴ In reply the latter takes a fruit of the banyan tree; breaking it open, one sees the seeds, almost infinitesimal; breaking open one of these seeds, one does not see anything more. "That subtlety (*anima*) which one can no longer perceive, of that subtlety this great banyan tree exists. That subtlety is its selfhood, its true reality. As when salt is dissolved in water, it can no longer be perceived, but still it is present: thus also one does not perceive in one's body *SAT*²⁵ (true reality, that which IS), but there indeed it is. It is the *âtman*, and that art thou, O Çvetaketu."²⁶ "He who dwells within the seed, whom the seed does not know, whose body the seed is, who rules the seed: he is the Self, the ruler within, the immortal; unseen, but seeing; unknown, but knowing."²⁷ "The *Âtman* can only be described negatively—not this! not this! He is incomprehensible, undecaying, unbound, non-suffering, imperishable: and thus one reaches fearlessness."²⁸

Âtman was alone, in the shape of a *Puruṣa*. Looking round, he saw nothing but himself (= his *âtman*). Because, before (*purā*, *pūrvā*) all, the Self (*âtman*) burnt up (*uś*) all evils, therefore he was a person (*puruṣa*). The *âtman* said, This is I; therefore he became the *ego* (*aham*) by name." Man's advance from consciousness to self-consciousness could not be more unmistakably stated.

²⁴ Çhand. Up. 6.12-13.

²⁵ There is in the upaniṣads and thereafter a continual play in the words *sat* (or *asat*), from *as* (English *is*), "being," *to on*, and *satya*, "genuine," "real."

²⁶ "That art thou" = *tat tvam asi*, is an epigram which has become classic.

²⁷ Bṛh. Up. 3.7.23.

²⁸ Bṛh. Up. 4.2.4.

4. BRÁHMAN

So far Brahmanism only took over from original Dravidian ideology: whether the doctrine of *samsâra*; its cause, *karman*; its cure, ecstatic intuition; or its perduring substrate, the *âtman*. All these doctrines it took over as they stood, practically without any modification: it merely changed the setting, introducing the preposterous "fire sacrifice" imagery. But as regards the *âtman*, Brahmanism struck out in a novel direction. In Dravidian thought the *âtman* (or *jîva* = "anima") was the individual soul: in the upanišads the *jîvâtman* ("individual soul") was identified with the *vaiçvânara* ²⁹ *âtman* ("universal soul"). In non-Brahmán thought, recognition of man's soul had, by way of exaggerating its individuality, led to the error of monadism; in Brahmán philosophy it led, by way of exaggerating the universality of the Absolute, to that of pantheism. This reaction of Brahmanism was a natural one, caused by the theism, ingrained in Vedic thought, revolting against the atheism of native philosophy. Brahmanism thus made a great contribution by clinging to theism and thus ultimately saving India for theism; its tragic error was to think that it could do so only by jettisoning the hardly won recognition of human personality, which had been the great achievement of original Indian philosophy.

This error the authors of the upanišads were led into by mistaking the soul of man for man's essence.³⁰ "As by a

²⁹ From *viçva* ("all") and *nara* ("man").

³⁰ Man's soul is individuated by his body, which individuation produces substantial, i.e., personal, and not merely accidental characteristics. This is the

lump of clay all earthenware is known and by a copper button everything made of copper," ³¹ so these men had come to think that by *vaiṣvânara âtman* they could know the ulterior reality which lay behind each *jīvâtman*. With that fatal facility of theirs for false analogies and for mistaking logical abstractions to be real distinctions, they concluded from the essence of individual man, his soul, a "quintessence" of all men; from the formal element of one material thing (the essence of this individual thing) a "quintessence" of all essences; and, not enough with this, from the "quintessences" of all essences (human, animal, vegetable, and mineral) to a "super-quintessence" (*τὸ ὅν ὅντις*), an "oversoul" of the universe: which "oversoul" they identified with Bráhman.

Fortunately for the historian an example of the genesis of this faulty logic in magical thinking and its transference to philosophy is preserved in one of the brâhmaṇas. The story told there ³² is that of six brahmáns going to king Aṣvapati to be taught what the "Agni Vaiṣvânara" is; i.e., that fire is common to, and the familiar friend of, all men, good or bad, friend or foe; and that Agni therefore cannot be a specifically brahmanical deity: the lesson which the non-brahmán king no doubt wished to inculcate, being that the daily fire sacrifice, the *agnihotram*, must not be monopolized by brahmáns. ³³ In the Čhandogya Upaniṣad

fundamental point, completely missed by Indian philosophy: the difference between the essential and existential order of being, between *essence* and *substance*. See *supra*, p. 3.

³¹ Chand. Up. 6.1.3.

³² Čatapatha Brâhmaṇa, 10.6.1.

³³ In the Č.Br. the story ends incongruously with the injunction of turning the fire sacrifice into a "sacrifice" of the breath (*prâṇa*).

(5.11) the setting is faithfully kept: only here the six say to the king, "You know the *vaiṣvânara âtman*, tell us that." Each brahmán is asked, what this "universal essence" is: one says heaven, another the sun, others air, ether, water, earth: in the end the king tells them that everyone's own *âtman* is that "universal essence" as if it were many. "But he who worships the *vaiṣvânara âtman* as identical with himself, has existence in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves." ³⁴

That this "universal essence" should be the word of magical power, *bráhman*, was an inference which must have seemed obvious to brahmanical mentality. The Kena Upaniṣad, the latter half of which is as ancient as the first is recent, has a significant story,³⁵ of how Agni can burn only on account of a mysterious power to do so, which indeed is nothing less than *bráhman*; how Vâyu can blow only on account of the same *bráhman*, and so on with all gods: thus arriving at Bráhman as the Absolute at the back of all deities. What more natural than to conclude that Bráhman should similarly be at the back of my self? And what does that mean, "at the back of," if not that Bráhman is my self (*âtman*), my essence, as he is the essence, the self, of all beings? "All this is Bráhman. He is my self within the heart, smaller than the kernel of a mustard seed, greater than all these worlds" (Āh. Up. 3.14.1-3). "This great, un-

³⁴ Āh. Up. 5.18. Significantly after this the next sections of the chapter abruptly switch over to the need of offering the *agnihotram* to *prāṇa*: i.e., to the breath, because no doubt it is by the respiratory yoga exercises that this ecstatic insight had been gained.

³⁵ Kena Up. 3.14-28.

born Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Bráhmaṇ. Fearless is Bráhmaṇ, and he who knows this becomes verily the fearless Bráhmaṇ" (Bṛh. Up. 4.4.25). For, since the word of magic power, *bráhmaṇ*, is individualized in this sacrifice and that, and yet is one and the same, so also (in the words of the Bṛh. Up. 2.3.1) "there are two kinds of Bráhmaṇ, the formed and the formless, the solid and the fluid: *This which Is (sat)* and *That one (tya)*." By this pun *sat-tya* = *satya* ("true"), Bráhmaṇ is to be expressed as the only true reality, which, beyond the sense organs (*axa*) is *paroxa* ("invisible," "mysterious"). It also contains the epigram, "This (*etad*) is That" (*tat*) which expresses the same leading idea as the epigram *tat tuam asi* already analyzed by us. "This is That: thus they realize the supreme, the ineffable, bliss. How then may I come to know it? Does it shine or does it reflect? Him, the resplendent, everything reflects. His shining is the light that illumines all the world." ³⁶

To a modern Occidental, trained in logical thought, such a doctrine as expressed by these two epigrams can of course mean only pantheism and monism. It does, however, by no means follow that the upaniṣads themselves meant to convey anything as clear-cut as that. Addled by their magical thinking, untrained in pure thought, their authors saw mysterious analogies, where we are struck by incon-

³⁶ Katha Up. 5.14-15. Cf. Bṛh. Up. 4.5.15.: "When there is duality, one sees the other, one knows the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he know another?" Note the passage from self-consciousness to solipsism, from discovery of one's inner world to repudiation of any outer world.

sistencies, and felt an esoteric insight where we see flat contradictions. The original theism of Vedism had largely been submerged by the materialism of sacrificial magic: still, some of it had survived, and even the oldest upanišads are incessantly changing over from Brahmán, masculine gender, to Bráhman, neuter gender, and back again. Moreover, the phraseology of polytheism is deliberately continued; as, for instance, in a famous passage of the Bṛh. Up. (5.15.1-2): "The face of the true (Bráhman) is covered with the golden disk (of the sun). Open that, O Pûšan,³⁷ that we may see the nature of the True. O Pûšan, only seer; Yama;³⁸ Sûrya, son of Prajâpati;³⁹ spread thy rays! The light, thy fairest form, I see: I am what he is (scil., the person in the sun)." Hence we must never lose sight of the fact that, for all its apparent monism, brahmanical thought remained charged with a deep undercurrent of theism. This at once came to the surface when a fresh impetus of theistic thought struck India, as it did consequent upon contact with Persia, which also helped to fortify it against entire submergence under Dravidian ideology, which as we have seen was fundamentally atheistic.

But with this we reach a third stage in the evolution of philosophical thought in India.

³⁷ From *pûś* = "causing to thrive." A solar deity, messenger of Sûrya, "the sun" (from *svar* = "light"; Avestic *hware*). In Indo-Iranian thought the sun is the eye of Varuna, Ahura Mazda.

³⁸ Vedic ruler of the *pitr̥loka*.

³⁹ "Lord of Creation," the demiurge of the Brâhmaṇas.

CHAPTER V

Dravidian Reactions: Jainism

1. ITS ANTECEDENTS

THE theistic reorientation given by Brahmanism to philosophy, as current at the time (eighth century) in India, naturally led to reactions on the part of the intellectual milieu, out of which that philosophy had originally arisen.

The first discussions, as already noted, were provoked by royal sarcasms, meant to taunt brahmáns.¹ They led to further discussions among the brahmáns themselves,² to proper instructions by their royal patrons, and very soon to a great number of different "schools of thought" among the brahmáns.³ On the non-brahmán side the new, brahmanical versions of their own ideology naturally led to strong opposition. We shall presently show how a conservative reassertion of archaic thought was organized into an institutional religion, Jainism, by Mahâvîra; and how another sage, the Buddha, tried to escape both horns of the dilemma by a pragmatism which issued in another

¹ Cf. Břh. Up. 4.1.1.: "When Janaka sat, giving audience, Yâjñavalkya approached. 'Have you come to ask for some more cows,' said Janaka, 'or to ask subtle questions?' 'For both, Highness,' answered the brahmán." Similarly *ibid.*, 6.2.1., where King Jaivali taunts the same brahmán, when still a boy.

² Cf. Čh. Up. 5.11.1.: "Five great theologians came once together and held a discussion on the *Ātman* and the *Brāhman*"; or *ibid.*, 1.8.1.: "Three men once said, We are well versed in *udgitha*. Let us have a discussion on *udgitha*."

³ Of whom ten have become traditional.

institutional religion, Buddhism. But both religions were founded two to three centuries later than the period we now have in view and they are themselves witness to a great intellectual and spiritual turmoil having preceded them: Jainism speaking of 363, and Buddhism of 62, different philosophical systems prevalent at the time of their founders. Nothing is known of most of these systems beyond the fact of their existence. There was an obvious distinction between Âjîvikas and Mithyajîvakas; ⁴ there were further the broad categories of Čârvâkas, the out-and-out materialists, and the Nâstikas, the universal skeptics.⁵ There were the Lokâyatins, who denied the existence of a human *suppositum* altogether and therefore also metempsychosis itself. There were the Determinists of the later Goçâla type, for whom the working of *karman* was so automatic as to exclude the possibility of free will, and who therefore denied the possibility of human responsibility. One suspects that many other schools were simply personal cliques and that their differences often related to the punctilio of magical futilities or to logic-chopping of the "barren mother" kind.

Two certain facts stand out clearly: one, that there was going on endless wrangling amongst rival disputant ascetic philosophers; two, that the latter were in no way organized, but wandered about, each man being his own law, much after the manner of the multitude of *sâdhus*,

⁴ "The right way of making a living" and "the sinful way of making a living," the latter meaning by sorcery. Cf. Poussin, *op. cit.*, pp. 302, 306.

⁵ The terms may be roughly translated "whose god is their belly" and "nothing exists," respectively (*čaru* = "eat"; *nasti* = "there is not").

who still swarm over the face of contemporary India. Both facts deserve emphasizing. That both arose out of the subjectivism of necessarily personal spiritual experiences is obvious: for *ex hypothesi* there can naturally be no appeal to an extrinsic authority, to decide between contradictory subjective opinions or magical hallucinations. That such contradictions arose, or at least came to be felt and argued about, only from about 750 B.C. onward is explained by the intellectual conflict, then first observable, between the Brahmanical ideology and one which was both pre-brahmanical and anti-brahmanical. Hence the two centuries following gave the world, until the rise of Jainism and Buddhism stabilized thought by presenting definite alternatives, the then novel spectacle of clever dialecticians wandering up and down the face of India, in search of "cows and subtle questions." The family likeness between this brood of unscrupulous verbal tricksters and the Sophists of Greece and the relativist and nominalist dialecticians of China is striking enough and will be duly considered by us when we come to deal with these two interesting phenomena. Here let us retain that philosophical disputations originated in India in the eighth century B.C. and raged there between 700 and 500 B.C. for reasons which satisfactorily explain their origin and persistence.

Let us now turn to the second fact singled out by us: namely, that both Jainism and Buddhism are religions, started at a definite point of history by a definite human person. The fact is well known; so well known that it is taken for granted. But does it not require an explanation?

How was it that at that time there arose suddenly two founders of religion in India, where hitherto all religion had been purely traditional and anonymous? Where indeed in the whole world which we have surveyed in *Protohistory*, from Paleolithic times to the fall of the Persian Empire, do we find any example of a historical founder of religion, except Zoroaster? ⁶ The sudden emergence of such unprecedented founders of religion is therefore something which cries out for an explanation. The case of Zoroaster himself we have already analyzed, coming to the conclusion that Zoroaster is a product of the Mosaic revelation, conveyed to Media by the Israelites transplanted there. Seeing now that the emergence in India of both Mahāvîra and Çâkyamuni coincide with a proved influx there of Persian civilization, the conclusion is irresistible, that the founding at the time in India of two institutional religions was rendered possible only by this culture contact and indeed is directly due to it. We subjoin a chronological table of events, all of which seem clearly interconnected in the spread of the ideas we are considering.

ca. 750-500, Upaniṣad period
in India begins

722 Destruction of Samaria

705-675 Achaemenes

660-583 Zoroaster

600-559 Cyrus I

600-420 Çaiṣunâga dy-
nasty

⁶ We do not refer here to Akhenaton's ephemeral reform which itself was provoked by Hebrew thought, or to Moses (see Part III).

586 Destruction of Jerusalem

558-529 Cyrus II

563-483 Çâkyamuni Gau-
tama

521-486 Darius I

539-467 ⁷ Vardhamân Ma-
hâvîra

516- Gandhâra } Persian
510 Sindh } provinces

As will be seen, the two Indian reformers were contemporaries, but Çâkyamuni was senior to Vardhamân, and Jainism was to some extent a reaction to Buddhism: for all that, we shall treat first of Jainism, which was but a formulation of the archaic ideology still current at the time, whereas Buddhism was a novel and purely personal achievement of its founder.

It would of course be a mistake to think of pre-Buddhist India as professing a yet unreformed religion, subsequently modified but on the whole faithfully preserved by modern Jainism. India's popular religion was still the cult of Mahâ Devî and her fertility magic, more and more brahmanized and monopolized by the *ŗtvij*, the "regularly sacrificing priest," i.e., those brahmâns who by way of routine and as a profession offered sacrifices for the broad masses of the people, and who by this time seem to have completely superseded (or incorporated) what body of non-brahmân medicine men had hitherto existed. It was when brahmân "peaceful penetration" tried to seize and monopolize for its own purposes also the esoteric doctrine of the native elite, that there came that intellectual opposi-

⁷ The date calculated by H. Jacobi. Cf. Sten Konow's "Die Inder" in Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1925), II, 92.

tion which caused first of all the rise of wrangling ascetic dialecticians and ultimately that of two distinct religious rivals of Brahmanism—Buddhism and Jainism.

2. SOTERIOLOGY

It is admitted on all sides that Jainism presents singularly archaic features of a native primitiveness which has become as it were petrified. This tallies perfectly with the claim made by Mahāvîra himself, that his doctrine is nothing new, but simply a re-enunciation of truths that go back to times immemorial. Universal in the golden age of the world, these truths, he said, had been held by an ever shrinking minority, as times progressively deteriorated: he himself being but the last of a line of twenty-four tîrthankars,⁸ who in previous ages had tried to stem falsehood and decay by recalling men to the ancient truths. The present bad times indeed are said to be but forerunners of still more evil times, the number of true believers steadily decreasing, until at one epoch there will be no more Jains at all in the world.⁹ Then, however, the wheel of *samsâra* will have reached its nadir; things will get better and better, until the golden age is regained; but then a new cycle of degeneration and regeneration, of involution and evolution, will recommence. And so *ad infinitum*. This pessimism also finds expression in Jain tradition regarding their sacred scriptures, the Pûrvas, enshrining Mahāvîra's authentic teaching. The rigorist "original

⁸ From *tîr* = "to traverse": "one who makes a ford through *samsâra*."

⁹ At the 1931 census of India one and a quarter million Jains were enumerated out of a total population of 338 millions.

community”¹⁰ hold that they have all been completely lost and that the only remaining sources of original knowledge are quite historical authors of the eighth and ninth centuries of our era. The laxer and more opportunist Çvetâmbara sect¹¹ held a council in A.D. 467 at Vallabhî and there reconstructed (or collected remnants of) the original scriptures as best they could, and have since considered this new canon authentic.

Vardhamân was born 539 B.C. at Vaiçâlî in Magadha, son of Siddârtha of the aristocratic (non-brahmân) Jñâta clan. He had an elder brother and a younger sister and took a wife, Yaçodâ, of whom he had an only daughter, Anojjâ. However, at the age of thirty and on the death of his father he became a *nirgrantha*¹² wandering ascetic, discarded even clothes and, after twelve years of mortification and meditation, reached the supreme illumination, called *Kevala*. For the last thirty years of his life, i.e., from 497 onward, he wandered about Magadha and Anga, teaching his doctrine, collecting around him a community of monks, 4,200 according to tradition, and organizing the lay adherents, whose spiritual advisers his *çramaṇas* were to be. He died at Pâvâ near Patna, in a sitting posture, reciting the fundamental points of Jain doctrine.

What is this supreme illumination, so complete that all lesser illumined mortals must accept its authority as enunciating absolute truth? *Kevala* means “nothing but,”

¹⁰ *Mûla Sangha*, the sect otherwise known as “Digambaras,” i.e., “the garmentless” (*ambara* = “garment”; *diç* = “space”).

¹¹ “Wearing white (*çveta*) garments.”

¹² “Without any ties.”

“alone,” “complete”; *kevalatva* means “the state of self-subsistence.” It expresses the leading feature of Jainism, which is its monadism; i.e., the belief that each *jīva* (“soul”), when purged of the last trace of *karman*, is not merely self-sufficient, but actually self-subsisting, and therefore omniscient. Each soul, in fact, when it has reached the *kevala* state, is nothing less than an ultimate unit of being, a monad; one would almost say The Absolute, if this metaphysical term did not exclude the possibility of there being more than one Absolute. Jainism holds certainly each liberated *jīva* to be absolutely blissful and independent, in the sense that there can be no further relations of it with anything else, including other *jīva*s that have reached the *kevala* stage. Being thus absolutely unrelated, no prayers can attain them: a belief which of course is merely the logical consequence of the whole yoga mentality that deliverance from *samsāra* is a question of purely human, personal effort. Consistently enough, therefore, there is no theistic trace whatever in Jainism, not even an apotheosis of the “victor”¹³ souls that have reached *kevalatva*.

What, then, is needed to obtain this deliverance? For the answer we must go back to the trance experience of the yogin and to the contrast he felt between the sensations of buoyancy and elation during his trances, and those of the

¹³ *Jina*; hence the name of this the *Jaina* religion. The victory (*jaya*) in question is of course the spiritual one over the senses, *indriyāṇām jaya*. The title of “great hero,” *mahāvīra*, bestowed on Vardhamān, refers of course to the same kind of victory. One would not be surprised to find that these terms expressed the natural reaction of a culturally higher and fundamentally pacific people against their conqueror’s worship of militarily successful “heroes,” like Indra.

aches and lassitude of "the morning after the night before." What is aching, what feels tired, but the body? What, then, more natural than jumping from this experience to the conclusion that the body is the enemy of the soul, which, if not weighed down by matter, could so easily go on soaring into the dream-worlds of its hallucinations? Here, we think, is to be sought the starting point of the idea which in the event became quite an obsession of Eastern thought and which has since exerted such a powerful attraction to the Gnostics and Theosophists of all ages: the idea that identifies evil with matter. What is perhaps the most curious thing about this, is that in the original ideology, which Jainism has so faithfully preserved, the *jīva* ("the animate") itself is conceived as something material, though sharply distinguished from the *ajīva* ("the inanimate"). The difference between the two substances is for Jainism the difference between the coarse and the extremely subtle, a difference of degree but never of kind. For instance, it is said a *kevala jīva* by expulsion of all adhering gross matter has become so light that it rises in a straight line until it gets above the universe; as one would say today, like a hydrogen bubble rising above the stratosphere. The fundamental, ontological distinction between corporeal and spiritual completely escapes these archaic philosophers. None of them ever conceive of the human soul as what it really is, i.e., the quite immaterial principle of wholeness and unity ¹⁴ which makes a human being to

¹⁴ I.e., the substantial principle, which Aristotle calls *morphê*, and St. Thomas Aquinas *forma*.

be a man and which distinguishes such a one from the sum of all the chemical aggregates that compose his body. This failure to grasp the nature of the spiritual is the failure of these first groping philosophers to get away from imagination to pure thought, a failure which of necessity makes their philosophy a materialistic one.

For Jains, then, man is not only a compound of animate (*jîva*) and inanimate (*ajîva*) monads, but the animate monad (*jîva*) itself is liable to an influx of matter, a taint, *leçsyâ*, which is said to color it as a blue light, for instance, colors a white crystal.¹⁵ This contaminating matter is for Jains *karman*, a term which here has not only the general Indian meaning of "activity," but also that of one of the six modes of atomic aggregation.¹⁶ It "settles on" or "flows into" the soul and thus gives it a body and determines its existential conditions. *Karman*, "activity," and the causal nexus between an act and its effect, are therefore again imagined materialistically, instead of being conceived as ideas. This causal nexus between act and effect, is called

¹⁵ Six colors are distinguished: the worst is black, expressing cruelty and coarseness; (2) blue for deceit and lust; (3) gray for anger and thoughtlessness; (4) golden for prudence and generosity; (5) pink for mercy and wisdom; (6) white for impartiality and indifference: a most revealing scale of values.

¹⁶ In a descending scale from subtlety to grossness, atomic matter (*pudgala*) is said to produce (1) molecules, (2) *karman*, (3) smells and flavors, (4) darkness and light, (5) liquids, (6) stones. Darkness therefore is not the logical concept of "privation of light," but a material thing, a little thicker than a smell and a little more tenuous than water.

As regards the *pudgala*, the inanimate atoms, they are not homogeneous, but of four different kinds. Their combinations and permutations produce the different bodies in the universe, which continually lose certain qualities of theirs and acquire others: hence the Jain term for "substance," *dravya* ("fluid matter") and for "accidents" *pariyâya* ("periodic changes"). As we have seen already, *dravya* may be either *jîva* or *ajîva*: both being eternal, indivisible atoms and ultimate monads.

dharma, a word which in Brahmanical literature means "rule," "duty," "religion." This, however, is an abstraction of later times: in non-brahmán literature, both Jain and Buddhist, the original meaning is close to that of the root *dhara* ("to bear"); i.e., *dharma* is "that which bears up, supports," and thus renders possible *karman*, "activity." Jainism, which as usual preserves archaisms, thus calls *dharma* and *adharma* two material substances,¹⁷ which enable bodies either to move or to be at rest, much as water enables fish to move about or to be still; Buddhist texts use the word *dharma* in the sense of "law" and also of the existential elements which that law has caused to constitute the life of an individual.¹⁸ Therefore also the place above the world, where the liberated souls enjoy their *kevalatva*, is void of these two substances, *dharma* and *adharma*, which permeate every spatial point within the universe: for the *kevala jîva*, of course, is eternally unchanging and therefore immobile with an immobility which is self-caused and has no more need of the extrinsic support of *adharma*.

3. ETHICS

The ideal to be aimed at, therefore, in getting rid of activity is non-activity, and the remedy against an in-

¹⁷ *Ākāśa* is similarly treated as an original, material substance. The term means both "ether" and "space." Its literal meaning is "that which contains," in the latter sense; but it is also that in which things are imagined to be (presumably something like air), since imagination boggles at a vacuum, a concept accessible only to pure thought.

¹⁸ Cf. H.v. Glasenapp: "Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Dharma Theorie," In *Zeitschr. d. D. Morgenl. Ges.*, XCII, 383-420.

flux of *karman* is immobility, like that of the cataleptic state of one in a trance. Hence the rigidity of all yoga postures,¹⁹ the need of mastering all one's movements, the ideal of deep meditation; hence also the supreme injunction of Jainism to all striving after deliverance from *samsâra*, to cultivate *amatva*, "equanimity," a uniform conduct toward all things, based on the complete absence of the feelings of attraction or revulsion in respect of any of them. The more violent a passion, the greater the agitation of the soul, the greater therefore also the influx of *karman*: taking this concept in conjunction with that of animism, we see that it is natural that the most violent activity, that of killing another animate being, is the worst of all in Jain ideology.²⁰ This *ahimsâ*,²¹ "non-injury of living things," may be called the master idea of Jainism: it has come to mean a universal gentleness, originating no doubt in the pacifism of the peasant civilization, but given an ethical turn which makes one suspect more recent, i.e., Zoroastrian, influences.

It must not be forgotten that in a materialist ideology the "law" of karmic cause and effect should, to be consistent, work automatically, i.e., excluding all idea of human responsibility. That this was the more ancient view seems borne out by one of Mahâvîra's rivals, Goçâla

¹⁹ The third *pratimâ*, mortification, enjoins three daily meditations in the rigid posture, called that of a statue, standing motionless and fixing one's eyes on the tip of one's nose: as represented in that Indus statuette of five thousand years ago, referred to by us on p. 155 of our *Protohistory*.

²⁰ Its axiom, "*ahimsâ paramo dharmah*" ("*Ahimsâ* is the supreme law"). The length to which Jains go in obeying this law is notorious: they not only feed bugs, but may not even crush sugar cane or oil seeds.

²¹ From *hims*, "to harm," desiderative form of *han*, "to strike down."

Mankhaliputra, whose adherents, the already mentioned Âjîvikas,²² formed a school of out-and-out determinists, who denied altogether human free will and who contended that their teaching was more in conformity with ancient tradition. It seems, therefore, that one of the reforms of Mahâvîra, and not the least, was so to reformulate the ancient system as to endow it with a moral purpose. Since we cannot admit the spontaneity of so startling an innovation, we must look for an outside stimulus and most naturally find it in the lofty ethical influences of Zoroastrianism, which were spreading in northern India at the time, in the wake of the intense culture contact with Persia. As we shall see presently, the consequence of these influences is still more strongly seen in Buddhism, and we suspect that it was in rivalry with Buddhism that Mahâvîra took the momentous step which, however, may have seemed not so startling at the time, when the natural truth of ethical ideas had come to be generally "in the air." Even if what he did was largely done to take the wind out of Çâkyamuni's sails, at all events what Mahâvîra did, what gave Jainism a permanent value, and what must be counted to him as a title to real greatness, was the adoption by him of an ethical method, by which to stop the influx of *karman*. Instead of the purely mechanical method of Yoga, Mahâvîra introduced the strictly ethical method of "right conduct" (*çaritra*); giving up the preposterous mechanical idea of "not moving," he taught his followers

²² Though strongly repudiated by Jainism, this sect continued to exist for many centuries, well into the Indian Middle Ages. It obviously had its roots deep in archaic tradition.

“to move” (*čar*) in the right way. Hence the first great commandments of Jainism: harmlessness, truthfulness, honesty, continence, frugality.

While the first and last (*ahimsâ* and *aparigraha*)²³ belong clearly to the ethos of archaic times, truthfulness (*satyâ*) and honesty (*asteya*)²⁴ betray their Zoroastrian inspiration. As for continence (*brahmačarya*), there was nothing in the original yoga mentality to call for it. On the contrary, its crude fundamental idea of not letting in any *karman* matter, could obviously have no objection to the emission of matter; erotic orgasm, in fact, ranking as a recognized method of getting “out of oneself” into a state of ecstasy. What was aimed at was complete detachment; hence the need of breaking all family ties and all other ties of home and kinship; hence the need of “being freed from all bonds” (*nirgrantha*)²⁵ to “reach the goal” (*sâdh*).²⁶ *Mahâvîra* is acknowledged in Jain tradition to have tightened up this demand for mere celibacy into the truly ethical precept of complete continence: a salutary transformation of the primitive practice, which shows the profoundly ethical reorientation effected by him. But nakedness remained for him, as for all Jain rigorists, the ideal and abiding symbol of all true asceticism, incidentally proving how little this has to do with eroticism.

Another, very primitive feature has found a permanent lodging place in Jainism: fasting, even starving to death.

²³ From *pari-grah* (“accept”): “non-acceptance,” scil., of superfluities.

²⁴ From *sten* = “to steal.”

²⁵ From *grath* = “to tie.”

²⁶ Hence *sâdhu*, modern synonym for homeless ascetic.

The idea obviously goes back to that of an influx of karmic matter. This is coupled with the experience of spiritual detachment provoked by hunger, sensations which may lead to clinically well-known hunger hallucinations. Jains are content with two meals a day: they regulate their fasting by the number of consecutive meals omitted, starting with the omission of three, and increasing the number to five, seven, nine, and eleven. A further refinement is to diminish the intervals between such fasting bouts from, say, once a year to once a quarter, once a month, once a week. The logical consequence of all this is obviously the ideal of starving oneself to death, a practice called *samlekhanâ*. The term is most revealing: it means literally "slimming," i.e., reducing the weight of one's body: matter being evil, an emaciated person obviously is nearer salvation than a stout one, an idea which, by its very crudity, shows its primitiveness.

We need not go in detail into the scale of eleven mortifications ²⁷ practiced by Jains, except to say that only the first two (right faith and the five commandments) are obligatory for all Jains and that only the eleventh (homelessness) marks a clear line of separation between laity ²⁸ and *çramanas*. Up to that point the rule of life of the latter is but an intensification of that of the former: laity and ascetics therefore form in Jainism an organic whole of persons, all set for *kevalatva*, some faster, some slower, but without

²⁷ *Pratimâ* (*prati* = "counter," *mâ* = "measure"), i.e., measures calculated not only to stop further influx of *karman*, but to burn up that already accumulated.

²⁸ *Upâsaka* from *upa-âs* = "sitting by the side of."

such essential differences as we shall notice presently in Buddhism. Even the eleventh stage, of homelessness, presupposes a lay body that will provide the communal halls ²⁹ (not monasteries!), where the *çramaṇa* is disciplinarily obliged to spend the rainy season, when nature is coming to life and it might not be possible to avoid killing inadvertently some insect.³⁰ The *çramaṇas*, while taking refuge in these halls, are expected to preach to the laity, instruct them, hear their confessions, and impose penances. As coenobitism, so also is temple worship of course incompatible with Jainism and its strict monadism, which can only admit of self-knowledge and self-discipline. An austere faith fanatically consistent, if ever there was one.

Jainism, then, in one sense is a religion founded by Mahāvîra. But to be true, this statement must be supplemented by a recognition that what, for the want of a better term, we may call Proto-Jainism, existed long before Mahāvîra, who only reformed a previous doctrine and practice. That the latter had their roots in Dravidian civilization is confirmed by the fact that Belgola in the Canarese country has always been a strong Jain center, to which already in 297 B.C. Jain *çramaṇas* are said to have fled, "owing to a famine." Perhaps they brought there Mahāvîra's reforms. That his Jainism was not some altogether new doctrine, is suggested by the fact that the South has always been the stronghold of the stricter, Digambara, sect. Jainism appears to be the original, national religion

²⁹ *Upāçraya* from *upāçri* = "to take shelter."

³⁰ Wandering in forests (which teem with life) is prohibited at all seasons.

of the Canarese: "the most ancient and greatest products of the Canarese culture," said Glasenapp,³¹ "bear the unmistakable stamp of Jainism. The whole Canarese literature until the twelfth century of our era is exclusively Jain." Similarly in the Tamil country Jain inscriptions go back to the second century B.C., and the golden age of Tamil classical literature (ending in the second century of our era) is entirely of Jain inspiration. The Chinese pilgrim, Hsuan Tsang, in the seventh century still reports Kânċi to be a Digambara stronghold. Buddhism, on the other hand, never made any headway in the south at all: which would be strange indeed if both religions were contemporaneous foreign importations. When Jainism waned there, beginning with the eighth century, it receded not before Buddhism, but before the rising tide of Ćaivism and Vaišnavism, which knew how to revivify both the old Mahâdevî cult and Jain ideology by a fresh and invigorating stream of theism.

In the north the Ćaišunâga kings are all claimed by Jains as adherents of their own faith: Bimbisâra is even said to have been a relative of Vardhamân. The first king of the Nanda dynasty is similarly claimed by them, as is that of the Maurya dynasty, Ćandragupta. The truth seems to be that all the earliest kings naturally belonged to the then all-prevailing Proto-Jain tradition, while later on Jainism and Buddhism were well-matched rival religions, of which now the one, now the other, would tip the balance of royal favor. With the fall of the Mauryas, the northern center

³¹ *Der Jainismus* (Berlin, 1925), p. 58.

of Jainism shifted west, to Mathurâ, whence it receded into Rajputâna and Kathiawad, to find its final refuge in Gujerat, where the bulk of actual Jains are nowadays living.³²

³² For northern Indian data, see Shah, *op. cit.* A. Guérinot, *La Religion Djaina* (Paris, 1926), has a useful map of all places of importance in Jain history; see Plate II.

CHAPTER VI

The Buddha

1. HIS LIFE AND DHARMA

HAVING studied in Jainism one, and that the most typically Dravidian, reaction to the Brahmanism of the upanišads, we shall now turn to one which is not so much a reaction on the part of the traditional non-brahmán ideology, as one which, though deeply rooted in that native tradition, is the product of a single personality. This person consciously and deliberately offered an altogether novel solution of the many then contending rival problems by his claim of having discovered an altogether novel approach to them all.

This person was one Siddârtha,¹ of the Çâkya² (or Gautama)³ clan (or country) of yeomen-ricegrowers, presided over by his father Çuddhodana. He was born in 563 B.C. by his mother Mâyâ in a wood called Lumbinî, outside the capital city of Kapilavastu on the borders of modern Nepal, a spot attested to by a stele erected there three centuries later by Açoka. The Çâkya country numbered about half a million people, including other castes than

¹ Literally, "one who has attained his object."

² From *çak* = "able," "powerful." Hence his usual name of "sage of the Çâkya clan" (Çâkyamuni). Derivation from *çâka* = "Scythian" may be unwarranted, though Persian influence had evidently reached the country.

³ After Gotama, a legendary Brahman sage, who had been adopted by the clan as their eponymous hero.

that of the Çâkyas (brahmáns, carpenters, smiths, and potters are mentioned). That the Çâkyas were non-brahmáns is uncontested; that they were also non-Aryans seems clear from the subsequent representations of the Buddha and his people, which never show any Aryan features in their physical make-up; the ideological milieu being of course unmistakably Dravidian.

Siddârtha grew up in comparative luxury in his father's "palace," though later stories have evidently exaggerated the wealth and power of his sire. Married at an early age, he became disgusted ⁴ with the life of the senses which he led, and at the age of 29, i.e., in 534 B.C., renounced wife, child,⁵ and home, to become a traditional *çramaṇa*. He underwent his training in yoga in a Magadhan forest cave at the hands of some yogins dwelling there. The trances obtained failed to satisfy him, and he embarked instead on a most rigorous course of self-mortification as a solitary hermit in another forest solitude. His fasting was so rigorous that he often swooned and barely missed dying of starvation. In the end he gave it all up and in Bodh ⁶ Gayâ (south of modern Patna) under a spreading bo tree,⁷ having again taken to eating normally, settled down to puzzle out not only the problem, how to gain freedom from re-

⁴ Tradition has dramatized, how old age, illness, death, asceticism, forced themselves on his attention.

⁵ His son Râhula, said to have become later on one of his disciples.

⁶ From *budh* = "awake": hence *bodha* = "understanding," *bodhi* = "enlightenment," *buddhi* = "intelligence," and *Buddha* = "The Awakened" or "Enlightened One."

⁷ *Ficus religiosa*, called *açvattha*, because a single tree with its numerous aerial roots forms a commodious shelter, a "standing place for horses" (*açva* = "horse").

birth (*moxa*),⁸ but also the certitude of it. For what had failed to satisfy him so far was that the feeling of deliverance, obtained in his trances, disappeared as soon as he came to. How could that be real deliverance, which was not permanent?

He started of course, as from axiomatic premises, from the principle that man is liable to perpetual rebirth and that these existences are essentially sorrowful. Nobody seems to have felt as keenly as this Ćâkyamuni the misery of living on and on through lives, all of them composed, as the proverbial saying had it, of joys as small as a mustard seed and of sorrows as big as Mount Meru. And as he sat there, analyzing man's attitude to this sort of life, it suddenly came to him, as it were with the flash of intuition, that man lived only because he wanted to live. Let him give up clinging to this miserable, absurd life and he would naturally be rid of it once for all. What could lead to rebirth but this desire, this "thirst" (*třřna*) for it? With this he seemed to have seized the fundamental mischief-maker: for each succeeding life was in itself separate from the others and merely related to them; what causes the relationship is a desire for it. This seemed to him to be the *bodhi*, the supreme understanding, which he had sought so long: it broke the spell which had until now chained him to everlasting cycles of rebirth; henceforth he had awakened as from a bad dream, he had become *buddha*.

⁸ From *muč* ("to release"). *Moxa* is the desiderative, "seek deliverance," but also the deliverance itself. Past participle *mukta*, *nirmukta*, "one delivered from."

“Of many rebirths have I ceaselessly traversed the cycles,
 Seeking the builder, suffering rebirth.
 Builder, thou art discovered: never more shalt thou build
 A house. The beams are broken, the frame destroyed.
 Delivered is my heart, destroyed all desire.”⁹

For a week he remained in blissful contemplation of the truth which it seemed so evident he had discovered; and for a week a struggle went on within himself: now that he knew how to end it all, why not do so at once? But should this precious, this unique, discovery of his thus perish with himself, having benefited none but himself? Later accounts have dramatized this story as a struggle between the Buddha and Mâra: ¹⁰ the Buddha's compassion with the suffering multitudes triumphs; rather than leave them without the saving knowledge he possessed, he decides to go on living out his present life, showing them how to tread the path discovered by him out of the labyrinth of existence.

The temptation passed. The Buddha goes to Sârônâth, a place a few miles north of Benares, and there in its Deer Park (Mṛgadâva) begins to “set in motion the wheel of the law,” *dharma*, i.e., of the method or rule, discovered by him, whereby all men without distinction, if they would, may become buddhas themselves. The oldest records refer

⁹ The words which the Buddha is supposed to have exclaimed on being illumined, according to what is perhaps the most popular passage of the *Dhammapada*, second-century B.C. metrical composition on “The words of the law.” The date traditionally assigned to his illumination is 527 B.C., seven years after his becoming a *çramaṇa*.

¹⁰ “Death” from *mṛ* = “to die.” “Death” thus becomes in Buddhist tradition the “Tempter.”

only to the four events ¹¹ in his life that seemed most fundamental: his birth in Lumbinî Park, his illumination at Bodh Gaya, his first sermon in the Mṛgadâva, and his death, or "entering upon *nirvâna*." But later accounts naturally dwell very much on the forty-four years of the Buddha's missionary activity, during which he formed his closest disciples into a *sangha*, a coenobitic monastic order, the first in the world, to perpetuate the method discovered by him, by practicing it. While wandering about and begging his daily food after the usual fashion of the *çramaṇas*, he seems to have spent much of his time (certainly the rainy seasons) either in a park given to him by King Bimbisâra (the Veluvana near Râjagṛha) or in another, the Jetavana near Çrâvastî (capital of Kosala), given to him by a wealthy merchant there.

Of the disciples he made, his cousin Ânanda became his favorite. Though following the Buddha for many years, he was not received as a monk until 507 B.C. Another cousin, Devadatta, was a rigorist, who caused a first serious schism: and it is noteworthy that monks said to follow Devadatta's rule are still mentioned in the seventh century of our era. The Buddha himself was far removed from rigorism, but also from laxity: the golden mean, which gave him such poise and serenity and made him consider nothing human alien to himself,¹² evidently was hard for lesser men to

¹¹ Symbolized by a white elephant (of whom his mother dreamed after conception), the Bo tree, the wheel, and the stûpa (a funerary monument, supposed to contain part of his ashes).

¹² He accepted in the most pleasant manner invitations to feasts, got up for him whether by kings or artizans, merchants or even professional prostitutes.

keep to and explains much of the dissensions chronic among his adherents. When his stepmother, Mahâprajâpatî, on the death of her husband in 522 B.C., became a follower of his, he allowed himself to be persuaded, somewhat reluctantly, to let her found an order of nuns, parallel to his order of monks, a radical departure this from then prevalent custom. Suffering, the origin of suffering, the method whereby to overcome sufferings: this was the theme which engrossed his whole life and monopolized his preaching; this also the reason for his master-passion, an all-comprising compassion with the whole of suffering humanity.

Into his order he admitted men of all sorts and conditions,¹³ provided, of course, they believed in *karman*, i.e., in a retribution awaiting all human acts. Therefore Nâstikas, who denied the possibility of any rebirth, were *eo ipso* excluded: theirs was the heresy of heresies, the *mithyâ dṛṣṭi*,¹⁴ strongly denounced again and again by the Buddha; for obviously the whole of his teaching and mission stands and falls with belief in transmigration and, we must add, belief in a moral government of the world. For the Buddha, karmic retribution was a purely spiritual and ethical principle, purified of all its original mechanistic and magical notions: a principle all the more tenaciously held perhaps because with it had to be combined the traditional atheism which could find no room for a moral Gov-

¹³ Not excepting a former barber of Kapilavastu, one Upâli, who became a great pillar of the *sangha*.

¹⁴ "The false view."

error of the world. That this clear and strong ethical basis and moral temper of the Buddha's doctrine came to him from Zoroastrian sources is not only antecedently manifest, but is in a special manner demonstrated by a passage,¹⁵ from which we learn that he admitted to his order, without their having to pass through the ordinary novitiate, members of a fire-worshipping (*aggika* in Pali) sect, known as *Jaṭila*,¹⁶ because "they believe in *karman*." ¹⁷

The *tour de force* of the Buddha was not only to combine belief in a moral government of the world with disbelief in a moral Governor, but also belief in the transmigration of the soul with disbelief in any transmigrant soul. Such at first sight truly stupefying mentality can be understood only when we realize that the aim of the Buddha was not of a speculative order but of a strictly practical order. "I have discovered much more than I have explained to you, O monks," says the Buddha.¹⁸ "And why have I not explained it? Because it would be unprofitable, neither leading to renunciation nor to disgust of the world nor to detachment nor to destruction of the passions nor to peace, wisdom, illumination, and *nirvāṇa*. What have I explained? Suffering, the origin of suffering, the way to eliminate suffering: this is profitable teaching because it

¹⁵ *Mahāvagga*, 1.38.11, i.e., from one of the earliest scriptures, dating from the fourth-century B.C.

¹⁶ "Wearers of tangled hair." From *jaṭā* = "braid of hair" (as worn particularly by Śaiva ascetics). The combination of Śaiva *bhakti* with obvious Mazdeanism is striking.

¹⁷ We recall that Čākṡyamuni lived within a hundred years after Zoroaster (660-583) and during the reigns of Cyrus II (558-529) and Darius I (521-486).

¹⁸ *Samyutta*, 5.

leads to *nirvâṇa*.” One could not improve on the explicit, terse terms in which the Buddha himself has stated his limited aim; not once, but again and again.¹⁹

And the way to eliminate suffering is “the noble eight-fold path” of right belief, right resolve, right speech, right behavior, right occupation, right effort, right meditation, right concentration.²⁰ It is not by any physical or moral anesthesia that desire (*tṛṣṇa*) is to be destroyed: else, as he says,²¹ “all the blind, deaf, and imbeciles would be saints.” The will is not to be destroyed, but to be trained so as no longer to be swayed by either concupiscence, aversion, or infatuation. This naturally demands a great moral effort, which can be crowned by success only if the life and discipline of a *bhixu*²² in a *vihâra*²³ is embraced. For this training of the will, meditation is extensively employed, a meditation that is not at all meant to issue in a trance. The first thing to be meditated on naturally was suffering: that everything is at bottom sorrowful and transient. To overcome the insensate thirst for so dolorous an existence, the monk was next trained in *nirmamatva*, perfect indif-

¹⁹ Cf. *Majjhima Nikâya*, 63: “I never asked you to lead the religious life under me, so that I might elucidate to you, whether a saint both exists and does not exist after death, nor whether he is both non-existent and not non-existent. All this is not profitable and so I have not elucidated it.” *Ibid.*, the parable of the wounded man, whose curious questions about his assailants cannot be satisfied, because the supreme need of the moment is to call a doctor who will prevent his bleeding to death.

²⁰ *Dîgha Nikâya*, 22.

²¹ *Majjhima*, 3.

²² From *bhaj* = “to desire a share.” *Bhixu* has become the technical term for a Buddhist “mendicant friar.”

²³ Literally “pleasance”; Buddhist monastery; hence the modern “Bihar” the province at one time studded with *vihâras*, the ancient Magadha.

ference toward "mine" (*mama*= "of me"). He was to acquire the habit of thinking that one's thoughts are not one's own, by disavowing them continually and making "acts of will" to that effect. For, as the Buddha justly realized, only by destroying man's self-regarding principle could man's desire for existence be destroyed: therefore the *bhixu* was also advised to employ his imagination in looking upon his body as if it were already a putrefying corpse; and upon his soul as if it were merely a sequence of disparate moments; as it were a file of ants touching one another; or a river that is seemingly the same, though at every moment composed of a different volume of water. The point for us to retain here is that the Buddha did not wish to explain by such imaginations the nature of either body or soul, but used them for the merely practical purpose of quenching his disciples' "thirst" (*tṛṣṇa*) for further existence, and not for the intellectual purpose of quenching their thirst for knowledge. This point is capital for the understanding of Buddhism: ²⁴ simple in itself, but of course difficult to believe, since man's intellect is made for truth and his will really does not stir until the intellect moves it. Yet this was exactly what the Buddha prided himself on having discovered: that is, a way of eliminating the questioning mind by stimulating the imagination through ingenious "as if's."

²⁴ It was first made with admirable clarity by Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his great works on Buddhism, as, e.g., *Le Nirvana*.

2. THE SANGHA

Such severe "spiritual exercises" were of course impossible except for professional ascetics,²⁵ seriously set on attaining *nirvâṇa* ²⁶ by quenching definitively this illusive thirst for existence. The multitudes could only be exhorted to lead a moral life of universal kindness and benevolence, by treading the first stages of the eightfold path. In return they were not promised prosperity or progeny or victory, as Brahmanism promised, but a good rebirth and even a long spell in *svarga*,²⁷ if they used their present life for laying up for themselves sufficient "merit" (*puṇya*). For the practice of this kindness to all, the Buddha himself was the most inspiring model. Witness the question once asked of him, whether he really never had said anything to displease anybody, and his answer: "When the Tathâgata ²⁸ knows that a word is true, right, salutary, and, though unpleasant and disagreeable to some, yet opportune to say; then the Tathâgata says it precisely because he has pity on people." ²⁹ Hence also, although he practiced and preached an indiscriminate benevolence and compassion toward all, he did not expound his doctrine uniformly to all and sundry, but profoundly to some, superficially to others: "As a peasant cultivates first his best fields, then

²⁵ Note how in Greek *askêsis* still carries the Buddhist meaning of an athletic training of the spirit.

²⁶ From *niś* (*nir*) = "out," and *vâ* = "blow": hence *nirvâṇa* = "that which has been blown out" or extinguished.

²⁷ A sensuous kind of paradise.

²⁸ Literally "one who has arrived at This," a favorite synonym for the Buddha.

²⁹ Majjhima, 58.

the middling ones, and finally the poor ones, so also the Buddha," he said on one occasion,³⁰ "preaches the *dharma* first to his monks and nuns, then to his lay adherents,³¹ and finally even to those multitudes that do not follow him at all."

For those who lived closely with him there could be no doubt that he was right: he was himself a shining example and proof that his method worked; he had indeed "arrived at This," which he promised to them also. They said, his method, "the *dharma*, has delivered him: therefore this *dharma* will also deliver us." ³² Some of his sayings seemed difficult to understand and even more difficult to believe, being incapable of proof: what matter, since he, who claims to be *the* Buddha, really and visibly has got over all the impulses of attachment, aversion, and pride? "Nobody can accuse him of any faults." ³³ Hence there are quite clearly three successive resolutions to be taken by aspirants to *nirvāṇa*. First, "I take my refuge in the Buddha," because he has given an ocular demonstration of having himself attained this goal; secondly "I take my refuge in the Dharma," because by it, he says, he has himself achieved liberation, and by it we also can obtain it; thirdly, "I take my refuge in the Sangha," for without life in it, strict application and practice of the *dharma* is impossible. It will be seen, how everything really depends in the last end

³⁰ Samyutta Nikāya, 42.

³¹ The *upāsaka*, who acquired merit principally by providing for the *bhixu* and *bhixunī*.

³² Majjhima, 2.

³³ Anguttara, 4.

on faith in the Buddha, and not on faith in his teaching apart from him: a point of the greatest importance for understanding the ultimate development of an atheistic religion into a religion of its deified founder. Very soon it would be said: ³⁴ If anyone dares say or think that the Gautama has no superhuman virtue, still less does he possess the absolute truth, that his *dharma* is mere dialectics, obtained by experimentation and private judgment, if anyone thus speaks or thinks, he will be precipitated into deepest hell." Thus we see that, notwithstanding the Buddha's continual appeals to reason and to the reasonableness of his teaching, the ultimate appeal is not to reason at all, but to his own authority. It could not be otherwise, seeing that he asked men to follow him not *because* his *dharma* was true, but *as if* it were true.

There can be no question of course that the Buddha's great, lovable and yet masterful personality impressed itself so perfectly on his most intimate disciples that they all became *arhats*.³⁵ The utter detachment of these *theras*³⁶ and *theri's* may sometimes strike us as almost inhuman; but for anyone reading the Buddhist Scriptures, containing so many of their autobiographies, there can be

³⁴ Majjhima, i.

³⁵ From the root *arh* = "to deserve," literally "a worthy." The word both in Jain and Buddhist literature has come to mean a degree just below that of a *tirthankar* or *buddha*.

³⁶ The Pali equivalent for the Sanscrit *sthavira* = "old," this term in Pali has got the meaning of our "Reverend." Cf. the Gk. *presbyteros* taking on the meaning of *priest*. A famous collection of lyrics, the *Thera* and *Theri Gāthās*, made in the second-century B.C. (though much of it is far more ancient) gives a good picture of the happiness of these "religious," when the *sangha* was at its prime.

no doubt of the great joy they felt at having got rid of every disturbing impulse, of having all their faculties under complete control, and of leading a life of complete selflessness and universal benevolence; the supreme felicity, of course, consisting in the conviction that at death there either would be nothing left to cause further rebirths at all (in which case they would have reached already arhathood) or at least that there would be no more than eight further lives to lead, each life one stage nearer to that of a true *arhat*. In the meantime is there any greater happiness on earth than that of being a good *bhixu*, "leading a virtuous and serene life, a life of great dignity and spiritual power, content with little, freed of desire?" ³⁷

The ultimate goal, attained at death by the Buddha, aimed at by his followers, is of course *nirvâṇa*. So far had their quenching of desire to go, that they would no longer desire even *nirvâṇa*, though all the time straining every nerve to attain it; spending their lives in an effort to reach it, while telling themselves all the time that they neither knew nor cared whether there was any such thing as *nirvâṇa*. The Buddha himself never defined it: he only emphasized that it is not annihilation.³⁸ A currently used synonym for *nirvâṇa* is *nirvṛti*, which, though literally meaning "extinction," as of a lamp, has likewise come to mean "inward tranquillity" and "bliss." "One does not know whither the fire went after extinction: equally im-

³⁷ As *Dīgha Nikāya*, 1, puts it.

³⁸ To one who asked him whether he taught annihilation at death, he replied that the only annihilation he taught was the annihilation of desire (*Mahāvagga*, 6.31).

possible is it to say whither the *arhat* goes," ³⁹ is a typical expression. In another passage it is said that "*nirvâṇa* is not-born, not-become, not-made, not-caused, and therefore immutable, and free of all suffering." ⁴⁰

What then is this *nirvâṇa*? Is it all really nonsensical as it seems? We do not think so. It certainly was not so for the Buddha or his followers. Trying to put ourselves into their mentality, we rather think that what all these men—Buddhist, Jain, Brahman—groped after and tried to express in the endeavor common to all of them, of getting away from individualized *existence*, was the dimly conceived notion of *essence*; from *act* (*karman*!) these primitive thinkers tried to get back to the *potentiality* out of which it had been concretized.

Topsy-turvy? Of course it is; of course it is an inversion of all values, to see the *summum bonum* not in the *Actus Purus* (absolute actuality), but in the *potentia pura* (the absolutely indeterminate). But once you start with the premise that existence is evil, that the trouble at the bottom of everything is for one everlastingly to be this, that, or another, instead of simply being: is it not logically consistent to wish to flee from *existence* into *essence* and from *act* to *potentiality*? Here of course we are not concerned to show the metaphysical impossibility of all this, but only how philosophy originated and why it developed in India in the way it did. If our interpretation is correct, we certainly can now understand why the idea of human

³⁹ Udâna, 8.10.

⁴⁰ Udâna, 80.

personality, though it originated in India, got from the very start there on the wrong track: for the person is merely the individuation of the human essence, it is existential and not merely essential being. We know well enough that this inversion of thought remained inextricably part of all philosophical thought even outside India and how it was only the genius of an Aristotle, who, two centuries later, was able to disentangle from it the very notion of "potentiality" and to discern the element of determinability (*hylê, prima materia*) in all the material universe, reduced to actual existence by a determinant essence (*morphê, forma*).

The Buddha himself entered upon his *parinirvâna* at the age of eighty (in 483 B.C.), when he must have deemed his mission ended. It was during a last peregrination of his, when he was reaching Kuçinâgara, the capital of the Malla country,⁴¹ that his own flame went out. Ânanda is said to have prepared his couch there under two stately çâla⁴² trees in blossom near the river Hiranyavatî, the "Gold River." There to his weeping disciples, for the last time he spoke of the transitory nature of everything, adding: "But do not think that the *dharma* is losing its master and that there will now be no more master. In future let *dharma* and *vinaya*⁴³ be your master. Attend without ceasing to your own deliverance." With this he lost consciousness and peacefully breathed his last. The Mallas arranged for the solemn cremation of his remains, the ashes being

⁴¹ In the modern district of Gorakhpur.

⁴² *Vatica robusta*, yielding valuable timber.

⁴³ "Training instruction," "discipline"; from *naya* = "leading."

distributed among the faithful throughout India. Precious *stûpas* were built as reliquaries for them, the most ancient mentioned being those set up at Bodh-Gayâ, Sârônâth, Sânci, and Barhut. Incidentally they constitute the first historical recorded veneration of relics; the preservation of the remains of the defunct being an idea quite alien to Indian thought, which considers everything connected with death polluting. The ashes therefore are always scattered for the purifying action of water over a running stream near which the cremation has taken place: they disappear completely to mortal sight and thus, according to the primitive Aryan idea, enter the spirit world, a notion which of course also tallied well with the pananimism of Dravidian ideology. At all events it will now be evident what a radical departure from current practice this preservation of the Buddha's relics constituted. It expresses better than anything else could the feeling of utter dependence on their master by his disciples, who clung desperately to any remaining vestige of his for comfort and support; it also proves how, from the very start, loving devotion, *bhakti*, to the person of the Buddha has formed part of his *dharma* and *vinaya*.

3. THE LITERATURE

Vinaya and *dharma* were henceforth to be the master of the Buddha's bereaved disciples: after forty-four years of teaching, both were of course presumed to be well known to all of them. Although the Buddha's life falls into a period when the art of writing had come into current use

in India, he himself is not reported as having reduced any part of his teaching to writing. The monastic rule of life, which came to be technically known as *vinaya*, was obviously a matter punctiliously to be remembered and handed on by oral tradition; and so would the salient points of his many sermons and answers to queries, i.e., the *dharma*. For centuries there seems to have been felt no need in India itself for turning this sacred lore into "scriptures." Only when Buddhism had spread to distant countries of strange speech, such as Ceylon, came the need of canonical writings to be felt. Thus it was only in 80 B.C. that for the first time a Singhalese king, Vettagâmani, caused this oral tradition to be written down. A collection of authentic tradition regarding both *dharma* and *vinaya* had already been decided upon in 247 B.C. at a council of a thousand monks, convened to Pâtaliputra at the instigation of the emperor, Açoka, whose orderly mind was appalled by the dissensions and mutual recriminations of hundreds of sects and subsects into which Buddhism had already split at that time. The language which this Açokan canon of tradition employed is Pâli, and it is in Pâli that it came to be written down in Ceylon.

Pâli ⁴⁴ itself is probably an artificial conflation of three vernaculars spoken at the time: Mâgadhî, Çaurasenî,⁴⁵ and Mâhâraştrî. It is a much elided form of Sanscrit (e.g., *dhamma* for *dharma*, *nibbâna* for *nirvâṇa*); and it has become the sacral language of Buddhism, as against the

⁴⁴ Literally "series," or "series of texts."

⁴⁵ The language of the Mathurâ region.

Sanskrit of Brahmanism, although the Buddha himself deprecated attaching any importance to the letter of what he said. That the Pâli texts regarding *vinaya* and *dharma*, the so-called "baskets," i.e., "collections," of it,⁴⁶ reproduce a very ancient oral tradition, is proved by the fact that no allusion is made to later times, even Açokan, nor to any Singhalese peculiarities. The sect, whose texts were thus "received," seems therefore justly to have borne their name of "The Old School" (*Sthavira vâdin* or *Theravâdin*).

The Vinaya Piṭaka deals entirely with the monastic rule. Its oldest parts are those dealing with *pratimoxa* and *karmavaçya*. "Pratimoxa" (literally, "counterdeliverance") is an enumeration and word by word explanation of the 227 kinds of sin which prevent *moxa*: at stated times the abbot at a "chapter" of his monastery would, after the recitation of each sin, ask if anyone present had been guilty of the sin in question, whereupon public confession and imposition of a penance would follow. Everything indicates that this ceremony goes back to the Buddha himself; it also illustrates how the office of an abbot naturally grew up, almost from the very start. It also explains the fact that each abbot was entirely autonomous, since he represented the Buddha, and the further fact that there was no central authority above the abbots. The result was that interpretation of the Buddha's words was a matter of

⁴⁶ The Vinayapiṭaka and Sûtrapiṭaka (*sutta* in Pali means "lecture"). Usually three baskets (*Tripiṭaka*) are spoken of; but the third, the Abhidharma Piṭaka, is only a systematization made of the second, and dates from between 100 B.C. and A.D. 100.

private judgment, *quot capita tot sententiae*, sects multiplying at a fast and furious rate.

The *karmavaçya* deals with the ritual and ceremonial of the Sangha. Two sections of the Vinayapiṭaka are devoted to it, the Mahâvagga and the Čullavagga. The former deals with the *pratimoxa* ceremonies and those for reception into the Order; also with rules for the clothes, medicines, and transport of the monks, and the settling of disputes and schisms. The Čullavagga is devoted to minor points concerning the daily life of the monks and their behavior toward one another. Around this ancient nucleus of a monastic *Regula*, an accretion of edifying stories and legends soon came to be added, though, by the nature of the subject, to a lesser extent than was the case with the Sûtra Piṭaka.

The Sûtra Piṭaka is a collection of sayings concerning *dharma*, which the Buddha was remembered to have given, each "lecture" beginning: "Thus did I once hear. . . ." Sometimes the form is that of a sermon, sometimes of a dialogue, copiously interlarded with explanatory stories, very much after the *itihâsa* ("thus it was") style of the Mahâbhârata. The two most ancient sections of this Piṭaka are "The Long Lectures" section and that of "Middling Length," ⁴⁷ which seem to go back to the fourth century B.C. Even so, of course there are many obviously later accretions. Most of the contents are in prose; of those in meter (the *gâthâ*) we have already mentioned the lyrics of

⁴⁷ *Dîgha* (= "long") *Nikâya* (= "section") and *Majjhima* (= "of middling length") *Nikâya*.

the Thera and Therî, and the "Dhammapada," both of which are of second century B.C. compilation, as are also the "Jâtaka Gâthâ."⁴⁸ The latter are stories of 546 of the Buddha's former lives, each story beginning: "At such and such a time was born the *Bodhisatva* ⁴⁹ from the womb of such and such a being." They contain fables and popular stories, some of which have been utilized in later times and other climes by such authors as Aesop and Lafontaine (some instance that, of the diffusion of culture). What is historically important is that the *stûpas* of Sânci and Barhut depict already scenes taken from these *Jâtakas*, mentioning sometimes even the titles of these stories, thus proving that in the third and second centuries B.C. the tendency to bhuddicize everything popular, however extrinsic, was in full swing. As it is, the Sûtra Piṭaka is acknowledged to contain the most important literary products of Buddhism.⁵⁰

Although the Pali texts enumerated have been preserved in their entirety, the Sanscrit version of them has come down to us only in fragments. Most of these latter have but recently been discovered in abandoned *vihâras* of Chinese Turkestan; besides, there are numerous quotations from these Sanscrit texts in Indian literature; and finally, there are the translations made of them into Chinese and Tibetan. Therefore, though they once existed, the fact remains that in India, its homeland, this

⁴⁸ *Jâta* = birth.

⁴⁹ I.e., "the being" (*salva*) that was ultimately to reach *bodhi* ("illumination").

⁵⁰ For details see the monumental work of M. Winternitz, *Die Geschichte der Indischen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1920).

canon of scriptures disappeared, as did the sect who maintained it, of *Mûla Sarvâsti-vâdin*.⁵¹ From this fact we can only conclude that, while this Sthavira version was the only brand of Buddhism that happened to reach Ceylon, in India there were ever so many versions of what was really the true meaning of the ambiguous (because pragmatic) teaching of the Buddha, and that in their struggle for existence the Sthavira version went under, being deemed *hîna*, i.e., "deficient."

What was it, then, that this version, presently known as the "Hîna Yâna,"⁵² was deficient in? Its successful rival, the "Mahâyâna," leaves us in no doubt about it: it lacked sufficient devotion to the person of the Buddha, over and above its devotion to his *dharma*. This loving devotion (in Sanscrit, *bhakti*) to the person of the Buddha is, as we have already seen, inherent in all Buddhism, including that of the Hîna Yâna: but in India it received a persistent impetus from Zoroastrian theism, which was lacking in Ceylon. In India therefore the growing tendency among the Buddha's followers was to deify their master and to emphasize more and more his superhumanity, his "supermundaneness," as a prominent sect (the Lokottara Vâdin)⁵³ puts it. Presently, under the influence of the Zoroastrian idea of a Messiah, the Buddha from a teacher became a savior, and under that of the Brâhman, from a

⁵¹ "The Original School, who deem everything to be real," who correspond to the Theravâdin of Ceylon.

⁵² *Yâna*, from *yâ* ("to proceed") = "road"; in Buddhist literature, "vehicle."

⁵³ *Uttara* = "super"; *loka* = "world"; *vâdin* (from *vad* = "speak") = "pro pounder of."

man became the Absolute. These tendencies prevailed in India because there all conditions favored them: but it would be wrong, we repeat, not to see that they are inherent in all Buddhism, which in the last resort is forced to "take its refuge in the Buddha," before it can take refuge in his *dharma*.

It is true that the ideal of the Pali canon is a *jñāna marga*, rather than a *bhakti marga*; that its doctrine is strictly atheist, with, logically at least, no room for prayer and grace. The Buddha is gone, he has reached his *nirvāṇa*, where he can no longer be attained. Did he not state himself: "Be your own lamp, be your own refuge, be your own help"?⁵⁴ For all that, though the Master is no longer in communion with his followers, the latter remain forever in communion with him through the loving veneration with which they surround his memory and through the meditation on him, which is the best preparation for becoming an *arhat*. However rationalist an extreme Theravâdin might be in theory, the cult or some cult of the Buddha remained for him of the essence of his creed. For the monks greater emphasis on *jñāna*, for the laity greater emphasis on *bhakti*: but, as L. de la Vallée-Poussin says, even nascent Buddhism is already essentially a *bhakti* religion and therefore differs *toto coelo* from Jainism.

Further proof of this fact may be found in a Lokottaravâdin scripture of the Hînayâna itself, the *Mahāvastu*,⁵⁵ and in the early date of the most ancient of the Mahâyâna

⁵⁴ Dīgha, 2.

⁵⁵ *Vastu* = "worthy object"; *mahā vastu* = "The Great Theme."

scriptures, the *Lalita Vistâra*; ⁵⁶ the composition of the former going back to the second century B.C., and of the latter to the fourth century B.C., though their final redactions, as now existing, date from six centuries later. Both are in the main biographies of the Buddha, following closely those contained in the canonical Pali scriptures; in fact the narrative of the *Lalita Vistâra* seems even more archaic than that of the *Mahâvaggâ*. But the point of view is quite different: for both *Mahâvastu* and *Lalita Vistâra*, the humanity of the Buddha is not real: he washes his feet, although they are not dusty; he eats, although he suffers no hunger. His life is a divine play, a make-believe; his humanity merely *lilamanuṣya* (= "man in appearance only"), to employ a term used in the *bhakti* cults of Brahmanism and its *avatâras* ⁵⁷ of Viṣṇu. In fact, apart from the latter cults, the further evolution of Buddhism in India, as represented in the *Vaipulya Sûtras* ⁵⁸ of the Mahâyâna, cannot be understood at all. We shall therefore now go back to Brahmanism and consider its response to Zoroastrian theism on the one hand, and to the attitude of loving devotion to the Buddha on the other: a combination of impulses which, as we shall see, transformed Brahmanism into Hinduism, and produced the great *Bhakti* religions of India.

⁵⁶ *Lalita* from *lal* = "play"; *vistâra* = "detailed description."

⁵⁷ *Ava* = "down," *tŗ* = "traverse"; *avatâra* = "descent" (scil., of gods).

⁵⁸ *Vipula* = "extensive" (from *pŗ* = "to fill"); "vaipulya sūtra" therefore = a "deep" or "full treatise."

CHAPTER VII

Bhakti

The Religion of Loving Faith

1. THE EPICS

WE left off our account of Brahmanism at the point where, through contact with proto-Jainism it had produced for its intelligentsia the esoteric doctrines of the upanišads. For the people there remained the routine ceremonies and the sacrificial cult: but soon this popular religion would also be powerfully influenced and transformed; not by the same contact, of course, but on the contrary by that with the theism of Persia. Both developments preserved continuity with Vedas and Brâhmaṇas: the upanišads by attaching themselves to what doctrinal elements there could be discovered; the new popular theism by connecting itself with their legendary and mythological contents.¹

Versified tales of gods and heroes, ballads or panegyrics, demonstrably go back to the Vedic age. The knowledge of these ancient lays and tales was deemed increasingly meritorious and by the time of the Čhandogya Upaniṣad ² they were already referred to as "the fifth Veda." During the

¹ The Mahâbhârata is traditionally linked up to the White Yajur Veda; its heroes appear already in the Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa.

² 7.1.2 and 7.7.1: "The fifth, the Itihâsapurâṇa." *Itihâsa* = "thus it was"; *purâṇa* = "old legend," from *purâ* = "once upon a time."

açvamedha,³ for instance, ten days were devoted exclusively to the recitation and chant of old legends or else of ballads composed *ad hoc* for the glorification of the donor of the sacrifice. The bards of these lays constituted a special caste⁴ of court poets, *sûta*, who at the same time were the royal charioteers; presumably because they were eyewitnesses of the exploits of their royal masters. The body of this epic literature became ca. 500 to 250 B.C. stereotyped and unified, if the term is admissible, into a single poem. The kernel of this poem was an account of the heroic battle between the hundred Kauravas and their five cousins, the Pândavas, two legendary clans of the Bharata tribe: whence it was called the *itihâsa* of the Bharatas, the Bhârata. This original tale ran to 8,800 couplets: today, by dint of continuous incorporation into it of all kinds of extraneous matter, its size has swelled to no less than 100,000 couplets, and its current name has become the Mahâbhârata.⁵ On the one hand, whole new books were tacked on to it; on the other, the original tale was farced, not only with every conceivable legend current at the time, but also with didactic portions on questions of philosophy, of law and science, probably the first example of what today the French would call "la haute vulgarisation." The insertion of these parts was done in a most

³ The grand "horse-sacrifice," the ceremonies of which were spread out over a year, was offered up by a king who claimed universal dominion.

⁴ Said to owe its origin to xatriya-brahmanî unions: a happy metaphor to describe the semi-sacerdotal, semi-military, nature of this epic literature. The minstrels, who went about reciting it among the populace, were on the contrary contemptuously called *kuçîlava* (= "poetasters").

⁵ The Āyvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra mentions already both a shorter and longer version, a Bhârata and a Mahâbhârata.

naive form: the whole twelfth and thirteenth books of the Mahâbhârata, for instance, are supposed to be lectures delivered by Bhîṣma, leader of the Kuru army, as he lay dying on the battlefield. Equally abrupt and unmotivated is the most famous of all these interpolations, *The Song Celestial*,⁶ addressed by his charioteer Kṛṣṇa to the central hero of the epic, Arjuna, the illustrious Pâṇḍava. In short, the Mahâbhârata has become not so much a book, as an encyclopedia of mythology, history, philosophy, and law, meant, not for the professional or priestly caste, but for the people at large, as proved by the fact that it has ever remained, to this day, the most popular book in India.⁷

2. THE BHÂGAVATAS

The part that here concerns us most is the just mentioned Bhagavad Gîtâ, which from being the gospel of the Bhâgavatas,⁸ has ended by becoming that of all India.

Who were these Bhâgavatas, worshipers of The Adorable Lord? Their coming into prominence coincides with the era of greatest Persian influence in India, say between 500 and 200 B.C. There were at first a number of synonyms

⁶ The Bhagavad Gîtâ (*gîtâ* = "inspired song," from *gai* = "to sing" "to celebrate in song"); hence *gîtâ*, its past participle, = "sung."

⁷ Note the proto-Aryan features of the original story which combines the story of a fight (cf. *Iliad*) with that of the travel-adventures of a wandering hero (cf. *Odyssey*).

⁸ This word = "belonging to the Adorable One," *Bhagavat*. The latter word, "adorable" = Nom. *bhagavân* (Vocative *bhagavan*)—*bhaga* = "loveliness," whence *bhagavat* = "possessed of loveliness," goes back to Bhaga, Vedic name of one of the Adityas, i.e., God (e.g., *Bug* in Slavic has become the sole name for God). Bhaga was the divine Dispenser, both of food and of matrimonial affections; the root meaning *bhaj* = "to deal out." Note the connotation of love in all these terms.

for the term, showing that their emergence is not due to a single event, but to a continual infiltration of both ideas and men from the great neighboring empire, the state religion of which was Zoroastrianism. All these synonyms point in this one direction. If Zoroastrianism thus accounts satisfactorily for the monotheistic element in Bhagvatism, it does nothing to explain the element of *bhakti*, which is so characteristic of it. For an explanation and derivation of this we must clearly turn to Buddhism, which during exactly the same period (500–200 B.C.) grew, both extensively in importance and intensively in its loving devotion to the Tathâgata, who had become man in order to save man. Such *bhakti*, i.e., such devotion and gratitude to a person, could never have been produced by Zoroastrianism (nor by its inspiration, the Mosaic dispensation) on the one hand, nor by the eroticism of Mahâdevî worship on the other. What was needed to generate *bhakti* was the feeling of utter dependence on and gratitude to a person, to whom one owes one's highest good, i.e., salvation: and such love his adherents clearly bore to the Tathâgata. If Brahmanism turned a human being into The Absolute, the love of his disciples turned a teacher into the savior, a development powerfully assisted by Zoroastrian monotheism and its expectation of a *saoshyant*. But the principal, because formal, cause of all subsequent Hindu *bhakti* religions is clearly the Buddha, who thus gave to the emergence in history of human personality such an amazingly novel turn.

We shall begin our consideration of Bhâgvatism with

that of the *Sâtvata*.⁹ The word occurs in Mahâbh. VII, 7662, to denote the clan (or caste) to which Arjuna's charioteer, Kṛṣṇa, belonged. Manu X, 23, includes the Sâtvatas among the low-caste people, born from outcaste Vaiçyas and not entitled to wear the sacred thread. This idea a very much later writer, Yâmunâçârya (tenth century of our era), tries very lamely to refute. Anyhow to him we are indebted for the information that the Sâtvatas' profession was the constructing and repairing of temples and images, evidently a craft introduced by them. By order of the king, we are told, "they worship in the temples of Viṣṇu and they are also called Bhâgavatas." Those who adore *Bhagavat* with *sattva* are called *Bhâgavata* and *Sâtvata*, explains Yâmunâçârya. A still more recent Purâṇa, the *Bhâgavata-Purâṇa* (thirteenth century), which, however, contains much ancient material, mentions the Sâtvatas (ix.9.50) as worshipping Bhagavân and Vâsudeva. In the Mahâbh. vi, 66, 41, one Samkarṣana (an elder brother of Kṛṣṇa's) is said to have introduced the *sâtvata* rites in worshipping Vâsudeva. The *Sâtvata* faith, according to the Mahâbhârata, was given by Nârâyana, since when many have held it: its identity with the *ekântin* and the *Pañçarâtra* faith is attested by Pâdma Tantra IV, 2, 88. The conclusion of all this seems to be that the Satvats were originally the masons, introduced from Iran to build in dressed stone and to carve bas-reliefs in the Persian manner. In India their Zoroastrian faith, therefore, came to be

⁹ *Sâtvata* is used in the Vedas for "warrior"; *satvât* in the Brâhmaṇas denotes some undefined people in the south, identified in classic literature with the Yâdavas; *sâtvata* = "relating to the *satvât*."

called the *Sâtvata* faith, i.e. the faith of the Satvats. Their first center, just outside the Persian provinces of the Indus valley, seems to have been Mathurâ: therefore Kṛṣṇa, the Sâtvata, is said to hail from this district. When Greek influences superseded Persian ones with the establishment of Hellenistic kingdoms in northwest India, they are said to have migrated to Kačč, where Kṛṣṇa built his new capital, Dvârka. This was the citadel of the later Kṛṣṇa cult, which from the first thus tried to prove its connection with and derivation from the religion of the Satvat.

With the spread of *sâtvata* ideas in India came naturally their accommodation to and diversification in the Indian milieu. From the texts already quoted we also learn first of the existence of Vasudeva, i.e., people, who have got the *Vasu*¹⁰ for their gods (*deva*): to belong to them, *vâsudeva*, becomes inevitably the patronymic of Kṛṣṇa. The original Vasudeva cult of fire as shining light no doubt was that of the *aggika* mentioned in the Pali texts, both being Indian versions of "fire worshiping" Zoroastrians. In the Mahâbhârata (VI, 65) the Supreme Being, Puruṣottama, is called Vâsudeva and is said to have become incarnate in human form, called there "two sages," by name Nara and Nârâyana; elsewhere (Mahâbh. XII, 341, 41) Nârâyana is made to say: "Being sunlike, I am called Vâsudeva." Pâṇini (ca. 300 B.C.) in his grammar explains *vâsudevaka* as meaning "having the Vasu for gods," whereas Patañjali (ca. 150 B.C.), in his commentary on Pâṇini, explains

¹⁰ From *vas* = "to shine." The Vasu were the gods (i.e., ideas) of brightness and beneficence, that go with the original Agni cult. *Ews and *uśas* (dawn) derive from the same root, *vas*.

Vāsudeva as a synonym for *Bhagavat*. An inscription of the same period refers to a temple of *Vāsudeva* at Ghosunda. We clearly have here a merger of the cult of God as Shining Light with that of God in human form, *nara*,¹¹ the most Indian of all these theistic developments. Before considering this *Nârâyana* cult, we may add that the Satvat religion later on became the “*Ekânta Dharma*”,¹² eventually to be described in the *Hari-Gîtâ*, the *Ekântin* using with predilection *Hari*¹³ as their cult title of God, *Bhagavân Hari*. Although ultimately there is perfect interchangeability between “*Viṣṇu*” and “*Hari*,” the latter term at the start was evidently less affected by polytheism than was the former. In the *Bhagavad Gîtâ*, “*Hari*” simply stands for “*God*” (XI, 9 and XVIII, 77).

Coming now to the *Nârâyana* cult of God as “descended from man,” this term does not occur at all in the *Bhagavad Gîtâ*. The *Taittirîya Āraṇyaka* (X, 1, 6,) identifies *Nârâyana* with *Vāsudeva* and *Viṣṇu*; the *Mahâbhârata* (V, 2568) says that God is called *Nârâyana*, because he is the refuge of men.¹⁴ The real origin of the term must be sought in the sacrificial magic of human sacrifice, which formed part of a ghastly rite lasting five nights. In the *Brâhmaṇas* this Dravidian *pañcarâtra* sacrifice was of course taken over, but sublimated so that there it was the Demiurge, *Puruṣa Nârâyana*, who, by performing the

¹¹ From *nṛ* = man; cf. Greek *anēr*.

¹² = “Having one sole end.” Also called *Ekâyana* = “Path of the One” and “The Bhakti of the *Ekântin*,” as *Nilakantha*’s commentary on the *Mahâbhârata* is named (*Ekântino niṣkāma bhaktâh*”).

¹³ In the Vedas the term means only “yellow,” but later stood vaguely for the solar deity.

¹⁴ Cf. the Buddhistic “I take my refuge in the Buddha.”

puruṣa-medha ("human sacrifice") of himself, thereby became the entire universe.¹⁵ However labored, this adaptation brought into Brahmanism an idea which there was to blossom forth into the concept of divine "descents" (*avatâra*) into human form: the Bhagavad Gîtâ thus (VIII, 4) calls a super-sacrifice (*adhi yajña*) of the Bhagavan his *avataraṇa*, "descent" upon earth in the shape of a human individual. Characteristically Indian is the fact that simultaneously the term Pânçarâtrin¹⁶ lost all its original undertones and became simply a synonym for Bhâgavatas or Vaiṣṇavas.

The term Vaiṣṇava, "worshiper of Viṣṇu,"¹⁷ really is a term belonging to a period subsequent to the one we are now considering, when, heralded by the Bhagavad Gîtâ, Brahmanism had been transformed into Hinduism. Here we would emphasize only that of the two streams of Hinduism, Vaiṣṇavism and Çaivism, though both are definitely theistic *bhakti* religions, the first by attaching itself to solar deities clearly points to Iranian Mithraism as its immediate point of departure, whereas Çaivism is a distinct response to the same stimulus, but its very name proclaiming its close connection with the cult of Mahâdevî, Çiva's spouse.

There remains one other cult name for God in the new

¹⁵ Cf. Çatapatha Brâh. XIII, 6, 1.

¹⁶ The Mahâbhârata, e.g., speaks habitually of the five philosophies or religious sects of Brahmanism: Sâmkhya (atheism), Yoga (asceticism), Vedânta (theopantism), Pânçarâtra (Vaiṣṇava theism) and Pâçupata (Çaiva theism).

¹⁷ Viṣṇu is in the R̥g an insignificant solar deity which, however small, can in three steps (sunrise, noon, sunset) traverse the heavens. Out of this meager metaphor there has been evolved the doctrine of Viṣṇu the Dwarf, so small that he can slip into anything, and with it that of divine immanentism.

theism of India to refer to, and that is Kṛṣṇa,¹⁸ who in modern Bhâgavatism has come practically to monopolize devotion. In the Mahâbhârata, Kṛṣṇa is merely one of the innumerable secondary figures, brought in incidentally. He is described as a clever and unscrupulous fighter, very human indeed, with no hint at divinity. In the Bhagavad Gîtâ itself the framework—a dialogue between Arjuna and his *sûta*, Kṛṣṇa, reported by yet another *sûta*—is obviously just a literary device of the Sâtvata author and a very clumsy and naive one at that: there is no vestige whatever of any Kṛṣṇa cult. In subsequent centuries the identity of Kṛṣṇa as a divine *avatâra* came increasingly to be pressed, though the incongruity of such interpretation with the general character of the figure of Kṛṣṇa in the epic itself was still so keenly felt that new *purâṇas* had to be produced to supply the divine elements hitherto lacking and correct the impression previously created. We thus get the *Harivamsa* ("The Genealogy of Hari") and the *Anugîtâ* ("Epilogue to the Bhagavad Gîtâ"). We repeat, that at the time of the composition of the Bhagavad Gîtâ (ca. 250 B.C.) neither Viṣṇu nor Kṛṣṇa cults had yet developed, nor the doctrine of *avatâras* been worked out, except in the general way, formulated by the Bhagavad Gîtâ (IV, 7-8):

"Whensoever *dharma* fails and *adharma* prevails,
then do I bring myself to bodied birth.
To guard the righteous, to destroy evildoers, to establish
dharma, I come into birth age after age."

¹⁸ Literally = "black."

A translation, one wonders, of Zoroastrian Messianism into Indian parlance?

3. THE SÂMKHYA-YOGA DARÇANAS ¹⁹

As for the Bhagavad Gîtâ itself, the great work which has become the rallying point and gospel of Indian theism, its leading thought is to "show a more excellent way" to the people within the fold of Brahmanism, than that provided by the *karma-yoga* of sacrificial magic or the *jñâna-yoga* of the upanišads and the Sâmkhya and Yoga systems of philosophy. Sacrificial magic and upanišads we are already familiar with: the Sâmkhya and Yoga darçanas as such we have not yet met with, and something must therefore be said about them if we are to understand the Gîtâ's attitude.

The Sâmkhya is the reformulation by a Brahmán author, Kapila (ca. third century B.C.), of the cosmology of the old Dravidian ideology, which we have already studied in connection with Jainism; the Yoga Darçana similarly one by Patañjali (ca. second century B.C.) of the system of asceticism practiced in India since archaic times, likewise well known to us. Evidently Brahmanism at the time was hard put to it in its struggle for survival with this non-brahmán ideology and in defense resorted to its usual method of bodily incorporating alien thought into its own all-comprehensiveness and then passing it off as its very own. The author of the Gîtâ seems to have doubted the

¹⁹ From *sâmkhya* = "calculation." *Darçana* = "teaching," from *dṛṣ* = "to behold."

success of the method and anyhow felt that he possessed a far superior one.

Like Jainism, Kapila's cosmology distinguishes two ultimate substances, spirit and matter, *jīva* and *ajīva*, here called *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Out of *prakṛti*, primal matter, the whole of nature is evolved: first the most subtle elements of it, the mind organs (*buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *manas*),²⁰ then the progressively coarser ones, from the substrates (five each) of perception, action, and sensation, to the five gross elements of ether, air, fire, water, and earth. There are thus counted twenty-three emanations or consolidations of *prakṛti*, constituting with it twenty-four "categories"²¹ and with the soul, *puruṣa*, twenty-five. This is the classical Sāmkhya. But there are two other versions of it: of the materialists, who leave out the last category (the twenty-fifth), and of the theists, who add a twenty-sixth, viz., God.²² It is from its fondness for enumeration as a substitute for explanation that this "system" has been nicknamed "of numbers," *sāmkhya*.

Next in importance to these twenty-three *tattva* of *Prakṛti*, the twenty-three quiddities of matter, come its three *guṇa*,²³ its fundamental "qualities." If *tattva* replies to the question, What is it? the *guṇa* replies to the question, How is it? Thus the "quality" of all things is classified as

²⁰ "Intellect," "self-consciousness," and "thinking," not considered as functions of the soul, but as separate kinds of material "stuff."

²¹ The word used is *tattva* = "that-ness," "quiddity."

²² The Mahābhārata (XII, 318) mentions these three schools of 24, 25, or 26 categories in the Sāmkhya. The Yoga Darśana, as we shall see, calls itself the 26 *tattva* system, a "seviṣvara sāmkhya," i.e., one that serves Īṣvara.

²³ The original meaning of the word is the "strands," of which a rope is composed.

being either *sattva*, *rajas*, or *tamas*,²⁴ three terms which originally referred to the three regions of the universe: the bright heavens, the intermediate region of wind and rain, and the earth. The prominence given to them is quite incomprehensible until one realizes that they most faithfully characterize the three strands of which all Indian thought is still composed: *sattva*, the serene sky of proto-Āryan pastoralism; *rajas*, the region of the thunderstorm of Nordic war ideology; *tamas*, the earth, worshiped by the "black natives" of Dravidian India. Logically indefensible, this doctrine of the three *guṇas* is thus seen to express in the most precise manner the fact that Indian thought is a blend of three fundamental elements, and to explain whence these elements derive and how they came to amalgamate. By way of further proof we may say that not only is this *guṇa* doctrine applicable and still regularly applied to the caste distinctions between Brahmāns, Xatriyas, and Çûdras, but that it is entirely restricted to Indo-Aryan ideology and quite unknown to Jainism²⁵ and proto-Jainism. In Sâmkhya and Indian philosophy generally these terms had perhaps best be translated as the intellectual, kinetic, and inert characteristics of things, if that makes any sense in English. The Bhagavad Gîtâ devotes two of its eighteen chapters (14 and 17) to a discourse on the "Three Guṇa": its illustrations convey perhaps best the still current meaning of these terms. *Sattvic* is called a

²⁴ *Sattva*, "being-ness," "essence"; *rajas* = "region of clouds"; *tamas* = "darkness."

²⁵ The four *guṇa* of Jain philosophy (cf. *supra*, p. 68) are the substrates of touch, taste, smell, and sight.

man "in whose body the light of knowledge springs forth at all its gates"; *rajasic*, when "greed, activity, restlessness, yearning" arise; *tamasic*, when "uncleanness, inaction, and bewilderment arise" (XIV, 11-13). Applied to food, it calls food *sattvic* if it is "moist, oily, firm, cordial"; *rajasic*, if "bitter, sour, salty, pungent, rough, scalding"; *tamasic*, if "dried-up, stale and stinking" (XVII, 8-10). And finally XVIII, 41: "The works of Brahmáns, Xatriyas, Vaiçyas, and Çûndras are severally distinguished by the *guṇas*, sprung from *prakṛti*." The whole point of the *Gîtâ*, as we shall see, is just this, that it proclaims a method whereby "can be transcended these three *guṇas*, whence arises the body (*xetra*) of man, so that the body-dweller (*xetrajña*) may be delivered from birth and pain" (XIV, 20).

The usual term for this "body-dweller" is *puruṣa*. In number the *puruṣa* are, like the *jîva*, infinite, eternal, and completely isolated from one another; thus we see here in *Sâmkhya* a faithful reproduction of Jain monadism. In itself the soul, *puruṣa*, is simply a mirror, reflecting the perpetual changes in the body with which it has got tied up through *karman*; Kapila also compares it to a light which lights up the "mind-stuff."²⁶ This reflection of the body in the mirror of the soul is not an illusion; it is real for the body, but logical only for the soul, which is unrelated and ever free. The illusion consists in self-consciousness making it appear as if the soul, which in itself is actionless and

²⁶ Both similes recur in Plotinus. Kapila's metaphor describes well the psychology of self-consciousness and the distinction between the self-conscious self (*puruṣa*) and its self-consciousness (*buddhi*).

passionless, acted or suffered. It is the (material) mind, which accumulates *karman* and then makes it appear as if the soul had acquired this particular *karman*; it is the suffering of the body when lit up or reflected by the soul. Hence it is only through ignorance (*avidyā*) and failure to distinguish (*aviveka*) that *buddhi* is mistaken for *puruṣa*, and existence becomes dolorous. The moment there is *viveka jñāna*, which realizes the essential difference between body and soul, the complete isolation (*kaivalya*) of the soul is achieved and its deliverance (*moxa*) effected: the soul plunges into an irrevocable, blissful, unconsciousness, while the body is resolved into *prakṛti*. The light lights up, and the mirror reflects, nothing more.

Sâmkhya therefore is purely gnostic: once *buddhi* can make the supreme distinction (*viveka*), it is delivered. Thus matter (since *buddhi* is material) delivers both itself and the *puruṣa*, which *ex hypothesi* needs no deliverance. But it is unprofitable to press the contradictions inherent in the system. The main point for us to realize is that Sâmkhya and Jainism are practically identical; both are atheistic and materialistic and yet both teach the existence of a soul, whose supreme aim it is to be released from matter; which shows once more how inapplicable our terms "atheism" and "materialism" are to all this sort of protophilosophy.

Patañjali's *Yog-Anuśāsana* ²⁷ has naturally undergone many redactions and in its present form dates only from A.D. 450, but its matter goes back to archaic times. These

²⁷ *Anuśāsana* = doctrine," from *śās* = "to instruct."

yoga practices we have already sufficiently studied, from Mohenjo Daro down, and can therefore be quite brief regarding their brahmanical systematization and formulation. Patañjali distinguishes two classes of yoga: that of the means, *Kriyâ Yoga*, and that of the end, *Râja Yoga*. Both are intended to train the will, not the intellect (as does the Sâmkhya).

Kriyâ Yoga ²⁸ is also very aptly called *hatha* ²⁹ *yoga*, since it comprises those ascetical exercises which do violence to ordinary human nature, like the *âsana* (posture), *prânâyâma* (breath), and *nidrâ* ³⁰ (hypnotic) practices, which we already know. As a preliminary, however, there is now demanded of the disciple observance of the moral law: and it is interesting to note that this morality repeats literally the five precepts of Jainism (*ahimsâ*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmaçarya*, and *aparigraha*), adding to them five more, which evidently are of Buddhist origin: *pratipaxa* ³¹ (on an evil thought arising to make an act of the will of the opposite virtue); *muditâ* ³² (cheerfulness); *maitrâyana* ³³ (good will to all); *karunâ* (compassion); and *apexâ* ³⁴ (detachment).

The *Râja Yoga* or "Chief Yoga" consists no longer of physical, but of purely spiritual exercises, *dhâraṇa* ³⁵ (men-

²⁸ *Kriyâ* = "labor"; from *kṛ* = "to do."

²⁹ *Hatha* = "Violence."

³⁰ *Nidrâ* is used more for "drowsiness"; *svap* (Greek, *hypnos*) means "deep sleep," either natural or of death.

³¹ *Paxa* = "flank"; *pratipaxa* = "opposite side."

³² From *mud* = "to be glad."

³³ From *mitra* = "friend."

³⁴ From *ix* = "to look at," and *apa* = "away from."

³⁵ From *dhṛ* = "to hold."

tal concentration), *dhyâna* ³⁶ (meditation), and *samâdhi* ³⁷ (contemplation). *Dhâraṇa* is negative: it is the effort of keeping one's thoughts from wandering and bringing them back to the single idea one intends to think about, e.g., Īṣvara, "the Lord." *Dhyâna* is positive and active: it is thinking about that single idea itself. *Samâdhi* is passive: the mind merely contemplates what the object, previously meditated on, imparts. This would be contemplation in the Christian sense, if Indian philosophy did not explain it as an identification of subject and object. The highest stage is held to have been reached when the contemplative is no longer aware of the contemplated, but loses consciousness altogether: the *puruṣa* is then believed to have got rid of its connection with even the most subtle matter, "mind-stuff" (here called *ċitta*), ³⁸ to have obtained deliverance (*moxa*) and thus its pure pristine solitariness (*kaivalya*).

Ċitta, therefore, in this philosophy is intimately connected with *ċesta* (conduct), since the will can set upon itself by restraining and controlling itself. The tendency to *moxa* is said to be imbedded in the will as part of its nature, whereas its tendency to *samsâra* is a subsequent, accidental acquisition. Therefore all that promotes *moxa* is called meritorious (*puṇya*), ³⁹ and all that promotes per-

³⁶ From *dhî* = "thought."

³⁷ *Idem*.

³⁸ From *ċit* = "intend"; hence *ċitta* = "will." In Sâmkhya, as we have seen, this "mind-stuff" is called *buddhi* ("intelligence"): necessarily so, since the Sâmkhya is gnostic, whereas the Yoga System is volitionist.

³⁹ Originally "auspicious" and "inauspicious." Note the theistic leaven at work in matter originally put forward by atheistic magic, and changing the meaning of these terms.

petuation in *samsâra* is sinful (*pâpa*). *Āitta* contains all the stored-up impressions and dispositions of previous lives (*karman*), which however are not all lit up simultaneously, since those inappropriate to the present life remain below the threshold of consciousness. But any act that a person has once enjoyed so impresses *āitta*, that it tends to repeat it in this life or another. Hence the need of eradicating by yoga practice such impressions as tend to *samsâra*. The goal, *moxa*, implies the cessation of all activities of *āitta*, a state called *nirvṛtti*,⁴⁰ i.e., a sort of *harakiri* of the individual *āitta*, which then sinks back into primal matter (*prakṛti*).

Now, Patañjali's formulation, significantly enough, introduces a theistic note into this inherently atheistic ideology. For him God is *Īṣvara*,⁴¹ "the Lord," a name derived from that of husband of the mother goddess (*Īṣa* in later Hinduism). Patañjali explains God as one of the *puruṣa* that never got mixed up with *prakṛti*, and even as desiring the deliverance of all other *puruṣa* and as helping them in their meritorious endeavors. Logically, of course, God is an incongruity in this system, of which Jainism is the only consistent exposition. The fact remains that for Brahmanical circles, at a time when the tide of Sâtvata theism was flowing so strongly, this philosophy was pressed

⁴⁰ From *vṛt* = "to revolve," "to go on."

⁴¹ From *īṣ* = "to be master of"; thus *Īṣvara* is the exact equivalent of *Dominus*. We suggested (*Protohistory*, p. 207) that the concept of God as "Lord" was first formulated in Babylonia: now *Īṣvara* is just a translation of *Bel*, *Ishara* being the Kassite word for it (*ibid.*, p. 319). Moreover, the word *ish* itself is Semitic: in Hebrew *ish* and *baal* remained synonyms (for *lord* and *husband*), until Hosea (2.18-19) insisted on the substitution of *ish* in all words compounded with *baal*, because of the latter word's pagan connotation.

into the service of devotees of Īṣvara, "the great Yogin," who was now identified with Bhagavân, the very word "yoga" now coming to be used in the special sense of "devotion to God": a sense the use of which was consecrated above all other writings by the Bhagavad Gîtâ.

4. THE BHAGAVAD GÎTÂ

In the Mahâbhârata, as it stands, the Bhagavad Gîtâ forms part of Book Six, one of the five books (out of a total of eighteen) devoted to describing the great battle on Kuruxetra between Pâṇḍavas and Kauravas. The exact point where the Gîtâ is inserted is a scene, describing the dismay of Arjuna, leader of the ultimately victorious Pâṇḍava host, who is appalled by the idea of the imminent dreadful slaughter of his kinsmen, and who is being cheered up by his charioteer, Kṛṣṇa. The dialogue between the two men continues in the best epic style up to what is now chapter 2, verse 38, of the Gîtâ, when there starts a didactic treatise in poetical form of an altogether different style and ethos. The role of the two men is reversed: Arjuna becomes a mere foil to the teachings uttered by his charioteer, who now assumes the aspect of the Lord, Īṣvara, himself. The last two verses of what I hold to be the original epic, run as follows:

37. "If thou be slain, thou wilt win Paradise;
 if thou conquer, thou wilt have the joys of the earth;
 therefore rise up resolute for the fray.
38. Holding in indifference alike
 pleasure and pain, gain and loss, conquest and defeat,

so make thyself ready for the fight, thus shalt thou get no sin." ⁴²

It is on these last lines as a text that a later hand seems to me to have written an exposition of a new doctrine of Yoga, wherewith he meant to transcend the current Sâmkhya-Yoga teachings. The *svadharma* principle, that every caste has a law of its own, is summed up later on again toward the end of the Gîtâ and explained as sprung from the *guṇas* (XVIII, 41), to comply with which is natural:

XVIII, 47. "There is more happiness in doing one's own *dharma* poorly

than in doing another's *dharma* brilliantly.

In doing work assigned by nature, one incurs no stain.

48. The work to which one is born one should not forsake, defective though it be; for defective are all doings, as smoky are all fires."

Transcending this doctrine of *svadharma*, the Lord is made to say in a verse which the greatest Indian interpreters of the Gîtâ, including Râmânuja, consider to be the very summit to which all preceding chapters lead up:

XVIII, 66. "Surrendering all *dharmas*, come for refuge to me alone.

I will deliver thee from all sins. Grieve not."

In the following verses, that conclude the Gîtâ —it ends with XVIII, 78 ⁴³—this new teaching is in so many words

⁴² Which he would incur if he, of Xatriya caste, refused to fight. In making the break after verse 38, I follow Schrader.

⁴³ The concluding verses 73-78 are placed in the mouth of the narrator and signify merely: "The End."

called its "supreme secret," reciting which "among my worshipers with supreme devotion toward me he shall assuredly come to me; none shall be dearer to me on earth than he" (XVIII, 68-69).

This great and new doctrine of his the author of the *Gîtâ* calls a superior kind of yoga, surpassing all others practiced so far. Neither the teachings of the *Sâmkhya* nor of the *Yoga Darçana* (properly so called) are contradicted as false by him—would he be Indian, if he were not syncretistic?—they are true, as far as they go, but inferior. Against the *jñâna yoga* of the one and the *karma yoga* of the other, he proclaims however the sovereign power of *bhakti yoga* to lead man out of *samsâra* to *moxa*.

Bhakti, a term so happily translated "loving faith" by a great modern bhakta,⁴⁴ lends itself particularly to use in conjunction with yoga in this new sense, which really is the original sense.⁴⁵ The *Sâmkhya* had spoken of the "yoking together" of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*: the *Gîtâ* now pleads for a yoking of the soul with Bhagavân in "loving faith," *bhakti*. This "loving faith" of his devotee is returned by Bhagavân's loving kindness, *prîti*:⁴⁶ *sa me priyah* ("dear is he to me") in the refrain of such a beautiful passage (XII, 13-20), as, for example:

"Subdued of spirit, steadfast of purpose,
who has set mind and understanding on me

⁴⁴ Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar. For the role of *bhakti* in Buddhism, see *supra*, pp. 103 ff. *Bhakta* is the past participle of *bhaj* and means "devoted to"; *bhakti*, a noun derived therefrom, "devotedness."

⁴⁵ From *yuj* = "to harness," "to yoke."

⁴⁶ From *prî* = "to be pleased with," "to show kindness to." Cf. Açoka's name "Devanâmpriya" = "dear to the gods."

In worship of me,

Dear is he to me.

He who is equable to foe and friend, in honor and dishonor,
In heat and cold, in joy and pain, free from other attachment,
In worship of me,

Dear is he to me."

There is another word of great importance used in a novel way in this connection by the Gîtâ, the word *prasâda*,⁴⁷ which originally means "a food offering" made to a deity; an offering, part of which was afterward distributed by the priest among the worshipers as the deity's "gracious gift" to them. Hence *prasâda* is used in the Gîtâ to mean "kindness" or, as it is usually translated, "grace." Thus the Bhagavân is said by *prasâda*, by an undeserved act of grace, to reveal to Arjuna his "supreme form" (XI, 47); a grace bestowed for "faith" and not for "works":

XI, 48. "Not for study of Vedas, not for sacrifices, alms, works,
not for grim mortifications may I be beheld in such
shape"

54-55. "But through undivided devotion by him who is surren-
dered to me

Who is devoted to me, void of other attachment,
Without hatred to any born being, he verily comes to me,
By him may I be known and seen in truth and entered."

This is a grace, moreover, offered by Bhagavân to all man-
kind alike, without any distinction of sex or caste:

IX, 29. "I am equable to all born beings, there is none whom I
hate or favor:

All that worship me with devotion dwell in me and I in
them;

⁴⁷ From *sad* = "to sit down," especially at a sacrifice. Hence *prasad* = "to be pleased with a sacrifice," "to be gracious."

32. Even those born in sin—women, Vaiçyas, Çûdras—
If they turn to me, come to the supreme path.
30. Even if a great evil-doer worships me with undivided
worship,
Speedily he becomes righteous of soul and comes to last-
ing peace.
33. How much more then shall righteous Brahmáns and de-
vout Xatriyas?
Be assured that none devoted to me is lost.”

Thus it will be seen that all that matters is *madyoga* (“joining himself to me”). The *madbhakta* (“who is devoted to me”) worships the Bhagavân as supreme Lord of all yoga, Yogeçvara. For whatever a man puts his faith in, that he himself will become:

- IX, 25. “Whose devotion is centered on the *devas*, will go to *deva-
valoka*,
On the *pitř* to *pitřloka*, on the *bhûta* to the *bhûta*.⁴⁸
On me, to me.”

In the splendid passage which follows, the Gîtâ lays down the only right way by which to escape from the bondage of one’s activity (*karman*):

- IX, 27. “Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever
thou wishest to sacrifice,
Thy gifts and thy mortifications, do all as an offering
to me.”

What counts is not the magnitude or the liturgical exactitude of the gift, but the loving intention with which it is offered:

⁴⁸ Literally “become,” past participle of *bhû*; hence “a being.” Here, however, not so much used in the meaning “creatures” as in the special meaning (unknown to the Vedas, but current in classical Sanscrit) of “ghosts.”

IX, 26. "If one of earnest spirit offer me a single leaf or flower,
This offering of devotion is what I take joy in."

The whole chapter ends with the injunction "Bhajasva mân" ("love me"), and with this injunction of uniting oneself to God by love, and to Him alone, we have reached the sublime summit of theism, as well as of the Gîtâ.

With this single-minded devotion (*ekabhakti*) to the Beloved (Bhagavân), Indian thought has traveled far indeed from the Jain and proto-Jain *taedium vitae*, caused by the vanities of *samsâra*. Can we doubt that this new note of affectionate devotion to Bhagavân came into the world of Indian thought through the deep personal passion for all creatures of the Buddha, and the response made thereto by his loving disciples, typified by Ânanda? Both Buddhists and Bhâgavats have in common that ethos of universal benevolence (*maitrî*), of equable temper (*samatva*),⁴⁹ of serenity (*çam*, *çânti*); but for both this ideal beauty of icy purity is as suffused by the rosy hues of human love of a person: *bhagavân* Buddha there, *bhagavân* Hari here.

Samatva the Gîtâ explains in the celebrated passage ending with the words: "samatvam yoga uçyate" ("samatva is this yoga called"):

- II, 47. "For the deed only strive thou
Never for results.⁵⁰
Let not the deed's fruit thy motive be
Nor be attached to inactivity.
48. In this yoga firm do thy deeds,

⁴⁹ For *samatva* in Jainism, see *supra*, p. 70; in Buddhism, see p. 84.

⁵⁰ *Phala* = "fruits."

All other attachment renouncing.⁵¹
 In success, in failure, the same thou be:
Samatva is this yoga called."

Not the Stoic (or rather, Jaina) impassivity of the *samnyâsin* is here preached, but renunciation (*tyaj*) of setting one's heart on the things one does ("karma phala tyâga"): that sort of renouncer, we are told (VI, 1-2), is the true *samnyâsin*, the true yogin, not the *vânâprastha* or *parivrâjaka*.⁵² The classic metaphor used for such a one who performs his acts without attachment (*sangam tyaktva*) is "the lotus leaf unsullied by the water" (V, 10). Like the Buddha, Bhagavân is eminently that Lotus: "Activity does not stain me, since I desire not its fruits" (IV, 14). In other words, God has nothing to gain by creation or from creatures; if in the Gîtâ this last conclusion fails to be drawn in this precise formulation, it is only because paganism has everywhere failed to conceive of a creation *ex nihilo*.

Even so, what advance beyond the doctrine of the early upanišads! Their authors of course also taught, as did Jainism, the need of loosening the bonds of action (*karma-bandha*), but they could do so only negatively, by way of detachment. Theirs could not be a positive method; for the latter implies attachment to a person, and these early upanišads know nothing of a personal God to whom the *jñânin* could attach himself. For the *jñânin* there was only one way, that of detachment, detachment from themselves,

⁵¹ "Attachment" = *sanga*; "renounce" = *tyaj*.

⁵² The "wandering about" religious mendicant.

i.e., their *âtman*, and realization that their selves are nothing *qua* their own selves, but Brâhman. Against this upanišadic endeavor of realizing one's identity with an impersonal world-soul, the Gîtâ holds out to the *bhâgavata* the ultimate prospect of fellowship, *sâdharmya*,⁵³ with the adorable Lord: a fellowship which as definitely rules out the soul's identification with Brâhman, as its monadism in Jainism.

5. BRÂHMAN AND ÎÇVARA

The great difficulty remained of reconciling the two ideas, the personal God of Bhâgata theism and the world-soul of upanišadic theopantism. For the constitutionally syncretistic Indian mind cannot bear a clear-cut "either—or": it refuses to recognize contradictions and, ages before Hegel, thinks only of resolving theses and antitheses into higher syntheses.

The Bhagavad Gîtâ contents itself to explain, in a passage which begins:

"He who at his last hour, when he casts off the body, goes hence, Remembering me, assuredly comes to my state of being,"⁵⁴

that Bhagavân is "That Brâhman," the super-self (*adhyâtma*), the superbeing (*adhibhûta*), the super-god (*adhidaivata*), the super-sacrifice (*adhiyajña*), who sums up all that has previously been said about him, in however diverse and halting a manner.

The upanišadic circles themselves are more explicit,

⁵³ XIV, 2.

⁵⁴ *Madbhâvam yâti*, VIII, 5.

strongly affected as they are by the tendency to *bhakti* which beat upon them from the East by the loving worship of Bhagavân Buddha in the Mahâyâna on the one hand, and from the West by that of Bhagavân Hari in the theism of the Sâtvas on the other. We refer here to the upanišads of the second group: more particularly to two of them by way of example: the one called in so many words "The Lord's Upaniṣad";⁵⁵ another, the Çvetâçvatara Upaniṣad. In both, repeated appeal is made to a personal, supreme Lord, Îçvara, who, in the Çvet. Up., is identified with Rudra,⁵⁶ the roaring chief of the storm-gods,⁵⁷ whose terrifying nature is propitiatingly glossed over by euphemistically calling him Çiva, "Gracious One." The problem of these authors was, as we said, how to reconcile this new idea of a personal Lord, Îçvara, with a superessence of all essences,⁵⁸ Bráhmaṇ; and its "solution," as usual, was by way of a pun: Bráhmaṇ (neuter) is said to be really the same as Brahmán (masculine), who is none other but Îçvara.⁵⁹ Moreover, this Îçvara, known elsewhere as Hari, is in the Çvet. Up., by another pun now addressed as Hara,⁶⁰ a word henceforth used as a synonym for Çiva.

⁵⁵ The Îçâ Upaniṣad is so called after the first word of it, Îçâ ("in the Lord," *scil.*, "let there disappear the whole world").

⁵⁶ For Soma and the Rudras, see *Protohistory*, pp. 267, 269.

⁵⁷ The Marut. This Vedic deity was appropriated by the Dravidian Mother Goddess cult and there became her husband, Mahâdeva. Cf. the use still made of the "bull-roarer" in fertility cults

⁵⁸ The idea (in Greek philosophy) of an *on ontis*.

⁵⁹ In the Bř. Ār. Up. 2.3.1 we have a first reference to "the forms of Bráhmaṇ the material and immaterial, the mortal and immortal, the solid and fluid, *sat* and *tya*."

⁶⁰ From *hř* = "to destroy." In modern times the battle cry of the Marâthas, invoking Hara, has ended in English by becoming the non-committal "hurrah."

The actual way of reconciling Bráhman with Brahmán is done by discovering “in the Highest Bráhman a triad” (1.7). “There are two, *Îçvara*, the knowing, and *jîva*, the unknowing, both unborn, one strong, the other weak. There is she (*prakṛti*), also unborn, through whom man’s *karman* is wrought, and there is the infinite Self, appearing under all forms, but himself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is Bráhman” (1.9). By way of illustration the author compares this triad “to the two pieces of wood (*jîva* and *prakṛti*) which rubbed together produced the fire, “the bright god,” *Îçvara* (1.14). This magic knowledge itself he calls Bráhman: “By knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been declared to be threefold, and this is Bráhman” (1.12): for, as the author has just said (1.11), “only *kevalatvam* (the state of aloneness) is bliss.” Hence that triad also is nothing ultimate, but must in the last resort be reduced to the Absolute One-ness, Bráhman, the Word of Magic Power. Thus logically a single concept is made to cover three ontologically distinct “absolutes”: *Îçvara*, *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*. As all three are eternal, but the last two are ruled by *Îçvara*, theism is vindicated in fact, after due lip-service having been paid to Bráhman: “That which is *first put in motion* ⁶¹ is perishable; the immortal and imperishable is Hara. That one God rules both the perishable and the *puruṣa*” (Çv. Up. 1.10). “There is one Rudra only, without a second, who rules all the worlds. He stands behind all


⁶¹ I.e., *prakṛti*. The word used here is *pradhāna*. Both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are of course used here in the sense familiar to us from the Sāmkhya philosophy. Note that the material world is only “set in motion,” not created, by God.

puruṣa's and at the end of time rolls up the worlds he produced" (3.2). "Know then, *prakṛti* is art (*māyā*) and the Lord the artist (*māyin*)" (4.10). "Let us know that highest lord of lords, the deity of deities, the master of masters, the highest above, as God, Lord of the world, Bhagavân" (6.7).

Although this passage is a clear and unambiguous profession of theism, expressing the leading thought of the upaniṣad, the fact remains that by it the impersonal Bráhman has not been set aside as untrue. It could not be, since personality was never properly thought out in India, but always only imagined. Hence a person was something man's imagination could get a hold of; therefore also something material. Quite naturally therefore a personal God, *Īṣvara*, must have seemed to Indian thought a concession to human weakness: God in Himself must be other than *Īṣvara*, which otherness they could only think meant something impersonal. The loving faith of these people yearned for *Īṣvara*, their reasoning, precisely because it was faulty, brought them back again and again to Bráhman. This is the great tragedy of all Indian thought: that it misconceived the truth it attained to and, rightly rejecting the misconception, wrongly took its stand on what is not true; that it made the great discovery of human personality, only to cast it away in the end in the pursuit of an *ignis fatuus*, which has led them deeper and deeper into the morass.

With this we may bring to a close our exposition of the genesis of philosophy in the India of the period (750-184

B.C.) under consideration. It is a chapter of history little known except to specialists, but obviously one of utmost general interest, since this period brought to birth the queen of all human sciences, philosophy, and since without a knowledge of it the singular importance of India for the development of human thought, and therefore that development itself, cannot be fully understood.




PART II

CHINA (1122-206 B.C.)¹

¹ An account of Chinese history up to 1122 B.C. will be found in our *Proto-history*. Chinese characters of words transliterated will be found in an Appendix, pp. 333-41.

CHINA'S
 "WARRING STATES"
 (479 - 206 B.C.)



CHAPTER VIII

The General Background

THE period we are now entering upon is the great formative period of ancient China, lasting from the advent of the Jou kings in 1122 B.C. to that of the Han emperors in 206 B.C. This period itself is clearly divided by the fall of the western Jou in 771 and the death of Confucius in 479 into three parts: the first, from 1122 to 771, being the time of royal power, the second, from 771 to 479, that of feudal power, and the third, from 479 to 206, that of civil war.

1. THE ROYAL PERIOD (1122-771)

The fall of the Shang dynasty is traditionally pictured as due to a single battle: with Bishop² we believe that it did not come melodramatically like that, but that the process of Jou superseding Shang was a long drawn-out affair of the best part of a century. The Jou on all accounts came from the west, i.e., the present province of Kansu, and were at the time considered "barbarian" by the Chinese. They must have been originally a pastoralist tribe (Iranian?) in process of sinification. The most striking feature of their pastoralist type of civilization is their

² C. W. Bishop, *Origin of the Far Eastern Civilizations* (Washington, 1942), p. 22.

worship of Heaven, Tien, the typical father-god of this civilization, symbolized by the sky, and not Di, who, as we saw,³ was the supreme ancestor-god of the Shang. We therefore have here another reversal of the usual course of events, in that in China the primary Aryan sky-god came after the secondary Nordic thunderstorm-god had already been established there. Fortunately the Jou kings stood firm in their allegiance to Tien and indeed turned his cult into a sort of dynastic prerogative, proclaiming themselves to be "sons of Heaven," Tien Dze, and thereby wiping the slate clean of the Shang ancestor cult of Di. The latter expression has continued in the Chinese language, but always in a subordinate connotation of *divine*, the Heaven-Father ideology prevailing.⁴ Hand-in-hand with this cult went of course socially a patriarchal order, a patrilineal succession, which superseded what still remained of matriarchy in Shang times, such as succession to nephew.⁵ The Jou kingship was sacral, the king's authority going back to a "mandate of Heaven," Tien ming: a concept that has ruled all Chinese civilization down to our own day. Originally it may have meant primarily that as Heaven's delegate the king had to second the heavenly order of nature by sympathetic magic: ultimately the

³ See our *Protohistory*, p. 250.

⁴ The main survival is the obviously syncretistic full title of God as Hwang Tien Shang Di: "Sovereign Heaven Supreme Divinity"; the title for emperor being Hwang Shang, "Supreme Sovereign."

⁵ An interesting example is that according to court ritual the dying king had to charge the Grand Protector, Tai Bao, the highest ranking noble, with the duty of seeing to it that the succession was actually transferred from his brother or sister's son to his own first-born son. Cf. H. Maspéro, *La Chine antique* (Paris, 1927), p. 153.

spiritual principle inherent in it came into due prominence, viz., that "authority comes from God only."⁶ One thing is certain: that the character for Heaven dates only from Jou times and never occurs during the Shang period. "The Tien deity originated among the Jou people and was brought east by them at the time of conquest," sums up Creel.⁷

The Jous of course were originally chieftains of a tribe, which after the conquest became a noble caste, lording it over the plebeian masses, much in the way the Shangs and their nobles had done before. The distinction between nobles (with the king at their head) and the servile population subject to them, was fundamental. Only the members of the ruling caste had ancestors and therefore souls that could become ancestral spirits, *shen*; the serfs had only such as could become ghosts, *gwe*.⁸ The nobles' marriage, *hun*, was a sacramental part of ancestor worship: it was sealed by the bride's participating in a ritual oblation to her husband's ancestors; the plebeians' marriage, *ben*, was a ritual form of elopement. The patricians were persons,⁹ being gentlemen, *she*; the plebeians, individuals

⁶ Rom. 13:1. Chinese tradition, as ultimately formulated, mentions as a first Jou ruler one Wen, a word which means "cultured," whose successor Wu, i.e., "warrior," was called upon in 1122 to overthrow the last Shang king, one Jou, who is described as a tyrant and in Chinese literature has become the typical "wicked king," who "blasphemes Heaven and oppresses the people," against whom to rebel is meritorious. The tyrant Jou is not to be confounded with the model Jou.

⁷ H. G. Creel, *Studies in Early Chinese Culture* (Baltimore, 1937), I, 51.

⁸ R. Grousset: *Histoire de l'Extrême-Orient* (Paris, 1929), I, 186.

⁹ They alone were entitled to have a "house" name, *hsing*, and as traditionally there were only a hundred noble "houses," the snobbery that went with subsequent democratization has had the unfortunate result, that the 450 million

of a herd, *nung*,¹⁰ being serfs, attached to the glebe: for all the land, of course, was parceled out among the nobles, who held it in fief from the king.

The distinction also comes out clearly in the syncretistic cult of both Heaven (Tien), the god of the ruling caste, and Earth (Di), the mother-goddess of the serfs. The patriarchal mentality of the nobles had only gods originally, and therefore also a divine male ruler of the royal or princely domain (*She* or *Hou Tu*); but the pressure of the old earth-mother concept has proved too strong, and in due course *hou*, "ruler," changed sex and became "queen"—*Hou Tu* today meaning "Queen Earth." And to cap it, both Di and Tu remain in use to express "earth," the former meaning more the actual soil, and the latter a place.

The arable land of the fiefs was divided into eight-family-blocks, each of which was subdivided into nine squares, somewhat after the fashion of *dzing*, the Chinese character for "well," for which reason it is called "the *dzing* system." According to it, the eight outer squares are assigned, one each, to the eight families of serfs for their own use, whereas the ninth, inner square had to be cultivated by the eight families in common for the benefit of their lord. The relationship between lord and serfs, as well as between king and lords, was a personal one and its scope so simple and restricted that tradition and customary law

Chinese of today have to share out among themselves no more than a hundred family names. Actually there are 438 names, but they are currently called "The Hundred Names."

¹⁰ The same word means "agriculture."

sufficed to rule it. This customary law (*li*) in later times became "social etiquette" and as such was codified, when written laws, promulgated by the will and authority of individual rulers, had come into use. Today the word *li* has come to stand for "traditional ceremonies" and "good manners," and one therefore does not understand the importance attached to it by philosophers like Confucius, unless one realizes that originally, in ancient Jou times, *li* was the equivalent of the Indian *dharma*, "social traditional rule," and of the Roman *mores* ("customs"): but whereas both *dharma* and *mos* have developed in the direction of "morality," *li* has developed in that of "ceremonial," though all three words go back to a time which did not yet distinguish between statute law and custom, nor between manners and morals.

The patricians formed, of course, a professional warrior-caste; that they constituted also a ruling caste was merely incidental to that fact. In battle each noble house acted as a distinct contingent. At the center was the chariot and on it a charioteer, a lancer, and an archer, all nobles; around it, north, south, east, and west, were four platoons of infantry, twenty-five men each, all serfs. The nobles in the chariot were clad in hide-armor, the peasant levies were armed with dagger-axes. The commissariat consisted of ox carts and pack-oxen, following behind with the provender. There was hardly any central plan: free enterprize was untrammelled, and a battle was just a glorified free fight. The importance attached to horses is illustrated by

the fact that the Minister of War (one of the three chief ministers of the king) ¹¹ was called "Master of the Horse."

An important place was held by the diviners, who were consulted before every greater undertaking, to ascertain whether the omens were favorable or what was the will of the gods. The latter enquiry was done by "consulting the tortoise," as of old, but a newer method also developed with the art of writing, viz., that of the "eight trigrams" (*ba gwa*),¹² which were held to be the systemization of the haphazard cracks in the tortoise-shell. Writing itself was done on bamboo slips and became general among the upper classes. Reverence to divinities and men was expressed by kneeling, bowing, and prostrating oneself, the Iranian method, known to the ancient Greeks as *proskynêsis*, and not by the Malay method of squatting on one's haunches.¹³ On the other hand, agriculturalist traits connected with the fertility ideology of the Yangtze Valley people and of regions still further south seeped in also: thus the belief in dragons as beneficent rain-senders, and such practices as tugs-of-war, ceremonial swinging, and bull-fights.¹⁴ Music and dancing as a magic ritual were prevalent, the dancers being "witches" who by dancing and drinking worked themselves up into a frenzy, the seance often end-

¹¹ The other two were the Minister of the Servants and the Minister of the Demesnes. Above them was the Chief Minister or Secretary of State.

¹² Cf. long and broken lines:



¹³ Bishop, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42. But if the idea came from the southeast, the artistic representation came from the northwest i.e., Babylonian *motifs* (dragon, griffin) transmitted to China through Scythian art. Cf. H. d'Ardenne de Tizac, *L'art chinois classique* (Paris, 1926), pp. 66 ff.

ing as a general drunken orgy,¹⁵ typical of the fertility cult. The supreme sacrifice was the hog-ram-bull sacrifice, the exact parallel of the Roman *suovetaurile*: if offered to the manes of the ancestors, the bull had to be white; if to the Earth-Mother, black; if to Di, red. In place of the sexagesimal system of the Shang, the Jou introduced a calendar of seven-day weeks.

The whole of this early Jou period has subsequently been idealized by the Confucian and other philosophers, who tried to get out of the then prevailing chaos by going back to the "kingly ways" (*wang dao*) of sacral kingship. The successor of King Wu was a minor when his father died; therefore his uncle assumed the regency between 1116 and 1109. He is known as "the Duke of Jou" and with King Wen is considered the creator of ancient Chinese culture which still goes by the name of "the Jou civilization." The surviving literature of that period was consequently hailed as "classic" and neatly classified, tucked away, and preserved as "The Three Classics," *dy-ing*, i.e., "Ballads" (*she*), of "History" (*shu*); and of "changes" (*i*). The *She Dying* is a collection of 305 court and folk songs from the various feudal states into which the Jou kingdom was divided. Some may even antedate the Jou, but this is doubtful.¹⁶ The *Shu Dying* is a collection of speeches, prayers, etc., uttered on certain historical occasions, but only a few of them seem to date genuinely

¹⁵ Cf. Maspéro, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

¹⁶ According to Y. L. Fung (*A History of Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Derk Bodde. Peiping, 1937, I, 415), to whose scholarly work I am indebted for the whole of this section.

from the time assigned to them; the majority of them are of much later composition. The *I Dying*, however, dates certainly from the early times of the Jou, only the ten appendixes being quite late additions. On the other hand, though the bulk of these classics was written during early Jou times, the final redaction of the texts, as now extant, dates only from Han times, i.e., after 206 B.C. At all events it is evident what treasury of information regarding the early Jou period these classics constitute. Historically interesting as they therefore are, their importance far transcends this special historical value: for it is not too much to say that on these classics as a foundation there rests the whole of subsequent Chinese culture and that by their study, the *Dying Hsüé*, the entire subsequent intellectual and literary life of China has been fed.

2. THE FEUDAL PERIOD (771-479)

The end of the royal house of Jou at Hsian came in 771. In 780 already there had appeared on the western frontiers of their kingdom a troop of new barbarian invaders, the Hsyen Yün, who have been identified with the Cimmerians: nine years later they were able to sack Hsian and put the king to death. The survivors fled to Loyang, and there the dynasty was continued under the name of eastern Jou, nominally from 771 to 256 B.C. Kansu and Ninghsia were now settled by other Scythian tribes, the Yuéshe, who were to play later on such an important part in Indian history: throughout the whole of the period under review the Scythian influence on Chinese art is most marked. The

spread of iron tools in the sixth century and the introduction of metallic money in the fifth century obviously goes back to the same culture contact.

Chinese tradition calls this period that of the "Spring and Autumn Annals,"¹⁷ covering the years from 722 to 481: a period which we shall roughly follow, and which incidentally extends from the first astronomically determinable date in Chinese history, an eclipse of the year 776, to the death of Confucius in 479 B.C.

The eastern Jou from the very start were a mere shadow of the early Jou kings. Real power had departed from their hands. That they remained even as figure-heads was due solely to the sacral nature imputed to their kingship. The great feudal lords or "dukes" became quite independent of the royal house *de facto*, if not *de jure*: and what unity of the country at large still existed was maintained through the leadership of the most powerful duke at the time. Such hegemony was first exercised by Duke Hsian of the Chi state (685-643). The last noble who is reckoned to have been such a "leader" (*Ba*), is a ruler of the Chu state (631-591). However, he was no longer content to call himself duke of that state, but king. Thus within two centuries even the fiction of Jou *de jure* kingship had broken down. The *Ba* have always had a very bad press in China, since Mencius defined these *führers* as rulers who "using force, make a pretense at virtue, whereas legitimate kings

¹⁷ *Chun Tsiou*, "Spring and Autumn," are brief annals of events concerning the small state of Lu covering the period mentioned; in the third century B.C. a commentary on these annals was written, the *Dzo Jwan*, which in fact constitutes a general history of the China of that period. The little state of Lu itself was situate in modern Shantung, south of the sacred mountain Tai Shau

(Wang) use virtue to practice humanity.”¹⁸ With the end of our period even the idea of a *primatus inter pares*, and with it all attempt at a central authority, had been abandoned; and there sets in an internal struggle between the rulers of the different states for absolute sovereignty: a warlike mentality, fostered by iron having come into common use in China during the sixth century.

The period is one of fundamental economic change. The idea of marking officially a stated quantity of copper began to be adopted from the west, and a coinage in the shape of miniature hoes and knives of copper thus began to make its appearance. With it a form of wealth other than in land became possible and with that again the exclusive power of the feudal landholders began to be undermined.

This development went hand in hand with that of private ownership in land. Originally there had been no such thing as private owners of land. All land had belonged to the king, who parceled it out among his vassals as fiefs, not as freehold property, to hold as long as they fulfilled their duty of military aid. But as time went on, younger brothers and favorites had been given smaller pieces of land, just to give them an income. In a society in which land was the only form of wealth, there was in fact no other way of providing for them. To begin with, these people had only been given usufructuary rights. But little by little these rights changed in practice to property rights. In this way there arose from the sixth century onwards a

¹⁸ Fung, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

middle class, standing between the great feudal nobles and the servile peasantry, owing allegiance to the former, but in poverty resembling the latter. It is this class which in the event was to provide the numerous adventurers and teachers, who became so prominent in the following period of civil wars and who gave rise to the Chinese concept of coupling scholarship with poverty.

Finally, there began in this period a definite influx of southern influences. So far the great basin of the Yangtze had hardly come into the picture while the regions still farther south (such as Fukien, Kwantung, Yünnan) had not as much as been mentioned. The change came with the prominence given to the state of Chu, which covered the modern provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, and Anwei. The people of Chu had not yet assimilated Chinese (i.e., Jou) culture: Mencius still speaks of them as "shrike-tongued barbarians of the south, whose doctrines are not those of our early kings."¹⁹ He reproaches them for their belief in witches and ghosts and for their excessive emphasis on sacrifices. This country is also reported to be the home of many "recluses," educated men who had escaped from the world toward which they adopted a purely negative attitude, being unwilling to take part in any social or political affairs. They are often mentioned by Confucius,²⁰ and we shall have no difficulty in recognizing in them a Chinese replica of the Indian *śramana* of the same period. The ethos of the peasant civilization is unmistakable in

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

this southern state, though culture contact with the north went on apace and was rapidly producing its complete sinification.

That China south of the Yangdze still formed at the time a single cultural bloc with Indo-China and through it was open to a continual current of Indian influences, is undeniable. What is usually forgotten is that there are two routes along which culture-contact has been effected throughout the ages. The northern route, via Central Asia to the Hwang Ho, has almost monopolized attention on the part of modern scholars, while the southern route, from Farther India to the Yangdze, has never received the recognition which the importance of this "back-door to China" deserves, as C. W. Bishop²¹ for one has pointed out. From prehistoric to our own times important elements of the Chinese civilization, such as rice and the domestic fowl, to mention only two, have come through it: indeed a regular trade-route, approximating the modern Burma Road, has ever linked Szechwan-Yünnan through Upper Burma with Annam and with Assam.²² Conse-

²¹ See his "Origin and Early Diffusion of the Traction Plow," in Smithsonian Report for 1937, p. 546.

²² The oldest literary reference to this route dates from 139 B.C., when the emperor Han Wu-di sent his general Jang Dyen to discover a route to Central Asia which would outflank the Huns, who were then blocking the way. He reported that products of Szechwan went regularly via Yünnan, Burma, and India to Bactria and advised its utilization. In actual fact the distance from Szechwan to Bactria by this route, i.e., south of Tibet, is no greater than the usual route, north of Tibet, of which alone one would think nowadays. Cf. an article by Kuo Tsungfei in the *Tien Hsia Monthly* of August-September, 1941, on "A brief history of the Trade Routes between Burma, Indochina and Yünnan."

quently the physical means for a contact between India and China must also be presumed to have existed at the time of the great intellectual ferment in India between 750 and 500 B.C., when Brahmanism, having stolen the thunder of Dravidian protophilosophy, tried to beat it at its own game. The fact of an influx of Indian ideas and problems into southern China is shown by the rise, just at that time, of the "negative recluses" already referred to by us and by the nature of the doctrines which they professed and which we shall study in due course. It was to stem this flood of un-Chinese, and, as it seemed to him, pernicious thought, that there arose the great "Master Kung" (Confucius, 551-479), contemporary of the Buddha (563-484). All of these matters we shall revert to presently. With Derk Bodde we may sum up this period by saying that "it was an age of uncertainty and of expansion, both geographically and intellectually."²³ The pacidity of a tribal, i.e., collective and traditional, mentality had been disturbed by the emergence of individualist, and indeed personalist tendencies, in the realm of thought and of social life. A landmark in this respect is the first written legal code of the year 536 which the *Dzo Jwan* records for the state of Jeng and comments upon as follows: "The early kings deliberated on the circumstances of each crime, to judge it, but did not lay down any general laws of punishment. When the people know exactly what the law is, they stand no longer in awe of their superiors. They get

²³ Fung, *op. cit.*, p. xvii.

a contentious spirit and appeal to the written words of the law, hoping peradventure to be successful in their argument. They can no longer be managed.”²⁴

3. THE PERIOD OF CIVIL WAR (479–206)

All these tendencies, whose origin must be sought in the previous period of “Spring and Autumn Annals,” came to full fruition in the next age, when their clash produced the greatest turmoil known to China before the advent of the Republic in 1911. Politically the greater part of the period is known as that of the “Warring States” (*Jan Gwo*), covering the years 403 to 221. The states referred to are seven in number and consist of those that had survived the previous tussle between thirteen feudal rulers. The wars for supremacy went on continuously for almost two centuries, with success favoring now one, now the other ruler. Six states fell out of the race first: Yüé incorporated Wu in 473 (both being “barbarian” southern states, north and south respectively of the Tsien Tang River) and Teng in 415, only to be swallowed up by Chu in 334. In 286 Chu, Chi, and Wé parceled out Sung among themselves; Lu (which had annexed Dzou) was in turn annexed by Chu in 249. In the meantime the Chin ruler of Dzin state had forged ahead in the north; he had formally ended the Jou dynasty in 256 and proclaimed himself their successor. By military superiority and ruthless methods he now pro-

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37. The quotation might be one from the minutes of a modern “British Resident” against the admission of pernicky lawyers into a state, “advised” by him.

ceeded to annex one after another the remaining six states: Han in 230, Wé in 225, Chu in 223, Jao and Yen in 222, and Chi in 221. Thus in the latter year the Chin "emperor" *She-hwang-di*,²⁵ as he now called himself, had eliminated all his feudal rivals and was ruling the whole of China (as then constituted) as a unitary empire. But at his death in 210 his rule, based as it had been on brute force, collapsed; a general rebellion broke out which lasted for four years, but at its end it was not the feudal rulers who were reinstated. Unitary rule had come to stay for good, when in 206 a peasant lad, Liu Bang, who had become duke of Han, made himself emperor and instituted the Han dynasty, which was to last from 206 B.C. to A.D. 220. But though the Chinese themselves in the event liked to call themselves "Han People," it is the Chin that have given to the rest of the world their name for "China": *Čina* in Sanscrit and *Sinae* in Latin, and thence into all the languages of the modern world.²⁶

Since Han Gao Dzu, "Eminent Han Ancestor," to give him his posthumous title, had profited by the feudal nobles' share in the rebellion, he naturally showed himself indulgent to them, even when he had re-established a unitary empire consisting, not of vassal states, but of provinces. But this recrudescence of the nobles "was but the sunset glow"²⁷ of a regime whose sun had set. In the period

²⁵ Literally "First Emperor Divine." *Di* ("divine"), it will be remembered, is the word for the (Nordic) god of war: a detail which sheds light on the origin and tradition of these Chin. Dzin state covered modern Kansu and Shensi and was at the time also still considered "barbaric."

²⁶ See Grousset, *op. cit.*, I, 206, and Bishop, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

²⁷ Fung, *op. cit.*, p. 18. There was a final rebellion of feudal nobles against

of savage warfare for mere survival, i.e., the *Jan Gwo* period, not only had those defeated feudal lords disappeared from the ranks of the nobility, but in the stress of the times the ability of many commoners had to be utilized in high positions. Of this innovation, examples are already recorded in the previous period: on the one hand we hear of a carter being called away from feeding his oxen to advise the Duke of Chi (685-643); on the other hand the *Dzo Jwan* in 539 states that descendants of noble families of the Dzin state had been reduced to the position of menials.²⁸

This political change went hand in hand with the previously mentioned economic change brought about by the introduction of a metallic currency. One soon hears of common people accumulating millions of (copper) coins and thus acquiring land, now become private property. With this the ancient *dzing* system of feudal times broke down. The "History of the Former Han Dynasty," (*Tyen Han Shu*), written in the first century of our era, laments that "with the decline of the House of Jou the peasants became few and the merchants many, and, though all people were theoretically of equal rank, some by the power of their wealth could become the masters of others."²⁹ The most famous example is that of Lu Bu-wé who, from being a wealthy trader, became prime minister of the Chin and

the emperor in 154 B.C. After its suppression the great Han emperor Wu-di (140-87 B.C.) introduced the examination system which definitely swept away even the last vestiges of distinction between nobles and commoners.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

as such guardian of the prince who subsequently became She-hwang-di. With this rise of capitalism came as a matter of course a decay of ancient customary law and morality.

Artistically there was a development from the simplicity of Shang times to a more and more ornamented style, which combined geometrical patterns of Asianic pottery with Scythian animal art influences. The latter dominated, the most frequent motif being that of fighting animals: but Chinese artists reduced the savage realism of this Nordic art to a symbolic representation of abstract ideas. This profound transformation is well illustrated by the figure of the Siberian tiger, which from the ferocious beast of prey becomes "the white tiger" of Chinese mythology, a symbol of the west and of autumn. (Compare, for instance, the tiger on a Siberian gold ornament on Plate 3a with the white jade tiger of Plate 4 of Tizac's already quoted book.) Similarly with the dragon, a Sumerian symbol, to be sure, but one which enters Chinese art through a Scythian medium, witness the Sarmatian dragon of Plate 14 *ibidem*. In Chinese ideology the dragon goes with the griffin, the two expressing an antithesis—of water and air, of moist and dry, of spring and summer, of male and female—the antithesis being graphically indicated by the contrast between the bull-like stub muzzle of the dragon and the aquiline beak of the griffin.³⁰

As Tizac remarks,³¹ what to us has become an art object,

³⁰ The very word "griffin" comes from the Greek *grypos* = "hook-nosed," showing that to the Greeks also the most characteristic features of this fabled animal with a lion's body and an eagle's head was its aquiline beak.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 144.



Trautmann collection, Peiping

Ding



P. C. Huang collection, Peiping

Dzun



Trautmann collection, Peiping



Trautmann collection, Peiping

to the people of Jou times was a cult object: thus the Jou bronzes, now delighting art connoisseurs, must by us be placed in their historical setting, to be understood. All of them in fact were in the first place used in magical or sacrificial operations, and as such had assumed rigidly set forms. There was first of all the *ding*, a tripod caldron with two ears, used for seething the flesh of a sacrifice, obviously a bronze derivate of the earthenware *li*. Libations of fermented liquor were offered in the graceful, slender *gu* and in the *dzun*, originally a more squat cylindrical vessel, corresponding to the Greek *kratêr*; cereals were offered up in a low basin, shaped like a modern sauce-boat, the *i*. These are only the principal types, but of course there are many more, the ritual becoming more elaborate as time went on. Of other bronze objects used for cult purposes, bells were prominent; music, as we said before, being originally part and parcel of all the magical incantations. With the bells went the drums, both being extensively used in the magic rites connected with war. Brass mirrors, closely resembling Babylonian specimens, were used primarily as reflectors, to concentrate sunlight on the oblations. The principal outlet for artistic craftsmanship was the adornment of chariots, into the construction of which bronze entered largely, but their woodwork also was extensively carved, mostly with animal motifs.³²

Of brass weapons we have already spoken: but what is interesting is to note that for ritual purposes knives, lance-heads, and the like could not be made of so "new-fangled"

³² Tizac, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

a material as bronze, but had to be of stone as of old: only that the stone used was of a rare and most precious kind, jade.³³ As a consequence, jade itself came to be considered an emblem of perfection, possessing in itself varied magic power: in fact our word "jade" comes from the Spanish *piedra de ijada* ("stone of the colic"), denoting one of its supposedly therapeutic qualities. That it is principally found in Turkestan, surely gives us a broad hint about whence Chinese civilization derived its originally religious and later artistic appreciation of jade. Its original use was entirely for sacrificial utensils, funerary amulets, and charms for the living, the idea of employing it for personal adornment being quite alien to the period we are surveying.

But no form of working in other stones, such as sculpture, was known in Jou times. Building was primarily done in timber; and there also architecture reveals itself as having been at the outset a magic art, namely, that of planning and erecting in strict accordance with astrological and mythological norms a dwelling for the mediator between the supernatural and the natural worlds, i.e., the "Son of Heaven," the sacral king. Hence the strict orientation north-south and east-west of the whole capital, of which the royal city formed the center. Enclosed by ramparts of stamped earth, its access was regulated by gates and wooden watch towers. Open-air altars to Heaven and Earth and temples to the ancestral manes formed the core

³³ Jade (or nephrite) is a silicate of calcium and magnesia, admixtures of chrome and iron producing the wonderful variegated colors, for which jade is famous.

of this sacral enclosure, the king's residence being originally only incidental to these sacral structures. That this royal city should always have also included a school, where the boys of the nobility were taught the magic ceremonies and arts of music, archery, charioteering, writing, and reckoning, bears out the hieratic foundation of such "town planning." The roofs of the houses were supported by massive wooden pillars, painted red; the walls consisted of wood and plaster. The curved roof with its upturned corners, however, was not a feature of Jou times, and did not come into use until the Han era.³⁴

Of important new features introduced during the sixth and fifth centuries, we must mention the ox-drawn plow and the water-clock and the sun-dial, all of which came straight from a south-Iranian contact, made possible through the eastward extension of the Persian empire under Cyrus, and especially under Darius.³⁵ But all this is dwarfed by China's change over, a very gradual one, from her bronze age to an "iron age." Curiously enough the metallurgy of iron seems to have come to southern China first, i.e., via the Burma Route, and in accordance with the pacifist mentality of the agriculturist civilization dominant there; the first manufacture of iron articles in China was that of domestic and agricultural implements.³⁶ From 500 B.C. onward, steel was made in the Yangtze valley from

³⁴ Bishop, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁵ Henri Maspéro (*op. cit.*, p. 617) considers that the two greatest waves of foreign influence in China synchronize—*grosso modo* and with a considerable time lag—with the conquests of Darius and Alexander in India and Central Asia.

³⁶ Cf. Bishop, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

local iron ore and wood, which was plentiful. When the making of steel came north, the dearth of timber there necessitated the substitution of coal for wood fuel. The military use of iron, however, came centuries later and was copied from western sources, which one has no difficulty in identifying with the Scythians and Sarmatians. We have a description, for instance, of a battle of a king of Jao, one Wuling (325-298), against the Hsyung-nu (Huns), where for the first time we meet with Chinese warriors as mounted archers, and others armed with long swords, all wearing boots and trousers.³⁷ But it was the Chins who seem to have made earliest and most extensive use of iron weapons and of the new Sarmatian military technique, which ensured their ascendancy and the ultimate unification of the whole country. The military advent of an iron age therefore is not part of the Jou age, but rather ends it.

At any rate, the history of the introduction of iron into China shows clearly the twofold provenance of the new and revolutionary ideas (ideological ones from India, militaristic ones from Inner Asia) which completely upset the old order of China time and again.

“When royal control lessened,” says *Tyen Han Shu*,³⁸ “and the feudal nobles were becoming more powerful, they differed also widely among themselves in what they liked and disliked. Consequently everyone in the world did what he wished and was a rule to himself.” With the waning of the authority which tradition had formerly

³⁷ Cf. W. M. McGovern, *The Early Empires of Central Asia*, 1939, p. 101.

³⁸ Fung, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

given to institutions and ideologies, a fertile breeding ground had been provided for the contending schools of philosophy which now arose, and thus, the *Shu* continues, "the differing practices of the nine schools swarmed forth and had a common development; each school seizing upon a single aspect or point, which was exalted as the sole truth and so discussed as to win the favor of their patrons, now this now that feudal lord." Literally thousands of scholars, belonging to the most diverse schools of thought were roaming the country, offering their services to the different rulers. The anarchy, both intellectual and moral, thus produced during the *Jan Gwo* period is of course paralleled by the corresponding period in India (and that of the Sophists in Greece).³⁹ It had reached such a pitch by the time Chin tried to unify China, that he ordered in 213 B.C., with that savage ruthlessness characteristic of him, the notorious "Burning of Books," forbidding even the mere storage, throughout his empire, of all "books of poetry, books of history, and the teachings of the various philosophers."⁴⁰ However much this edict has been held up to execration by subsequent writers, the fact remains that by it there was first attempted an official standardization of thought, which has since become the leading preoccupation of all later statesmen. Just as China has the distinction of being the first country to carry out the complete equalization of all men before the law, so was it also the first to grapple with the thorny problem of how to combine per-

³⁹ Protagoras was born in the year (480-479) that Confucius died.

⁴⁰ Fung, p. 15.

sonal liberty of discussion with authoritative maintenance of public decency and stable government.

With this we may close our sketch of the general background and turn to the development of philosophy during this, the most formative period of Chinese history, i.e., the millenium stretching from the beginnings of the Jou dynasty in 1122 to the setting up of the Han Empire in 206 B.C.

CHAPTER IX

Chinese Philosophy. Its Sources

1. THE INDIAN INFLUENCE

MEAGER indeed is the material for a history of the introduction of philosophy into China and its early development there. We say introduction, because evidently there has never been in China any spontaneous rise of philosophical thought. All its most ancient tradition and writings, the three "Classics" and the "Spring and Autumn Annals," are innocent of any metaphysical concern about the nature of things, their general causes, or last end. At a time when the old feudal order changed, the concern of educated people (who alone could read and write such books) was how to maintain order in human society, how to counter the novel mentality of untraditional individualism, and how to prevent the collapse of civilization beneath a mounting tide of general anarchy. In such a milieu we may look for "proto-politics," but certainly not for "proto-philosophy." And indeed the prince of all Chinese philosophers, Confucius, was, as we shall show, no philosopher at all, but a practical genius, concerned about re-establishing in the life of the nation an idealized ancient order; a man who thus has the distinction of being the first teacher in statecraft.

But though Confucius was not interested in meta-

physics, there is evidence that truly philosophical musings were indulged in by contemporaries of his: the "negative recluses" whom he met on his wanderings, especially in the south, in the state of Chu. One of these is reported to have said to a follower of Confucius: "All the world is a swelling torrent, and who is there to change it? As for you, instead of following a gentleman who flees from one prince to another, had you not better follow those who flee the world entirely?"¹ The "torrent" reminds one forcibly of *samsāra*, and the whole answer might very properly have come from one of the Indian *çramaṇas* of the time. Another oblique reference to the ideology of these ascetics is found in a passage recording the question of a pupil of Confucius: "If a man refrain from ambition, boasting, resentment, and desire, may that be considered virtue?" and the Master's reply: "It may be considered difficult, but it does not follow that it constitutes virtue."² Fung³ comments on this, that "to insist on having no desires oneself and at the same time to be indifferent to the desires of others, is nothing more than to be what Confucius called a "dried-up gourd." These ascetics, therefore, whom Confucius so much disliked, evidently indulged in a self-discipline aimed at the elimination of all desires, another feature unmistakably Indian.

Hence we may say that ideas common to Indian proto-philosophy, undoubtedly were current in China in the sixth and fifth centuries. They seem to have been restricted

¹ *Analects*, 18.6.

² *Ibid.*, 14.2.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

at the time to the south, but were gradually seeping in from the state of Chu during Confucius' lifetime. They must have reached Chu and the regions farther south at a still earlier date, say the seventh century, by the Indo-Chinese route described by us above. The ascetic flight from the world of gentlefolk leading a para-social existence is certainly not a phenomenon that would occur spontaneously in so traditionalist, not to say still tribalist, an atmosphere as that of the early Jou period. Indeed it fits in so ill with a Chinese milieu that even a three-thousand-year effort of acclimatizing it therein has met with but indifferent success.

Chinese tradition makes no mention of any introduction of such ideologies from abroad: in fact, there was no sharply defined boundary separating China from foreign countries. The region of northern Chinese civilization shaded off by imperceptible gradations into that of southern China; the latter similarly into that of Indochina, and this again into that of India. But Chinese tradition has ever stoutly maintained that this ideology is very ancient, that it antedates Confucius, and that in the last resort all systems of Chinese philosophy spring from it. It attributes its conception to an "ancient sage," Lao Dze, who may have been an actual person or merely a legendary personification of this ideology: it matters little. That later generations have confounded this Lao Dze with the author of the "Classic of the Way and Power," *Dao De Dying*, composed in the fourth century, is quite admitted nowadays. But this error does not invalidate the truth of the

original tradition. Moreover that tradition is borne out by the fact that the doctrines set forth by the *Dao De Dying* tally perfectly with what we know to have been those of the "negative recluses" and with none other.

Like the proto-philosophy of India itself, this offshoot of it in China was, at the time of its introduction there, still quite vague: a general outlook, an ethos, rather than a well-defined ideology. Of course it went well and was quite of a piece with the agriculturist civilization type, common both to Dravidian India and to Thai China: and in both countries it clashed violently with the pastoralist type⁴ of tradition of the north: Vedic in the one case, Jou in the other. But the outcome of this ideological clash was altogether different in the two cases: in India the north took over the philosophy of the south and made it its own; in China the philosophy that came to it from the south merely stimulated the north to keep out this flood of theoretical speculation, by entrenching itself in the severely practical field of political science and ethics. This surprising turn given to the development of philosophy in China is entirely due to a single personality, Confucius, whose influence overtowers all others, though paradoxically enough he himself can by no stretch be called a philosopher.

In conclusion we must say that the single source of Chinese, as of all philosophy, was Indian proto-philosophy,

⁴ Cf. the two types of courage mentioned by the *Jung Yung* (chap. 10): "To show forbearance and gentleness and not to avenge unreasonable insults: this is the courage of the southern regions. To lie under arms and die without regret: this is the courage of the northern regions."

typified in China by the legendary figure of Lao-dze; but that it received its signature from Confucius. To a lesser degree it was influenced by the ideology that goes by the name of Må Di. Having given what scanty evidence there is for the introduction of philosophy, we must now turn to its treatment at the hands of these two men.

2. CONFUCIUS

Confucius, according to chapter 47 of the *She Dyi*,⁵ was born in the year 551 B.C. in the state of Lu,⁶ though he was himself a descendant of the ruling house of Sung. His real name was Kung Jung-ni, but he has so universally been called respectfully "Master" (*fu-dze*) "Kung," that the Western world knows him only through the Latinized form of this expression (i.e., Kung fu-dze) as "Confucius." When nineteen (i.e., in 532), he entered the civil service of the Lu state, becoming its prime minister in 501. Not prevailing with the profligate ruler of the state, he resigned in 497 and started visiting other states. Accompanied by a band of followers who felt impressed by the principles of statecraft which he had practiced and which he now continued to propound to anyone willing to listen to him, Confucius spent fifteen years traveling about the country in this fashion. For the last three years of his life he returned to Lu, where he died in 479 B.C., having continued there to the end his task as a teacher (*fu dze*).

After the downfall of the early Jou the small state of Lu

⁵ I.e., "Historical Records," a work composed in the second century B.C.

⁶ In modern Shantung, south of the sacred mountain Tai Shan.

became famous as the country where the ancient Jou culture was most faithfully perpetuated. Fung⁷ calls Lu "a miniature reflection of ancestral Jou." The ruler of Lu was indeed a descendant of the celebrated duke of Jou and had inherited the historical records and all the paraphernalia of the royal Jou ancestor worship. It was therefore only natural that, as a high officer of Lu, Confucius' aim should have been the perpetuation of the cultural heritage, come down to his homeland from king Wen and the duke of Jou of blessed memory. That Confucius was singularly successful in this, is perhaps best illustrated by the terse saying of the *She Dyi* (CXXX) that "five hundred years after the death of the duke of Jou there came Confucius." An earlier writer⁸ sums up the achievements of Confucius as follows: "He possessed the whole of the Way (*dao*); he brought it to the people's notice; he practiced it. Hence his virtue is equal to that of the duke of Jou."

"He possessed the whole of the Way": the traditional way, that is, of the early Jou.⁹ He believed that "order" could be re-established only by reverting to the *Wang dao*, the "Royal Way" of ancient sacral kingship; and he believed further that to do so, one had to re-establish the ancient traditional customs and ceremonies, *li*. Of this *li*, the *Dzo Jwan* under date of 517 says that "it constitutes the

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

⁸ Hsün Ching (298-238 B.C.); cf. Fung, p. 56.

⁹ *Dao* means literally "a road" and metaphorically "the way of men, their conduct." The word is also generally applied to nature and society and there denotes the "good order" which distinguishes a cosmos from a chaos. *Wang Dao* originally, "The Way of Sacral Kingship," has come to mean the way of righteousness, as opposed to the way of brutal force.

standard of Heaven, the principle of Earth, and the conduct of man.”¹⁰ Always to comply with what conduct *li* demands of the moment, constitutes a discipline most precious in character building: a fact that underlies the analogous training of the Benedictine monk to the minutiae of liturgical *li*, an analogy made still more striking by the emphasis laid both by Confucius and Benedictinism on the value of music and the need of rendering it in the exact traditional way. *Li* and music were, in fact, two of the “six disciplines,” proficiency in which marked “the cultured man,” *zhu*, the other four being the three classics of poetry, history and divination, and the “Spring and Autumn Annals.”

“He brought this way to people’s notice”: Confucius was the first for making this traditional culture of the “six disciplines” available to all and sundry. We have previously explained the political and economic factors which made this age one of great social changes. Here we find Confucius, in his search after efficiency in administration, endorsing on principle the growing practice of disregarding class privileges, and thus with his usual honesty of purpose and common sense of approach enunciating one of the fundamentals of democratic statesmanship. Before his time only the aristocracy received education: Confucius insisted that “in teaching there must be no class distinctions.”¹¹ He it was who originated in China teaching as a profession, who made a living by charging tuition

¹⁰ Fung, p. 68.

¹¹ Fung, p. 49.

甲戌十月

萬世師表

張大千畫



Confucius

fees, and who thus popularized the culture of a gentleman. With him and after him there arises the new class of *she* ("literati"), who earn a livelihood without being engaged in farming, handicraft, trading, or governing: before him, *she* meant a military or civil official.¹² Other educated men are reported to have lived in Confucius' time, who were neither officials nor recluses, but these men earned a living by making hempen sandals and mats and, instead of charging fees, made such followers as they had earn their livelihood by the same simple handicraft.¹³ Confucius not only did not follow their example, but expressly condemned it, although he was severely criticised by his contemporaries for not engaging in any materially productive craft. Confucius, in fact, was the first professional schoolmaster, rather than the head of a school of thought. He taught his pupils to read and understand a wide variety of books, so as to give them what has since been called a liberal education. His ultimate aim was to make these pupils good officials: there is no trace whatever of their being initiated and trained in a particular system (*dao*) of philosophy.

"He practiced it." Confucius was eminently practical: not pursuit of knowledge for knowledge's sake, not the elucidation of hidden causes and general ideas was his aim, but such training of men as would make them "sages within and kings without."¹⁴ Of one pupil he said, that he was fit for an appointment as a revenue officer, of

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 51. What did they teach, one wonders? Perchance the same ideas as were held by the recluses?

¹⁴ Who could fail to be struck by the similarity of this ideal and that of Plato's "philosopher-kings"?

another as a controller, of a third as guestmaster at court.¹⁵ The education he imparted aimed at something quite limited, definite, and practical: to form men competent to manage affairs "in a state of a thousand chariots." It is therefore really not correct to call Confucius a philosopher in the strict sense. He was quite innocent of any metaphysical qualms and never brooded on abstruse problems. The utmost one may concede is that he was interested in ethics, that part of philosophy which studies human acts.¹⁶

This ethics of his was imbued with the sturdy common sense of pastoralist theism. For Confucius, Heaven (*tien*) meant "a purposeful Supreme Being":¹⁷ *ming* for him meant "Heaven's decree," i.e., will, and not a blind fate, a meaning attached to the term in later times. A contemporary once said of Confucius: "The world has for far too long been without principles: now Heaven is using the Master to sound a rousing tocsin." He himself felt that Heaven had conferred on him this sacred mission, i.e., of re-establishing the order (*dao*) based on the traditional culture of Jou times.¹⁸ Though so practical in the aim of his education, he was anything but a utilitarian: righteousness, he held, must be practiced for righteousness' sake. "The reason why the superior man tries to get into office," repeated one of his disciples, "is that he holds this to be

¹⁵ *Analects*, 5.7. Confucius left no writings behind, but his sayings and those of some of his pupils were collected by his followers and constitute the *Lün Yü*, a book of twenty parts, known to the West as *The Confucian Analects*.

¹⁶ The other two parts concern: human thinking (logic, psychology, epistemology) and being as such (metaphysics, or philosophy properly speaking).

¹⁷ Fung, p. 58.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

right, *i*. He therefore takes office, though aware that he will not make his principles prevail." Confucius himself was described by a contemporary as a man "who knows he cannot succeed and yet keeps on trying." Indeed Confucius said in so many words that "the superior man is guided by what is right; the inferior man by what is profitable."¹⁹ Yet he refused to be a mere doctrinaire, and it is said of him that "he was entirely free from four things: he had no preconceptions, no predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egotism."²⁰

With this righteousness as a basic principle, Confucius demanded of people to be straightforward, *je*. "Plausible speech, ingratiating manners, fulsome respect, I am ashamed of," he said.²¹ Hypocrisy in all its forms he detested. One aspect of this straightforwardness is what he called the "rectification of names" (*jeng ming*), by which term he means that the current sense of a word should correspond to its literal meaning. He used to wax wroth, for instance, that a certain kind of goblet should be called "cornered," when in fact it was perfectly round. Almost pedantically he insisted that this sort of misuse of the language led to universal confusion and betokened a crooked mind. Hence he said: "*Jeng* (to govern) means *jeng* (to straighten)."²² What he meant was that if a ruler, official,

¹⁹ Cf. pp. 74 f. The "Superior Man," originally meant a person belonging to the aristocracy. Confucius, against this idea of superiority by birth, used this term to denote superiority by character. Since his time *jün dze* has come to mean a man of such high moral attainments as would befit a prince.

²⁰ *Analects*, 9.14.

²¹ Fung, p. 67.

²² Fung, p. 60. Both *je* and *jeng* mean "rectangular" and are often joined up (*jeng-je*) to denote "straight," "upright," and metaphorically, "honest."

father, and son in their conduct conformed exactly to the concept (i.e., ideal) of such terms, all disorder would disappear from the world.

But for all his insistence on people being straightforward, he did not wish them to be rude. "*Je* uncontrolled by the rules of propriety, *li*, becomes rudeness," Confucius said.²³ We have already seen what stress he laid on these traditional good manners (*li*). It is well, however, to point out that to him mere correct manners, without the virtue of *zhen* inspiring them, were held as of no account whatever.²⁴ Perhaps the best translation of *zhen* is the Latin *humanitas*;²⁵ in other words, it stands for the altruism based on the fact that by nature *homo homini amicus*. *Zhen* for Confucius and for all that have come after him is the social virtue par excellence. His recorded definitions of *zhen* are many; perhaps the best is: "*Zhen* is the denial of self and response to *je* and *li*"²⁶ i.e., it is straightforwardness, tempered by good manners, inspired by altruism. Of this altruism he said that it consisted of two things, *jung* ("doing as one would be done by," or "faithfulness to one's human nature") and *shu* ("indulgence").²⁷ As for the practical application of *zhen*, Confucius' celebrated passage may be quoted: "If not *je* (right) and *li* (proper), do not look; if not right and proper, do not listen;

²³ *Analects*, 8.2.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.3.

²⁵ An excellent definition of it is given (cf. *Summa theol.*, IIa IIae, q.80, a.2) by St. Isidore: "A man is said to be *humane* through having a feeling of love and pity toward men: this gives its name to *humanitas*, whereby we uphold each other."

²⁶ *Analects*, 12.1.

²⁷ Cf. Fung, pp. 373 and 71.

if not right and proper, do not speak; if not right and proper, do not act.”²⁸ So much is *zhen* the master virtue for Confucius, that this word for him had come to mean virtue as such.

Thus righteousness, altruism, courtesy (*i, zhen, li*) may be said to sum up the ethical teaching of the Master Kung: as lofty a concept of natural virtues, surely, as has ever been formulated. Small wonder then that Confucius has remained for China to this day *the* Master, the great teacher of all that is best and most typically Chinese in the leading ideas of the nation and that this basic rock of Confucian common sense and conservatism should be discovered again and again, massive, unmoved, and glistening in the sunlight, whenever a flood of foreign ideologies, which at one time had seemed to overwhelm it, has ebbed away in the course of China's millennial history.

3. Mǎ DÌ

Mǎ Dì, it has been calculated, lived in a period not earlier than 479 and not later than 381 B.C. He was a high official of the Sung state (in modern Honan), which bordered on Chu. The people of Sung had already in the seventh century the reputation of having some queer ideas. Thus its duke Hsyang (650-637) is reported by the *Dzo Jwan* to have refused to wound an enemy twice or to take prisoner old men. After Duke Hsyang other men of Sung continued to strive for peace and even proposed a general disarmament of all states. Now it must be noted that all

²⁸ *Analects*, 12.1.

these rulers of Sung were not related to the Jou line of national Chinese kings, a fact which confirms one's suspicion that this strange pacifism displayed by them derives from that of the original agriculturist civilization of southern China, which seems to have persisted in Sung against the strong pastoralist influences of the north. To the Jou militarists such ideas must indeed have seemed extraordinarily foolish. This judgment found expression in the stories which later turned this naive, unwarlike people of Sung into simpletons of the type of the Wise Men of Gotham.²⁹

Other traits, typical of the agriculturist ideology, besides this pacifism, are its narrow materialism, which ranks utility and efficiency first, and its docility, which is based on the obedience natural to collectivism. We can therefore not deem it fortuitous that a high official of Sung, Mâ Di, should have turned these leading ideas into a system, again political rather than philosophical, once Confucius had shown the way of formulating and deliberately teaching current ideas which hitherto had been held unconsciously by mere way of tradition.

Mâ Di, with that egalitarianism which again goes so well with the agriculturist ideology, championed above all "the practice of the humble man," and opposed northern feudalism and its aristocratic way of lavishness. Frugality was the keynote of his own life, and frugality and work he demanded of all. Of food, he said, there should be enough before anyone worried about its quality; his clothes should be warm, before he could think about their beauty; his

²⁹ Cf. Fung, p. 78.

house safe, before he considered its amenities.³⁰ The Confucians thus reproached Mā Di with being blinded by utility and spurning culture. "Profit" (*li*) was indeed a dominant idea of Mā Di's system, but its meaning must be sought in the three tests to which Mā Di said every doctrine should be submitted: "first, to test the basis of a doctrine, we must see if it squares with the will of Heaven and the example of the Sage Kings; ³¹ secondly, we must examine whether it can be verified by the ordinary, sense experience of common people; thirdly, whether, when generally applied, it will redound to the advantage of the people at large." Mā Di emphasized that the greatness of a country depended on its population: therefore he wished a country to be populous and the people to be uniformly well off. For all that, the opposition of Mā Di's *li*, "advantage," to Confucius' *li* betrays a rationalistic orientation, quite in tune with the materialist ideas that had spread in India during the time of philosophical controversy.

Hand in hand with Mā Di's condemnation of things like music, which he said have no practical value but merely appeal to the emotions, goes his condemnation of the emotions themselves, which he called "the six depravities." Joy and anger, pleasure and sadness, love and hatred, he taught, must be altogether eliminated. This is an evident echo of the Jain and Buddhist ideal of *samatva*. But to this ideal Mā Di manages to impart a utilitarian twist: "When

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

³¹ Mythical exemplars of excellence. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

silent, one should deliberate; when talking, one should instruct; when acting, one should be efficient," runs one of his maxims.³² Indian sages, general benevolence toward all beings and compassion for them bear an evident family likeness with Må Di's "equal love" (*dyen ai*), which he opposed to "partiality": but even this concept he based on utilitarian grounds. "If it were not useful," he once replied, "even I would disapprove of it." And then he proceeds on a labored argument that a partial, i.e., narrowly egotistic, person would be useless to oneself when in need, or would make a bad ruler to live under.³³ Må Di rightly held that "partiality" was the principal cause of the calamities besetting his time and insisted that "equability" should replace "partiality." But this *dyen ai* of his has a hollow sound indeed, when compared with Confucius' *zhen*, an altruism based, not on human advantage, but on human nature. In the same manner, Må Di's pacifism was merely utilitarian. "When we consider the victory as such, there is nothing useful about it. When we consider the possessions obtained through it, they do not even make up for what has been lost." And, apparently without seeing that thereby he gives away his case altogether, he naively adds that war has indeed benefited a few states, but that the great majority of them have been injured thereby and indeed annihilated.³⁴ These expositions of his doctrine are, however, very interesting because they are the personal

³² Fung, p. 91.

³³ Quoted *ibid.*, pp. 92-94. Curiously enough, the obvious retort is never mentioned, viz., that, though egotism is not useful to others, it is useful to the egotist.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

commentaries of a single individual on general concepts which are not his own, their very feebleness proving that they were first essays in personal criticism.

That the general ideas on which Mā Di based his teaching had come from India is apparent, but that even more definitely he was influenced by peculiarly Buddhist notions is shown by the fact that he organized his followers into a *sangha*, the head or abbot of which he called a *dyü dze*, "great master." Followers who took office in the state were bound to contribute to the upkeep of the *sangha*; all were expected to render absolute obedience to its head. An early source ³⁵ (second century B.C.) reports that "those who followed Mā Dze amounted to 180 men, all of them he could have made to enter fire or tread on knife blades, and whom even death would not have prevented from following one another." Indeed the *Dyü-dze* evidently had power of life and death over the members of the Mādist body and controlled all their activities minutely and severely. It is again most instructive to see how the idea of an indubitably Indian institution, a monastic community, i.e., the Buddhist *vihāra*, is thus taken up in China and given there a political bias. The Buddha exacted obedience because he was the Tathâgata; Mā Di, because of a general principle which he took to be axiomatic and which he pushed to the extreme of absolutism, the principle, that is, of "agreeing with one's superior" (*shang tung*). His teaching is uncompromising: "What the superior thinks to be right, all shall think to be right; what the superior

³⁵ The *Hwai-Nan-Dze*, chap. 20.

thinks to be wrong, all shall think to be wrong.”³⁶ From the monastic sphere, Mǎ Di translated such obedience into the political sphere. What the head of the clan ordered, that the members of the clan must comply with; what the ruler of a state orders, that the people of the state must obey; what the emperor, the son of Heaven, commands, that all people must do: thus only, Mǎ Di said, could good order be established and maintained in the world. Such totalitarian *gleichschaltung* contrasts sharply with the traditional Jou principle of seeking, not identity, but harmony, not *shang tung*, but *he tung*.

“Harmony (*he*),” one of the eighth-century dukes had said, “results in the production of things, but identity (*tung*) does not. If identity is added to identity, all novelty is excluded. Therefore the early kings married queens from different families, sought riches from different regions, selected officials holding different opinions, and held discussions. They did so because they desired harmony. If there is only one sound, it is not worth listening to.”³⁷ The *Dzo Jwan* under date of 522 similarly criticizes a certain person because, “whatever you say yes to, he also says yes. Whatever you say no to, he also says no. If you were to try to flavour water with water, who would appreciate the result?” Comparison with such practical wisdom of the Jou period shows up the deterioration in political thought of a monoideic doctrinaire like Mǎ Di. A third-century Confucianist rightly observed that “Mǎ

³⁶ Fung, p. 100.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 34 f.

Di envisaged uniformity, but had no vision regarding individuality.”³⁸

The irony, and nemesis, of such rigid, authoritarian uniformity is that it inevitably leads to schisms within the unitary organization created. Mådism³⁹ was no exception to this rule, and after the death of its founder we hear of at least three different groups who disagreed heartily among themselves and called each other “separated Mådists,” the *dyü dze* of each group claiming to be the sole legitimate head of the whole Mådist body. With Må Di’s death there begins indeed a whole period of logomachies, not merely among the Mådists, but a triangular wordy warfare between them and the followers of Lao Dze and of Confucius as well. The period is the one which in political history has been called that of Interstate Wars (*Jan Gwo*) and which, as we have already seen, lasted from 403 to 221. It has a close parallel in the intellectual life of the China of this time, where the ferment of individual criticism was leading on the one hand to the formulation of sharply different ideologies and where, on the other, the wrangling disputations of philosophers gave birth to the art of verbal trickery, which we have already traced to India as to its original source, and which is best known by the term “sophistry,” given to it by its Greek counterpart. In China these “dialecticians are reckoned as forming one of the six schools into which Chinese philosophical thought is traditionally divided and which, as we have just said, were

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³⁹ I fail to appreciate the current Occidental usage of calling Må-Di’s “ism,” “Modism,” or “Mahism.”

formulated during this age of an endemic strife, that was both military and ideological.

With this we may conclude our chapter of the beginnings and turn to that of the formative period of Chinese philosophy.

CHAPTER X

The Formulation of Chinese Philosophy in Daoism

THE period we are now about to consider has been well characterized by Mencius (372–289) as one in which “Sage Kings cease to arise, feudal lords give free rein to their lusts, unemployed scholars indulge in unreasonable discussions.”¹ These *She* went about from one state to another, reciting their writings. Their mode of procedure is described by Mencius as follows: “One Hsu Hsing came to the Duke of Teng and said, ‘I have heard of you, Prince, that you are practicing a virtuous government. I wish to receive the site for a house.’ The Duke gave it him. His disciples numbered several score.”² The abstract of their teachings, which these wandering scholars now began to write down, was systematic: a novel form, since hitherto this sort of literature had consisted merely of records of disjointed conversations, a good example of which are the *Analects*, the collected sayings of Confucius.³ As general discussions hardened into distinct schools of thought, these abstracts became the *Classics (Dying)* of the respective schools after the fashion of and to replace the *Jou Classics*: thus, for instance, we get now a *Mâ Dying*, and a

¹ Fung, p. 132.

² *Ibid.*, p. 144.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

Dao Dying. Thus the originally "hundred" schools of thought ⁴ were eventually reduced to six. With the violent methods of unification practiced by the Chin emperor in 213, even these six were considered six too many, and since his time there is a persistent effort at standardizing Chinese philosophy in a single, official system. These developments fall outside the historical epoch we are here concerned with, but they explain the trend toward syncretism which becomes so marked already during the latter part of this period.

We shall now give a short account of the six systems and begin with the most ancient one, currently known as Daoism.

DAOISM ⁵

The principles inherent in the ideology of the "negative recluses," to whom the introduction into China of Indian protophilosophy is due, seem to have been first formulated by one Yang Ju,⁶ a contemporary of Mā Di.⁷ Unfortunately we know of these doctrines only from his opponents. Mencius, e.g., says that "the principle of Master Yang is, Each man for himself. Not of a single hair of his would he deprive himself, though it might benefit the whole world." A fairer summary is given by the already

⁴ The expression is first used in the *Jwang-Dze* (chap. 33) by a writer of the early Han period.

⁵ This word connotes here a philosophy and not the popular religion of Daoism.

⁶ There are two spellings; Fung believes that Yang Ju and Yang Sheng refer to the same person. Cf. Fung, p. 133.

⁷ Cf. Fung, pp. 136 f.

quoted *Hwai-nan-dze* (chap. 13) as follows: "Completeness of life, preservation of what is genuine, not allowing outside things to entangle one's person: these were the principles of Master Yang, condemned by Mencius." Lü Bu-Wé (d. 235 B.C.) quotes a similar saying: "A complete life is best; an incomplete life ranks next; death is worse; and life under compulsion the worst of all."⁸ What is this complete life (*chüan sheng*)? He answers: "A life in which the six desires are properly harmonized." Shall we be wrong then if we see in this term a paraphrase of *samatva*? Indeed the next chapter of the *Lü-She* explains in so many words that "man is endowed with desires, but these natural tendencies have their restraints. The sage cultivates these restraints and thus keeps control over his natural tendencies, preventing them from running to excess." The sage therefore is the *Râja-Yogin*, who cultivates his soul and who, like Master Yang, would not exchange it for a whole world of "outside things," which are mere *mâyâ*, "not genuine."

Gao Dze, a contemporary of Yang Ju, is also quoted by Mencius. In a passage on imperturbability, he contrasts the methods whereby he (Mencius) and Gao Dze have arrived at this result. In his own case, he says, his heart has spontaneously become unperturbed through the accumulation of righteous deeds. But Gao Dze, as a relativist and determinist, "never understood righteousness" and therefore has had to resort to "forcible repressions" to prevent

⁸ Lü-She, II, 2. This work aims at giving a summary of the doctrines of different schools of thought.

his mind from being perturbed.⁹ What can be meant by these “forcible repressions,” but a system of *hatha yoga*? To him human nature is like a volume of water: “Open for it a passage to the east, and it flows east; open one to the west, and it will flow west. As water distinguishes not itself between east and west, so also man’s nature distinguishes not between good and not good.”¹⁰

Peng Meng and his circle, who likewise belong to the fourth century, are noteworthy for speaking already of *Dao* as the Way par excellence. They are said to have taught that “selection involves exclusion, instruction involves incompleteness, *Dao* omits nothing”; and by way of example they observe that “heaven can cover, but not support; earth can support but not cover: *Dao* comprehends both by not distinguishing between them.”¹¹ Here obviously by *Dao* is meant *prima materia*, the great womb of potentiality out of which all existential things come. Whatever actually exists is limited by the fact that it is this and nothing else: potentiality might be either and everything else besides; therefore, so this argument runs, pure potentiality (*Dao*) must be greater than anything limited by actual existence. And Peng was not slow either in drawing the last consequences of this: ignorance, he said, must be superior to actual knowledge. “Knowledge,” he taught, “is not to know.” The *Dao* is a cosmic way, i.e., the great reality behind the universe; it is the inevitable, spontaneous,

⁹ Fung, p. 147.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 145. Note that “metaphysics” in Chinese is “the theory of the nature of things,” *hsing li hsüé*.

¹¹ Fung, p. 153.

all-inclusive. A king (of Chi), asking Tien Pien, a companion of Peng Meng, how with such principles he would govern, was given the answer: "My teaching contains nothing on government. It is like a forest which also contains no ready-cut timber." To the practical mind of China the para-social mentality of the yogin, which speaks to us out of all these reported conversations, must indeed have seemed laughable: men of ability, we are told, laughed at him and said: "Your way is no practice for the living, but a principle of death. It is indeed strange."¹²

The *Lao Dze*, or *Dao De Dying*, is the *Classic* of this school of thought, some of the forerunners of which we have just been considering. As previously noted, it represents the ideology of the often quoted "negative recluses" and therefore goes back to the seventh century. There is an obvious line of descent leading from these origins through the fourth-century worthies just treated to the *Classic* which formulated it and gave it a permanent form. The author of the *Lao Dze* seems to have been a native of Chu, Li Er by name, who wrote under the pseudonym of Lao Dan ("The Vast Perfect One of Old"). He was a "gentleman recluse" of the early part of the fourth century but, as come down to us, his *Classic* is probably a third-century version of what he wrote. As his pseudonym indicates, Li Er did not wish to put forward any personal, original thoughts of his own, but merely tried to fix a doctrine held from immemorial times, "The Way of the Ancients."

¹² *Ibid.* This response was given to another companion of Peng Meng, one Shen Dao.

The name by which this "Way" (*Dao*) is generally known is that of *Dao-De*. From the manner alone in which this expression is translated into English, i.e., "The Way and its Power,"¹³ quite apart from the pained bewilderment apparent in all sinological commentaries thereon, it is quite obvious that Western scholarship, notwithstanding its erudition which enables it to know all about it, seems to have missed understanding this term (*Dao De*). Yet, once one realizes the proto-philosophical gropings after the metaphysical nature of "being," so familiar to us already from India, the mystery shrouding *Dao* and *De* vanishes and we see in its stead a commendable attempt at defining potentiality and act. Let the reader judge for himself whether the following lines are not a perfectly straightforward description of potentiality: "There is a thing, formless yet complete. Before heaven and earth it existed. Without sound, without substance, it stands alone without changing. It is all-pervading and unfailing. One may think of it as the mother of all beneath heaven. We do not know its name, but term it *Dao*.¹⁴ *Dao* is impalpable, incommensurable, yet latent in it are forms and entities.¹⁵ Great *Dao* drifts about: it may go this way or that, and all things in the universe owe their existence to it."¹⁶ "It drifts about," like *dravya*, the Jain term for substance. "It may go this way or that." What better way of illustrating potentiality in terms of sense experience? The potential

¹³ Cf. Arthur Waley's translation of the *Dao De Dying* (London, 1934).

¹⁴ Chap. 25 of the *Lao Dze*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. 21.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, chap. 34.

obviously is not of the same order of being or reality as the actual; yet nothing that actually exists could have come into existence if there had not been first the possibility for it to exist; hence it is real enough in all conscience: "All things in the universe owe their existence to it." Could the matter be put more clearly?

The difficulty (and confusion) arises out of the fact that, until Aristotle, no special term was adopted to distinguish potential being from actual being on the one hand, and from not-being on the other. Following the Indian lead, the Chinese Daoists on the contrary simply called potential being a kind of non-being. "Non-being (*Wu*)," says *Lao Dze* (chap. 1), "is the term given to that from which heaven and earth sprang. Existence (*You*) is the term given to the mother that rears all things actual in the universe. These two have issued together but are different in name; the two together we call the mystery (*hsuan*)." Here we see how this philosophy goes wrong. Instead of distinguishing between actual being¹⁷ and potential being, it confounds the two, by using the same unfortunate term, *wu*, for not-being and for potential being: "Being is the product of non-being, out of being are produced all the things in the universe," says our author (chap 40). In the same way he says (chap. 37): "*Dao* is not active, yet it is also not inactive." Here the word for "not" is again *wu*, and what we translate "active" is the word *wé*, which means "to cause," "to do": hence the famous epigram of the school, *Wu Wé*, which, as it stands, means "Don't act." This of course is

¹⁷ In Chinese, *She*.

yet another twist given to these words, which however tally well with the Indian ideal of immobility and non-activity, *akarman* or *naiškarmya*.

Of *De*, *Lao Dze* (chap 51) says: "*Dao* gave birth to all things in the universe; *De* reared them. Becoming things, they gained forms. Therefore of all the things in the universe there is not one that does not honor *Dao* and prize its *De*": or, in Aristotelian phraseology, all things are the product of *hylê* (potency, *dao*) and *morphê* (act, *de*). The passage just quoted would thus be quite unexceptionable if it stood alone, for it would then mean that *dao* (potency) and *de* (act) are quite distinct and that a conjunction of both is needed to give actual existence to things. Such are the true facts of the matter. Unfortunately it looks as if our author, wishing monistically to reduce everything to a single principle, made *de* also subservient to, and issuing out of, *dao*: "Being is the product of non-being," it will be remembered he said in another place, where perhaps he only meant—what is perfectly true—that "existential being arises out of potential being." The point is that it does not arise spontaneously therefrom: "Nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act, but is moved thereto by one acting."¹⁸ But this observation of the Angelic Doctor, obvious and so easily ascertainable as it seems to us, leads straight to the positing of a First Mover, or *Actus Purus*, who both designed the potentiality of all things and then in accordance successively therewith brought all actual things into existence: an observation which would have

¹⁸ Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 2.

prevented all these topsy-turvy ideologies which subordinate the actual to the potential both in derivation and value. This observation, however, has remained beyond the reach of all pagan thought, even of Aristotle himself. *Lao Dze* is admittedly vague on this point: Fung¹⁹ seems to agree with our interpretation of its thought, viz., that “*de* is merely *dao* dwelling in objects, i.e., *de* is what individual objects obtain from *dao* and thereby become what they are.”

We must now revert to *Lao Dze's* dictum that “*Dao* never does, yet through it all things are done,” and to the epigram derived therefrom: *Wu Wei*, Don't act, which rules Laodzean ethics. “The world is invariably possessed by him who does nothing,” declares our author cheerfully in chap. 48. The reason for this is that “all things, however they flourish, return to their root. This return to their root is called quiescence and consists in submission to Fate”²⁰ (chap. 16). This “return to the root” is the law of action and reaction, the reaction (or reversion) being again given the primacy over action, for “the movement of *Dao* consists in reversion” (chap. 40). Hence, “if one seeks to diminish things, they sometimes increase; if one seeks to increase them, they sometimes diminish” (chap. 42). Hence the best plan is, *Wu Wei* (Don't act at all): “I act not, and the people spontaneously are transformed. I cultivate quiescence, and the people of themselves go straight.

¹⁹ Fung, p. 180.

²⁰ As pointed out already, for Confucius the same word, *ming*, meant the will of a personal God: in Daoism the term takes the tinge of atheism inherent in it.

The more laws are promulgated, the more thieves and bandits there will be. The more cunning craftsmen there are, the more troubled will be the country." The political philosophy of anarchism has never been more confidently put forward. And with the fanatical extremism common to this tribe, *Lao Dze* would "banish wisdom, discard knowledge, and the people will be benefited a hundredfold. Banish humaneness (*zhen*), discard righteousness (*i*), and the people will be dutiful and compassionate" (chap. 19). "The practice of *Dao* consists in subtracting day by day: let knowledge and desires be subtracted and yet again subtracted, till one has reached *Wu Wei* (non-activity)" (chap. 48). "Let the people have unadornment to gaze at and simplicity to cherish" (chap. 19), "and with unadorned simplicity there will come absence of desires. The people being without desires, there will come quiescence, and the world will spontaneously be at rest" (chap. 37).

The *Lao Dze* has become the bible of the Daoists, and few subsequent writers have advanced the philosophy of the "Potency and Act Classic" very much further. The great point is that anyhow Daoism was alone in treating of genuinely metaphysical questions, while rival schools contented themselves with the practical problems of politics and ethics. Of other Daoist writers of the period, only one deserves here further mention, not because of any originality of thought, but rather because he betrays a further influx of Indian ideas. This writer is Jwang Jou, whose life has been dated ²¹ as from 369 to 286 B.C. He was

²¹ Cf. Fung, p. 222. This would make Jwang Jou a contemporary of Candragupta and Zeno.

a native of the state of Sung and is reported to have been a prolific writer. The book *Jwang Dze*, however, seems to have been written mostly by later hands and only the first seven chapters (out of a total of thirty-three) seem to be authentically his own, although there is no reason to doubt that they all represent his teaching quite faithfully.

As regards *dao* and *de*, the *Jwang Dze* adds nothing to the doctrines contained in the *Lao Dze*. Only greater stress is laid on the continual flux of the phenomenal world: "The existence of things is like a galloping horse. There is no movement through which they do not become modified, no time when they are not changed" (chap. 17). An anarchist like Li Er, Jwang Jou believes in primitivity as man's ideal and in a Golden Age when "men dwelt together with birds and beasts, and the human race was one with all things. All being equally without knowledge, their *de* did not leave them. All being equally lacking in desires, they were all in a state of unadornment and simplicity. Being in this state, they possessed their original nature" (chap. 9). *De* is evidently the original *forma* of man, which Jwang Jou holds will become deformed and warped by education, as feet are deformed by binding. Therefore, he says: "Liberate your *de* and follow *dao*: Vain strivings after humaneness (*zhen*) and righteousness (*i*) only throw man's original natures into confusion" (chap. 13). Hence the emphasis on man's instincts, *chi*, rather than on reason. "The duck's legs are short, but if we try to lengthen them, the duck will feel pain. The crane's legs are long, but if we try to shorten them, the

crane will feel grief. Therefore let us not cut off what by nature is long, nor stretch what by nature is short" (chap. 8). "Bring your mind into a state of quiet and your *chi* into a state of indifference. Follow the spontaneity of things and hold within you no element of ego. Then the empire will be well governed" (chap. 7).

With this last quotation we see that Jwang Jou strikes a new note: that of systematic training of the mind in the proper yoga fashion. "To hold no element of ego" seems just a translation of the Buddhist training against "attachment to self," *nirmamatva*, and to discipline one's instincts (*chi*) of attraction and revulsion into a state of "indifference" can be nothing else but the striving after *samatva*. But there are even still more striking borrowings. Here is a passage from chapter 6 on *dzâ wang*, "sitting in forgetfulness": "What do you mean by this sitting in forgetfulness? I have abandoned my body [the typical trance illusion of the yogin leaving his body] and discarded my knowledge [discursive thought] and so have become one with the Infinite" [realizing the identity of *âtman* and *Brâhman*]. Here we have the first definite reference in Chinese literature of self-induced trances: the terms used are very felicitous, since they include the yoga posture (*âsana*), *dzâ* ("to sit"), as well as the loss of consciousness, *wang* ("to forget"). The same chapter refers to "deep breathing," which Derk Bodde²² rightly calls "special breathing exercises used to reach the stage of mystical union," in fact, *prânâyâma*. Again, Jwang Jou is the first Chinese writer to

²² Fung, p. 242.

refer in so many words to metempsychosis: "To have attained the human form is a source of joy. But in the infinite evolution there are myriads of other forms that are equally good. What an incomparable bliss it is to undergo these countless transitions!" (chap. 6.) Here the Indian idea has been taken over, but its meaning completely changed, to fit in with the peculiar Daoist abolition of all values; hence there is nothing dolorous felt here about the ceaseless cycles of rebirth. *Mâyâ* is equally familiar to our author: "How do I know that the love of life [*tṛṣṇa*?] is not a delusion? How do I know that the dead will not repent of their former craving for life? Only when one awakens, one begins to know that one dreamt. By and by comes the Great Awakening, and then shall we find out that life itself is a great dream" (chap. 2).²³

In addition to these examples, I would draw attention to the adoption of the upanisadic epigram *Etad tat* in chapter 2 of the *Jwang Dze*, bearing the heading, "The equality of things and opinions." We quote a typical passage: "There is nothing which is not *That* (*tat*, "the objective"); there is nothing which is not *This* (*etad*, "the subjective"). Therefore I say that *That* proceeds out of *This*, and *This* out of *That*. Is there really a distinction between *That* and *This*? Or is there really no distinction between *That* and *This*? Not to discriminate between them nor to oppose

²³ The first to point to these borrowings from India was August Conrady in his "Indischer Einfluss in China im 4. Jahrh. v. Chr." (*Zeitschr. d. D. Morgenl. Ges.* 60, 335-351; Leipzig, 1906). Conrady likewise showed that the lyrics known as *Li Sao* by Chu Yuan (who committed suicide in 288 B.C.) contain accounts of typical yoga hallucinations, such as magic voyages through the air.

That to This, is the very essence of *Dao*." Although the chapter deals mainly with the sophistry of the dialecticians, against whom he maintains the insufficiency of everything actual, the *Etad-Tat* phraseology is striking, and its use surely cannot be explained without reference to India. Jwang Jou is such an out-and-out relativist that he opposes the dialecticians only on the ground that it is profitless to argue about anything at all, since everything is one. "Because of the right, there is wrong; because of the wrong, there is right. Let us forget the distinctions of right and wrong. Let us find happiness in the Infinite and remain there." The same argument is taken up in chapter 17: "From the standpoint of *Dao* (i.e., pure potentiality), what is valuable? What is worthless? Do not maintain fanatically any convictions: that would be placing oneself in opposition to *Dao*. What are few, what are many? Be all-comprehensive like the points of the compass, to whose boundlessness no limit is set. Hold all things in your embrace, and then which ones will leave you? This is to be without one-sidedness. Where all things are equal, how can one be long and another short?"

There is no need to illustrate further this philosophy of "*Nichevo* as The Absolute." But before leaving Jwang Jou we must point to another expression of his which has a distinct ring of later Buddhism, viz., "Emptiness" (Hsü),²⁴ is an equivalent for *Wu*. Chapter 33 says in

²⁴ This word *hsü* in Chinese means not only "empty," but "unsubstantial," and thus is contrasted with "the actual" (*She*); it therefore could well be translated "the potential." *Hsu-She* in Chinese means: hollow-solid; empty-full; general-particular; abstract-concrete; false-true.

laudation of the mythical Lao Dan: "Men all seek *she* (the actual), he alone took *hsü* (the empty)." Chapter 4 indeed explains *hsü* as "an emptiness ready to receive all things: in this emptiness abides *Dao*." Chapter 12 describes well the yogin's experience of this "emptiness" after a complete purgation of the mind: ²⁵ "Through cultivation of *hsing* (one's nature) one returns to *de* (one's original form). Having returned to *de*, one becomes identified with the beginning. Thus identified, there comes vastness. With this one reaches a union with the universe. Joined in this union, one is as it were like someone stupid or confused."

With this quotation we may well bring our consideration of Daoism to an end. Daoist influence, as we shall see presently, has beaten strongly on all other schools of Chinese thought; as for its own evolution into one of the three quasi-religions of China, this is subsequent to the coming of the Han Dynasty and therefore falls outside the scope of our present study. Let us retain here that, while the Daoist writers here considered proved definitely the influx of subsequent waves of Indian thought, this influx does by no means imply the wholesale importation into China of a ready-made Indian ideology, but merely a contact with novel ideas, which became known and appreciated in a widening circle of men, who thereby pretended to possess a superior knowledge; ideas which, however, were considerably modified in the process of acclimatization in the alien milieu of China.

²⁵ *Hsin jai*, literally, "fasting of the heart."

CHAPTER XI

The Formulation of Chinese Philosophy in Confucianism

LEAVING the somewhat "stupefying and confusing" atmosphere of Daoist pseudo-metaphysics for that of bracing Confucian common sense, is like stepping out of a hothouse into the crispness of a bright winter morning.

MENCIUS

The teaching initiated by the Master Kung was carried on by his followers. Two names in particular are continually referred to by later writers, Dzeng Dze and Dze Se, both fifth-century figures, the latter apparently a grandson of Confucius. Indeed certain books, such as the "Classic of Filial Piety" and "The Great Learning," have been ascribed to them, though it is quite evident that they were written by third-century authors who used the names of Dzeng Dze and Dze Se merely as a literary device. The writings authentically next in date to the collected sayings of Confucius himself, are those of his great disciple and reformulator, Mencius, the *Meng Dze*.¹

Meng Ke, known to Occidentals as Mencius, seems to have been born in 371 B.C. in modern Shantung and to

¹ The original meaning of this is "the eldest son." The figures after quotations in this section refer to this book.

have died in 289, after having traveled about a good deal and suffered rebuffs at the hands of various rulers of warring states. His one aim was to defend the doctrines of Confucius against the attacks of Daoists and Mādists and to transmit the Master's teachings in their purity, so that the whole world "might enjoy tranquillity and good order" (II. b. 13). "Do I like disputation?" he once asked, and continued: "No, I simply have no alternative" (III. b. 9).

For Mencius, as for Confucius, the *raison d'être* of his teaching was the common weal: hence ethics was his main concern, and only to defend it against Yang Ju and Mā Di did he feel obliged to make excursions into psychology and metaphysics. What he advocated for the cure of all ills in the state was the method (*dao*) of the ancient sacral kings (*wang*), *wang dao*. We have already seen how he contrasted the right of legitimate kings and the might of feudal *duces*. But he did not make kingship an end in itself: kingship and a hierarchy of ranks and orders existed, according to him, only to promote the well-being of the masses. "The people are the most important element in a state, the sovereign the least," he said (VII. b. 14). Mencius' ideas about the legitimacy of a ruler likewise hit the mark with an astonishing sureness of touch. "Who gives the empire to another? The emperor? No: Heaven does. How does one know what Heaven's decree (*ming*) is? Heaven does not speak, but indicates its will (*ming*) through the private and public conduct of a ruler. Heaven causes a person to preside over human affairs and, when these affairs are well administered, the people accept him. Heaven gives him

the empire through the people" (V. a. 5). Hence mere heredity is not a title to kingship: a son must be worthy to succeed, to be a successor; if the people designate one worthier than any lineal descendant, it is to the former that legitimate kingship goes and not to the latter. Indeed he expressly distinguished between "putting to death a tyrant and assassinating a king" (I. b. 8),² a teaching on regicide which the Occident reached only two thousand years later.

Although Mencius thus placed the mass of the people and their welfare before the private interests of their ruler, he was far from wishing to abolish all distinctions between ruler and ruled. A contemporary of his, one Hsü Hsing, wished "rulers to cultivate the fields in common with their people and eat what they themselves grow; to prepare, morning and evening, their own meals, while at the same time they carry on their government" (III. a. 4). Against such preposterous primitivism, Mencius upheld the common sense of proper division of labor. "Some work with their brains, others with their brawn. The former govern the latter; the latter feed the former: this is a universal principle. Whatever articles an individual requires have been produced by other, diverse craftsmen. If the individual had to make them himself, the whole world would be kept running about the roads" (*ibid.*). Mencius thus is no egalitarian who would abolish all distinctions between men because of their substantial equality, but a democrat

² The Spring and Autumn Annals similarly distinguish in this regard between *sha* ("to kill") and *she* ("to murder"). Cf Leonard Shihlien Hsü, *The Political Philosophy of Confucianism* (New York, 1932), p. 57.

in the true sense of the word, which means one who holds that the ultimate control and designation of rulers rests with the ruled. America (and Russia), please note.

Economically, Mencius favored the traditional *dzing tien* system. But the central square of the *dzing* is no longer the landlord's, but called by him "the public field," which the surrounding eight families must cultivate in common "on the principle of mutual aid, while in cities the people should offer a tithe of their produce by way of taxes" (III. a. 3). Here we see how Mencius abandons completely the servile principle animating the ancient system and substitutes one of mutuality: loyalty to a lord is superseded by duty to the state. "Let careful attention be paid to education in the schools, with stress on the inculcation of filial piety and fraternal duty" (I. a. 3). Mencius' test of true kingship was that under such a king's rule "the common people should suffer neither from hunger nor from cold, and people over seventy could wear silk and eat meat, and no grey-haired people could be seen on the roads carrying loads" (*ibid.*). The *Wang Dao*, the method of such kingship, made people attend to farming at the proper seasons, prevented close-meshed nets for fishing, would not allow indiscriminate felling of trees in the forests (*ibid.*). The true king, himself not being harsh and hard-hearted, will exercise a rule which likewise will not be harsh and cruel (II. a. 6). "Treat the elders of others as you would treat the elders of your own family; treat the youths of others as you would treat the youngsters of your own family; and the

empire will revolve in the palm of your hand," was the maxim addressed by Mencius to rulers (I. a. 7).

Thus we may sum up Mencius' political philosophy by saying that its ideal was that of the Master, viz., to make men sages within and kings without, as the current saying was, which should be interpreted to mean that good government means a virtuous government. When somebody asked: "All are equally men, yet some are great men and some small men; how is this?" Mencius replied: "Those who follow that part of themselves which is great, are great men; those who follow the small, are small men. What constitutes a great man is to establish the nobler part of his being so that the inferior part cannot take it from him" (VI. a. 15). "That whereby man differs from birds and beasts the mass of the people cast away, whereas the superior man preserves it" (IV. b. 19). "This is what Heaven has given to us: the faculty of thinking, the mind" (VI. a. 15). And to the mind "the principles of reason and righteousness are as natural as the savoring of meats is to the palate" (VI. a. 7). The complete agreement of Mencius with Catholic teaching on this point is striking: both distinguish between a higher mind, comprising intellect and will and constituting the specifically human part, the *da ti* of Mencius, and a lower mind of perception and impulse, which we share with the animals, his *hsyao ti*. And both agree further on the fundamental truth that to the higher mind reason and the moral sense are connatural, but that both must be cultivated and therefore would be more per-

fectly developed in a sage than in the man-in-the-street. "The sages only apprehended ahead of us the principles of reason (*li*) and righteousness (*i*), which our minds mutually approve of" (VI. a. 7). "Altruism (*zhen*) is the mind of man, righteousness (*i*) his path" (VI. a. 11): "who dwells not in *zhen* and proceeds from *i*, is not really human" (IV. a. 10). Hence morality must be practiced not because it is advantageous, as the utilitarian would have it, but because it is properly human so to do. In this sense Mencius holds that man's nature (*hsing*), is originally good. "He who has exercised his mind to the utmost, knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven. To keep one's mind preserved and nourish one's nature, is the way to serve Heaven and to be in accord with its design (*ming*)" (VII. a. 1). "Without *i* (righteousness) and *dao* (*dharma*), man is in a state of starvation. They are produced by an accumulation of righteous deeds and not by incidental acts of righteousness" (II. a. 2). The nature of virtue as a habit could not be better put. "Be ye perfect" may be said to be the supreme precept of Mencius, to be carried out by self-examination and altruism: "All things are perfect³ within us. There is no greater delight than to find perfection⁴ when one examines oneself. To approximate most closely to it, one should vigorously strive after *shu* (not doing to others what one would not like oneself) and *zhen* (altruism)" (VII. a. 4).

³ The word used is *cheng*, "completed," i.e., perfect. The meaning is that the ideal is quite clear within us, i.e., to our conscience, however short of it we may actually fall.

⁴ The word used is *cheng*, which means here conformity of the actual with the ideal. The usual English translation "sincerity" is misleading.

If this is the positive side of Mencius' teaching, much of it had to be negative, i.e., a refutation of the errors of Daoists and Mādists. "Yang Ju's principle is, Each for himself. Though he might have benefited the whole world by sacrificing a single hair of his, he would not have pulled it out" (VII. a. 26): a biting *reductio ad absurdum* of the crass egotism inherent in Daoist quietism. In the same way Mencius spent much time in refuting Mā Di's *samatva*, which wished to root out by its *dyen ai* the particular loyalty and affection needed for the relationships between ruler and ruled, and between parent and child. "Without sovereign and without father: this is to be the same as a beast," was Mencius' concise comment (III. b. 9). As for the reality of "universal love," it can best be gauged by the fact that, if both Mā Di and Mencius condemned war, the latter did so because it was unrighteous, and the former because it was unprofitable. To the Mādist *li* ("profitable"), Mencius never wearied opposing righteousness, *i*, based on *li* ("reason"), the faculty which distinguishes man from beast. It is natural to man to give a proper burial to his parents, not because to do so is profitable, but because man's nature "could not bear the sight of their bodies being devoured by foxes and wild cats and infested by flies and midges" (III. a. 5).

With this we may pass from Mencius, truly "the eldest son" of Master Kung, to the next important Confucian of our period, Hsün Ching.

Hsün Ching probably lived from 298 to 238 B.C. Born in modern Shansi, he held official positions in several states

and died in modern Shantung. The *Hsün Dze* in 32 chapters is probably authentically his own work; the quotations following will refer to this book as extant.

Hsün Ching's Confucianism was greatly influenced by the opponents he had to deal with, especially their inherent atheism. Without ever going to that length, Hsün Ching sought to steer a safe middle course by adopting an agnostic attitude and rejecting superstition. As regards the former, he speaks thus of Heaven: "The fixed stars make their rounds, sun and moon shine alternately, the four seasons succeed one another, *yin* and *yang* go through their great mutations, etc. The results of these changes are known, but we do not know the invisible cause: this is what is called Heaven. It is only the sage that does not seek to know Heaven" (chap. 17). Therefore, he continues in the same chapter, "instead of exalting Heaven and thinking about it, why not make money and spend it profitably? Instead of obeying Heaven and praising it, why not adopt Heaven's decree (*Tien Ming*) and make use of it? Instead of looking for propitious times, why not seize an opportunity and utilize it?" Here we see our author's eagerness to take the wind out of the utilitarians' sails: "One should not neglect what man can do and think about Heaven"; and of the Daoists: ⁵ "To make perfect without acting (*wu*

⁵ Another good instance is Hsün Ching's use of the Daoist terms "quiescence" (*dying*) and "emptiness" (*hsü*) and their use to express a quite non-Daoist meaning. By *dying* he merely means the passive mind, the existence of which does not make him deny the active mind; and by *hsü* the same receptivity of the mind which remains, however many impressions may have been stored away in the memory. Cf. chap. 21: a quite unexceptionable psychological analysis of cognition, far indeed from the Daoist injunction, not to use the active intellect at all.

wé) and to obtain without seeking: this is meant by the activities of Heaven. But to understand the distinction between Heaven and man: this is to be a great man." At other times Hsün Ching uses the term "Heaven," not for what we may call "the unknown God," but simply as a synonym for "nature," as when he speaks of the five senses as *tien gwan* ("natural senses"), and of mind as their "natural ruler," *tien jün* (chap. 17); or when he says that "Heaven and earth are the origin of life: without them, how could there be life?" (chap. 19.)

As for superstition, Hsün Ching shows a great desire to dissociate himself from all that smacks of it. "If people pray for rain and get rain, what is that? The same as if there had been no prayer and it had nevertheless rained. Similarly when people try to save sun and moon during an eclipse, or decide affairs after consulting soothsayers: this is not because they really think they will get a result, but to put a fine appearance on the matter. Thus the superior man will look upon it, while the common people consider it supernatural" (chap. 17). In the same way he explains away the funeral rites as being only "for the living to give a beautiful ceremonial to the dead; to send off the dead as if they were living; to render the same service to the absent as to the present. Articles we put into the grave, as if the deceased was only moving house, to give the appearance, not for practical use." Upholding, as a good Confucian, the ancient customs and ceremonies (*li*) against the utilitarianism of scoffers, was naturally no easy task: hence these somewhat labored explanations. "Slighting

the dead and overemphasizing the living, is the way of Mâ Di," he sums up the matter. "Slighting the living and overemphasizing the dead is the way of the superstitious. Killing the living, to accompany the dead, is murder. The way of *li* and *i* is to send off the dead as if still living so that in death as in life there may be nothing that is not appropriate and good. This is the Confucian way" (chap. 19). Thus Hsün Ching holds fast to Confucius and blames only his successors for having allowed superstition to creep in: "Dze Se (a grandson of Confucius) began to develop peculiar theories called 'The Five Elements,' and Mencius followed. They passed them off as the true sayings of Confucius, and ignorant scholars welcomed them" (chap. 6).

As a Confucian, Hsün Ching had to hold the perfection of the Jou period against "abandoned and incorrigible people who say: Ancient and present times are different in nature, the reasons for their order and disorder differ," as, for instance, did Jwang Jou. Against such he observes that "the sage by his method (*dao*) can completely comprehend things. To him past and present are the same, for things of the same kind, though extended over a long period, continue to have the selfsame principles" (chap. 5). This traditional *dao*, the way of the ancient sacral kings, at all events possesses the advantage of being an objectively fixed authority: what confusion would not result by a general substitution of private judgment for it? This "*Dao* was the correct standard for ancient times, as it is for the present. If you depart from this way to choose your own subjective standard, then you shall not know what will

lead to calamity and what to happiness. No one will exchange two for one, because he knows the way of counting. To follow the Way is like changing one for two. How can there be loss? To leave the Way and choose one's own inner standards is like exchanging two for one: how can there be any gain?" (Chap. 22.) To practice this traditional way, perfection is needed.⁶ "Heaven and earth are great, but if imperfect, they could not effect any results. The sage is wise, but if imperfect, he could not have any effect on the people. Father and son are closely related, but if not perfect in these relations, they will stand far asunder. Singleness of purpose demands perfection: without it he who would skillfully practice the Way, though making it known in speech and appearance, would not get the people to follow him" (chap. 3).

When Hsün Ching said that one having a true norm could judge past as well as present, he truly philosophized by postulating general ideas. "Although things are innumerable, there are times when we wish to speak of them in general. So we generalize; we press on and generalize, and generalize still more, until there is nothing more general: then only we stop" (chap. 22). With this, Hsüing Ching proves himself a true philosopher and in advance of the merely practical mind of Mencius and a fortiori Confucius. This conception of the need of universals, as we would say, and of their reality, was forced upon Hsün Ching in his defense against the nominalism of the dialecticians.

⁶ The word used is again *cheng*. Pace Fung (p. 293), it really cannot be translated in English by "sincerity," since this would make no sense, as will readily be seen.

"Names," he lucidly teaches, "exist to denote actualities (*she*) and to distinguish similarities and differences. Therefore one who knows that different actualities have different names and uses their names accordingly and who does not refer to the same actuality by different names, will not experience any confusion. Names are not appropriate in themselves, but become so by agreement and custom. Some names are particularly felicitous: i.e., those that are simple, direct, easily understood, and not contradictory. Hence great is the wickedness of those who by confusing the correct nomenclature cause the people to wrangle and be perplexed. It is a crime like that of forging credentials or using false weights and measures" (chap. 22). Hence the need for "rectifying names" (*jeng ming*), as Confucius had already called it. As, to be perfect, practice must conform to ideal single-mindedly, so in speech names must correspond to things unambiguously. The fallacies which Hsün Ching castigated and exposed we shall revert to when we treat of the dialecticians who by juggling with words stupefied their audiences with such paradoxes as "to receive insult is no disgrace"; "mountains and abysses are on the same level"; "an ox and a horse are not a horse." To Hsün Ching these are just "heretical doctrines, heinous teachings, and impudent fabrications which cause people to depart from the way. But nowadays, alas, the world is in disorder, the sage has no power to compel people to do right, and so there is dialectics" (chap. 22).

In his psychology Hsün Ching at first sight seems to err by exaggeration when, against the clear teaching of Con-

fucius and Mencius, he proclaims "the nature (*hsing*) of man to be evil, and his goodness to consist only in acquired training (*wé*)."⁷ "Nature," he continues, "is the raw material; what are acquired are the accomplishments and refinements of culture (*wen*) and proper conduct (*li*)" (chap. 23). That, however, he does not really mean what the words strictly taken signify, is proved by the fact that he goes on to say that, "because man's nature is evil, he desires to be good." Hence obviously what Hsün Ching is groping to say is that human nature as such is good,⁷ but that it has received a general twist toward evil: which would have been the correct formulation of these twin facts. But in the absence of any specific revelation regarding original sin, it naturally was hard not only for Hsün Ching but for pagans in general to get these facts into a proper focus. The emphasis Hsün Ching lays on man's evil bent is, moreover, easily understandable when one remembers the primitivism advocated, e.g., by Jwang Jou, who held that man is perfectly good as long as his natural bent is not interfered with. Against them Hsün Ching stresses that training (*wé*) is imperative if individual and society are not to perish in a general chaos. "Man from birth is envious and hateful: therefore to give rein to man's original nature [really this ought of course to read "man's originally vitiated nature"] means inevitably strife and rapacity and a reversion to a state of violence. There-

⁷ Cf. also a passage from chap. 9: "Water and fire possess forces, but are without life; shrubs and trees have life, but no knowledge; birds and beasts have knowledge, but no morality (*i*). Man has all four and therefore is the highest being on earth."

fore the civilizing influence of teachers and laws, and the guidance of *li*⁸ and *i*⁹ are absolutely necessary" (chap. 23). And in chapter 19 he illustrates this dictum historically: "The early kings hated this disorder and so they established *li* and *i*, so as to set limits to this confusion by satisfying man's desires, without desires eating up things or things stretching desires to the breaking point. This is how *li* originated."

His explanation of *li* is as follows: "*Li* is rooted in three things: Heaven and earth are the origin of life; ancestors are the origin of human groups; rulers and teachers are the origin of orderly government. Without Heaven and earth how could there be life? Without ancestors, how could we have originated? Without rulers and teachers how could there be orderly government? If one of these three were lacking, men would be without peace. Hence our *li* must serve Heaven above and earth below, honor our ancestors and magnify our rulers and teachers" (chap. 19). "If people live solitarily and do not serve one another, there will be poverty. If people live gregariously, but without social distinctions, there will be strife. Poverty is a misfortune and strife a calamity" (chap. 10). "How are men able to form social organizations? By social distinctions.¹⁰ How can these distinctions be put into effect? Through *i* (righteousness). Only when there is righteousness in these distinctions can there be harmony" (chap. 9). The characteristic of tyrants is "to confuse these distinctions and to abandon

⁸ In the sense of the Indian *dharma*, the Greek *ethos*, and the Latin *mores*.

⁹ Corresponding to the Latin *fas* ("divine law").

¹⁰ *Fen*, "orders" or "estates," in Latin *ordines*.

li and *i*: through their bestial deeds empire leaves them" (chap. 18).¹¹ Hence the importance of attending to all the details of etiquette (*li*), an importance which received an ever-growing emphasis in succeeding ages.

Indeed, a compilation, the "Record of Customs," *Li Dyi*, made during the early Han period, has since come into ever greater prominence among Confucians. Its subject matter is indeed much older than its redaction, and portions of it may well be synchronous with the *Analects*. One chapter (28) is currently assigned to Dze Se, Confucius' grandson; however that may be, its authorship clearly goes back to Mencius' circle. Another chapter (39) seems to have been written by a disciple of Hsün Ching. Now included in the later compilation, are two books, now chapters 28 and 39 of it, called respectively the *Jung Yung* and the *Da Hsüé*, ranking among the great "Four Books" of Confucianism, the other two being the *Analects* of Confucius and the *Meng Dze*. We shall treat of these two separately and now confine our attention to the remaining portions of the *Li Dyi*.

At the outset the *Li Dyi* (chap. 7) lays down the great need of having the outward evidence of *li*, since the inner dispositions of man's mind remain hidden to others: "Good and evil are both hidden in people's minds. There is no visible manifestation of them and so, if we wish to comprehend them, what else is there except *li*?" *Li* "regulates and refines human feelings and thus keeps the people

¹¹ In the matter of regicide, as in that of egalitarianism, Hsün Ching thus agrees completely with Mencius: cf. *supra*, p. 195.

within due bounds" (chap. 27); therefore, "of all things whereby the people live, *li* is the greatest. Without *li* there would be no means of regulating the services to be rendered to Heaven and earth, of distinguishing the positions of ruler and subject, man and woman, father and son, nor of regulating the conduct between families, arranging for a marriage, and between friends." This *li* has of course had the tendency of becoming ossified and a matter of purely external routine: but the *Li Dyi* itself is quite emphatic that "*li* is only the embodied expression of *i*. Therefore, if there are any rites (*li*) which, though not of the early Jou kings, stand the test of *i*, they may be adopted on the ground of being righteous (*i*)" (chap. 7).

The *Li Dyi*, therefore, is careful to show the reasonableness of all rites, as laid down by custom, and to enlist man's reason in their performance so as to prevent their being turned into a mere piece of outward show. In doing so, the *Li Dyi* is rather prone to explain away *li* altogether, by making it appear as if the ceremonies were meant merely to satisfy man's emotions, and at the same time keep them in due bounds. The rationalist trend against magic is very marked. "Of all the ways of keeping men in good order, none is more important than *li*. Of *li* there are five kinds, and none of them is more important than sacrifice. Now the idea of sacrifice is not something that comes from without: it issues from within, being born in the heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression is given in ceremonies (*li*)" (chap. 21). Sacrifices are particularly offered as an expression of gratitude: to the mythical in-

ventor of agriculture at the harvest festival (chap. 9); and "to those who gave laws to the people and strengthened the state" (chap. 20). In the same manner the *raison d'être* of funerary rites is explained: "In dealing with the dead, if we treat them as if they were entirely dead, we would be showing lack of affection; but if we treat them as if they were entirely alive, we should show lack of wisdom. Therefore the funerary vessels are not capable of actual use; they are called *spiritual utensils*, indicating that the dead are to be treated like spirits. The calling back of the soul is a perfect expression of love, and the mental state for it is that of prayer. Filling the mouth of the dead with rice arises from a feeling which cannot bear that it should be empty" (chap. 2). "Such is the mind of the filial son, the real expression of human feeling, the true course of *li* and *i*. It is not something that descends from Heaven, nor does it come out of the earth. It is simply the expression of human feelings" (chap. 32). Similarly, "marriage ceremonies ¹² are intended to be a bond of love between two families, to secure the services in the ancestors' temple for the past and secure the continuity of the family line in the future" (chap. 41).

Elsewhere (chap. 17) music and *li* are contrasted to show how they complement each other: "Music comes from within, *li* acts from without. Coming from within,

¹² The underlying ancient fertility rite comes out strikingly in such a passage as the following: "If there were no union between Heaven and earth, the myriad things would not be produced. By the grand rite of marriage, generations of men are perpetuated through myriads of ages" (chap. 24). Note that the magic rite, not the act of coition, perpetuates humanity.

music produces serenity of mind; acting from without, *li* produces elegance of manner. Great music must be easy. Great *li* must be simple. The reason why courtesies could set the world in order is that there are music and *li*." All this seems rather remote from philosophy, but it explains well how it is that *li* plays such an important part in Confucianism.

Turning to what is now chapter 28 of the *Li Dyi*, the so-called Jung-Yung, the "Book of the Golden Mean," this is so called after the first words with which it begins: "The state of *jung-yung* ¹³ is characteristic of the superior man." This state is explained as one in which anger, sorrow, joy, and pleasure have not yet made their appearance; once they have appeared, but when due measure is kept in regard to all of them, this state is not that of *jung*, but of *he* (harmony), evidently a Confucian paraphrase of *samatva*.

The *Jung-Yung* emphasizes the "five relationships" which have become so characteristic of Confucian ethics: between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, friend and friend. It calls them "the universal method (*dao*) for all in the world." For their practice it preaches "perfection" (*cheng*). "Perfection is the way of Heaven. To attain to it, is the way of man. Perfection comes out of enlightenment, enlightenment out of instruction. It is not enough to perfect oneself, one must perfect all things. Perfection of oneself is humaneness (*zhen*); perfection of other things, wisdom. The

¹³ Literally *jung* means "middle," *yung* "the commonly used." The two terms are usually translated separately as "equilibrium and normalcy."

nature of a thing (*hsing*) is Heaven's design; ¹⁴ to follow it, is *Dao*; the cultivation of *Dao* is instruction. To develop one's nature to the utmost, one must be perfect to the utmost. Able to effect this, one can develop the natures of other men and things. Able to do this, one can assist Heaven and earth in their operations and form with them a triad. Therefore the superior man considers perfection the noblest of all attainments: for, knowing how to cultivate his own person, he knows how to govern others. Knowing how to govern others, he knows how to govern state and empire."

The *Da Hsüé*, or "Book of Highest Studies," now chapter 39 of the *Li Dyi*, similarly says that "the highest study is to exemplify illustrious virtue, to love the people, and to rest in the highest good. From the son of Heaven down to the common people, all must consider cultivation of the person to be fundamental. Their persons being cultivated, their families are well regulated; their families being well regulated, their states are rightly governed; their states being rightly governed, the whole world is at peace. Therefore the ancients, wishing to exemplify illustrious virtue, cultivated first their own persons. To do so, they rectified their minds; to do which, they sought for perfection in their thoughts; to do which, they extended their knowledge, which extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things"; a fit program indeed for "university studies." ¹⁵

¹⁴ The word used is *ming*, usually translated "will" or "decree" of Heaven, or "fate." It clearly means here the *lex aeterna* inscribed in all creatures.

¹⁵ The modern meaning of *da hsüé*.

In the event, the virtue of filial piety (*hsyao*) was exalted above all other virtues and made the very keynote of Confucianism. The composition in the third and second centuries of a "Classic of Filial Piety" (*Hsyao Dying*), contributed to this result, though in itself already the expression of a tendency inherent in Confucianism. This latter fact gave rise to the tradition that this Classic had Dzeng Dze, the renowned disciple of Confucius, for its author. But in fact both Confucius and Mencius made filial piety spring from *zhen*, and it is an unwarranted inversion of this teaching for this "Classic" to make *hsyao* and not *zhen* the root of all virtue and the end of all training. Says the *Hsyao Dying*: "From filial piety starts all virtue and teaching. We have received our bodies from our parents and therefore must not injure them: this is the beginning of filial piety. When we have established ourselves in the practice of *Dao*, so as to make our name famous in future ages and thereby glorify our parents, we have reached the goal of filial piety. It commences with the service of parents, it proceeds to the service of the ruler, it is completed by the perfection of our own personality. Filial piety is the way of Heaven, the principle of earth, the practical duty of man."

Compare with this the parallel passage from the *Li Dyi* (chap. 21): "The body has been transmitted to us by our parents. Dare anyone be irreverent in the use of this legacy? If a man is not grave in his own house, he is not filial; if not loyal in serving his ruler, he is not filial; if

not serious in the discharge of the duties of his office, he is not filial; if in friendship not perfect, he is not filial; if not brave on the battlefield, he is not filial. If he fails in these five things, his disgrace will reflect upon his parents. There are three degrees of filial piety: the highest is conferring honor on our parents; the second, not disgracing them; the lowest, supporting them."

With this quotation we may fittingly take leave of Confucianism and its development from the death of Confucius to the advent of the Han dynasty. This development, as we have seen, was strongly influenced by the apologetic needs against the host of opponents that had arisen, an influence which tended to make Confucianism a rather jejune creed. Fear of superstition deprived it of the sturdy theism of Confucius: what remained was a vague naturalistic animism, centering around the ancient concepts of a pastoralist Heaven and an agriculturist earth, and quite incapable of satisfying man's mind. Hence its escape into ritualism and its exaggeration of man's natural relationships in society. For all that, Confucianism remained fundamentally sound and obviously offered to rulers the only common sense basis available for orderly government. Small wonder that they eagerly seized upon it and wished to get rid of all the disturbing "philosophizing" of other schools of thought by making Confucianism the only licit philosophy. The further vicissitudes of this certainly most Chinese of all ideologies fall beyond the epoch we are here considering and we must therefore now

turn to consider the remaining four schools of thought that opposed Confucianism, until they either failed from inaction or were absorbed by their officially blessed rival, whose inherent truths anyhow gave it a greater survival value.

CHAPTER XII

Minor Systems

OF the remaining four "systems" of philosophy, as currently counted, all are united in the one feature which they have in common with Daoism and which places them in opposition to Confucianism, namely, of being non-moral.

1. LEGALISM

The first of these schools of thought, the "Legalist School" (*fa dya*), is a product of the time of Ba absolutism, which was formulated by "Lord Shang,"¹ a descendant of the Wei kings, a contemporary and opponent of Mencius. He was a staunch supporter of the then rising capitalism, an enthusiast of free competition, an opponent of the ancient *dzing tien* agrarian system and one of those who "accumulated millions."² The "Book of Lord Shang" (*Shang-jün shu*), though certainly not from his pen and a later compilation, represents faithfully enough the outlook of the man. It opens with a rebuttal of the validity of customary law, for which he wished to substitute more "up-to-date" statute law: "Former generations did not follow identical doctrines; so what antiquity should one fol-

¹ His real name was Shang Yang, but the book which goes by his name is called that of "Lord (*jün*) Shang." He served Chin, where he died 338 B.C. "Shang Jün" means literally "Merchant Prince."

² See *supra*, p. 146.

low? There is more than one way of governing the world and there is no need to imitate antiquity in order to take appropriate measures for the state. Consequently those who act contrary to antiquity do not necessarily merit blame, nor those who follow *li*, praise." Here we see clearly the contrast between *fa* (statute law) and *li* (customary law), which has given this school its name of "Fa Dya," a name which the usual English translation, "Legalist School," renders only imperfectly.

In another passage (II, 7) he distinguishes three stages of social development: at first,³ government was purely a family affair: "in middle antiquity people honored natural talent and delighted in moral virtue; in these latter days they prize rank and official status. These three methods are not antagonistic, but became respectively unsuited to the circumstances of their times. Therefore standards of value must change with the times." Here we have an attack on both *li* and *i*, which are now made to seem right enough in former days but which is held to be at present subordinate to the decrees of rulers. Instead of being the norm of laws, morality and custom are thus explained away in a relativist way.

Another book, the *Gwan Dze*, ascribed to the famous Prime Minister Gwan Jung of the first feudal leader, but evidently written in the third century B.C., similarly praises statute law in the following terms: "The intelligent ruler unifies measures and weights, sets up standards

³ When, as he says, "people knew their mothers but not their fathers." An interesting testimony to the early prevalence in China of matriarchy.

and upholds them steadily. Laws are the models for the empire and the standards for all affairs" (chap. 67). "Therefore laws are the highest principle for the empire. The maker of the laws is the ruler; the maintainers of the laws are his ministers; those who model themselves upon the laws are the people. When ruler and minister, superior and inferior, noble and commoner, all obey the laws, this is called a state of Great Good Government" (chap. 45). But the weak and vulnerable point of the Legalist system is that the laws decreed by the ruler not being subordinate and supplementary to the natural law, necessarily lack moral obligation, in that case their only sanction being the power of the ruler to enforce them. The *Gwan Dze* frankly acknowledges this: "If there is an intelligent ruler, who possesses the power to enforce his laws with absolute certainty, his subjects will not dare to do wrong or deceive their ruler, not because they love him but because they fear his awe-inspiring power. Therefore the intelligent ruler rests himself on a power compelling respect and thus keeps in order his subjects, who are forced to obey him" (chap. 67).

A theory of might instead of right, which has never lacked adherents among dominative rulers and despots. But the theory breaks down because its premise of "power to enforce with absolute certainty" cannot be fulfilled. As Napoleon once sighed: "One can do everything with bayonets, except sit on them." Consistently enough, however, the legalists of China have always upheld the need of this "power" (*she*) to bolster up "laws" made on

the *sic volo sic jubeo* principle: but they have not been slow to recognize also that still another principle is needed to stabilize even dominative government based on power, viz., *shu*, a word meaning "an art," in this case "statecraft" (with the accent on the last syllable). The need of this was particularly emphasized by another worthy of this school of thought, Shen Bu-hai, minister in the Han state, who died in 337 B.C. His writings are unfortunately lost: one wonders whether we have thus been deprived of a prototype of Machiavelli's *Prince*.

For the bulk of the tenets of the legalists we must go to a later writer, Han Fé, who also belonged to the Han state and died there in 233 B.C. The *Han Fé Dze* is a book which goes by his name, although evidently there are interpolations from other pens. The *Han Fé Dze* anyhow tries to syncretize all previous teachings on *fa*, *she*, and *shu* and declares all three to be equally necessary for a successful ruler. What he meant by *fa*, the *Han Fé Dze* (chap. 49) explains thus: "In the state of an intelligent ruler there will be no literature of books and records of customs, but the statute law alone will be taught. There will be no sayings of early kings, but the officials will act as teachers." As for *she*, it is explained as follows: "*She* is the means for gaining supremacy over the masses" (chap. 48); "it is that by which a ruler can govern the empire and attack other feudal lords" (chap. 52). *She*, he says, has two handles. "These two handles are punishments and rewards" (chap. 7). Naturally the accent is on the former: "The severe household has no fierce slaves, while it is the affectionate

mother that has a prodigal son. From this I know that *she* can repress outrage, whereas virtue and kindliness are insufficient to stop disorder" (chap. 50). And similarly he says, "when the sage Yao was of humble rank, nobody listened to his teaching; when he became ruler of the empire, his orders and prohibitions were obeyed. From this I see that talent and wisdom are not enough to subdue the masses, but that *she* suffices even to subdue men of ability" (chap. 40). On *shu* he does not expatiate to the same extent. All he says is that "if the ruler have no *shu*, there will be weakness above, just as, if the ministers have not their *fa*, there will be confusion below. Neither of them can be dispensed with; both are the fit tools for emperors and kings" (chap. 43). For "scholars versed in *shu* can bring to light the secret feelings of powerful men, and scholars versed in *fa* can rectify their wicked conduct. Hence, when scholars skilled in *shu* and *fa* are employed,⁴ nobles and overstrong ministers will be done away with" (chap. 11): and, we may add, in consequence of such methods absolutist regimes will become possible.

Obviously Han Fé had no use for the dialecticians and had the usual remedy for freedom of speech: "Words not in accord with laws and commands must be prohibited" (chap. 41). He therefore also believed in "rectification of names"; because, "for maintaining uniformity, names are of primary importance. When names have been rectified, things will be fixed; when not, things undergo change.

⁴ This seems a direct reference to himself, whose services the ruler of Han refused.

Therefore the sage holds to uniformity and rests in quiescence" (chap. 8). The argument is amazing for its *non sequitur*: but let that pass. His last remark shows the anxiety of this as of all writers of the time, to use Daoist expressions as if their own, non-Daoist, theories could be perfectly well squared with Daoism: proving the prevalence and popularity of Daoism at this period. Han Fé, for instance, also pays lip-service to the famous *Wu Wé* principle of Daoist non-activity: but what does he actually mean by it? Only this: that "when the cock is made to preside over the night and the cat is ordered to catch rats, each being employed according to its natural ability, then the superior is without concern. It is when each rests in his appropriate place that superior and inferior are in a state of *wu wé*" (chap. 8). But is a cat catching rats inactive? One really wonders whom so poor an argument could blind to the fact that *wu wé* means not non-intervention, but quietism. In the same chapter he uses the Daoist term "emptiness" (*hsü*) for his own purposes: "The sage at the center holds what is important, and the outside world will come to him to imitate him. He awaits them in a state of *hsü*, and they all work by themselves."

So much for the "School of Statute Law." The extraordinary thing is that, although the long history of China has not been lacking in despotic rulers, this school of a political philosophy of imperial absolutism has never been able to gain official recognition nor to compete seriously with the orthodox system founded by the Master Kung—a fine testimony to the political sagacity of the Chinese people.

2. MĀDISM

Of the early successors of Mā Di, the founder of this school, two names have come down to us, those of Sung Keng and Yin Wen. As an outward badge of their egalitarianism they wore a cap with a flat top, they observed strictest frugality as their mode of life, and the main message they had for their generation, "counseling the high and instructing the low," was "to save it from war, checking aggression and proposing general disarmament."⁵ Living in the fourth century B.C., they found themselves of course in the thick of the perpetual wars characteristic of the Jan Gwo period, and their pacifism therefore was as praiseworthy as it was common sense. Based, however, as it was on mere utilitarianism, it could not but fail of its purpose.⁶ No writings of their own exist: all we know about them, we read in other authors.

The *Han Fé Dze* (chap. 50) says that what Sung Keng preached was: "Do not fight; do not make enemies of others; do not feel shame because of detention in prison nor think it a disgrace to be insulted." This last point seems to have surprised his hearers most: the *Hsün Dze* explains their attitude by reporting: "Master Sung believes that, to show clearly that it is no disgrace to meet with insult, will prevent people from fighting; they fight

⁵ The quotation is from the *Jwang Dze*, chap. 33.

⁶ When Mencius asked Sung Keng how he wanted to make two rulers stop fighting each other, the latter replied: "I am going to tell them that their course is unprofitable" (Mencius, VI. b. 4). One is reminded of the letter addressed by the *Māhātma* (Gandhi) to the *Führer* (Hitler).

only because they consider it a disgrace to meet with insult." Confucians, who attached so much importance to the punctilio of etiquette, naturally were shocked at so cynical a disregard of what people said about oneself. We have already seen that Hsün Ching girded at them for their verbal *contradictio in adjecto* that "insult is no disgrace"; though right in this logically, this of course could not really meet the point, that at times insult, which indeed is a disgrace, should be borne cheerfully, if undeserved. But this point the Mādists did apparently not make, rather holding that resentment against an insult and shame for a disgrace are purely subjective and therefore will cease to exist as soon as one no longer considers an insult to be a disgrace. Sung Keng apparently was the first to base Mādist tenets on a changed mentality. As regards frugality, he wished to convince people, not of the need of restraining their concupiscence, but of the very little that man really desires if his concupiscence is not artificially stimulated by social example and rivalry. "To desire few things was their inner cultivation," says the *Jwang Dze* (chap. 33) of him and his companions. Hence *li* they called mere prejudices: "In every intercourse they began with knowing the prejudices," says the same text, which Fung⁷ explains as meaning that "men must rid themselves of all the bias created by their position, age, government, religion, customs, etc., before they can understand what things really are."

For later Mādism, i.e., of the third century B.C., we

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 152.

have the work called the *Må Dying*, which now forms chapters 40–45 of the *Må Dze*. Its contents are purely dialectical and meant as a defense of Mådist tenets against the logic-chopping of the dialecticians. Whereas the latter were nominalists, the *Må Dying's* point of view is strictly realist.⁸ Thus, e.g., chapter 41 lays it down that, “when one says that fire is hot, this does not mean that it is I who possess the hotness of the fire”; my senses merely convey to me a fact, “the hotness,” existing outside and independently of myself. Similarly, “when one knows something and cannot indicate (*je*) it, this is being stupid.” This refers to the dialecticians’ use of this word *je* as meaning “a universal,” and their contention that a universal either exists apart from the concrete thing wherein it subsists, or else that a universal exists only in the mind as a logical concept and does not form part of the thing’s reality, from which the intellect merely abstracts it. The *Må Dying* against this seems to say that, for instance, if hardness exists apart from a hard object, it ought to be possible to point to it (*je*). If anyone cannot do so and yet pretends to know it, he clearly talks nonsense.

The *Må Dying's* theory of knowledge is similarly sound. It distinguishes “knowledge” from “understanding”: “understanding,” it says (chap. 40), “is that by which the knowing becomes clear, by reasoning about the object.” Further: “Knowledge may be by way of information, inference, or personal experience. It consists in agreement

⁸ Fung (p. 268) inverts this fact.

(*he*) between the actual (*she*) and its name (*ming*).” Its logic is likewise sound and served as a useful corrective of the verbal tricks of the dialecticians. The *Må Dying*, for instance, lays it down that “different classes are not comparable”; hence one cannot ask, which is longer, a tree or a night? But there is no need for our purpose to go into further details of this rather arid subject.

Not so admirable are the arguments of the *Må Dying* in favor of a utilitarian ethics, to which the school is pledged. For instance, righteousness (*i*) it defines as “consisting in conferring upon others benefits (*li*), i.e., in having one’s mind set upon loving the world and being able skillfully to benefit it, even if actually prevented from benefitting it” (chap. 40). Here clearly *i*, righteousness, is mistaken for *zhen*, altruism, or rather identified with “universal love” (*dyen ai*), Må Di’s version of *samatva*. Universal benevolence of course is only an effect of righteousness and is not righteousness itself. In the same place the *Må Dying* defines the beneficial (*li*) and the injurious (*hai*) “as that which when obtained gives pleasure, or displeasure.” This would be sheer hedonism, but the *Må Dying* tempers it by its doctrine of “balancing” benefit (*li*) and injury (*hai*). Only when correctly weighed (*chüan*),⁹ do one’s likes indicate the beneficial and one’s dislikes the injurious. Thus, “if on meeting a robber one loses a finger to save one’s life, this is benefit (*li*), though meeting a rob-

⁹ Of this “weighing,” chapter 41 goes out of its way to emphasize its non-moral character: “To estimate the heaviness and lightness of bodies is called weighing (*chüan*). This weighing does not consist in finding out the right or wrong of things. It consists in balancing them correctly.”

ber is injury (*hai*).” And it continues: “To choose the lesser evil is the result of finding oneself in a situation which is not under one’s control, whereas to choose a greater good is done quite freely.” Evidently this doctrine is capable of an interpretation which would identify it with that of the Aristotelian pursuit of happiness through virtue, but Mådism does not so work it out. All we can say is that the *Må Dying*’s logic is sound, and that therefore its support of Mådist utilitarianism is rather incomplete and halfhearted.

Again, the objection of opponents to their doctrine of universal love, that one cannot love what is indefinite, the *Må Dying* (chap. 41) meets by denying that the number of people in the world is unlimited. The total population of the world represents a definite number, it says, and besides, “there is no difficulty in including all in one’s love without knowing the actual number.” The other attack of their opponents on their doctrine of universal love was to the effect that it was inconsistent with their admission that bandits had got to be killed. This they met by the true argument that loving the sinner does not exclude hating the sin: “to hate the existence of many robbers, is not to hate the existence of many men, and to kill a robber is not to kill a man *qua man*, but *qua robber*” (chap. 43).

In conclusion we may give the *Må Dying*’s neat repartee to the Daoist tenet of “Banish learning and there will be no more grieving” (*Lao Dze*, chap. 20). “Study,” says the *Må Dying*, “is advantageous. By maintaining that people do not know that study is of no advantage, one is thereby

informing them of this fact. This information that study is of no advantage constitutes teaching. To hold as a teaching that study is of no advantage is perverse" (chap. 41).

Later Mådism has played its part in stemming the flood of verbal trickery, which at one time constituted a very real danger in China. With the danger passed, Mådism itself passed out of the intellectual life of the nation, which remained faithful to its Confucianism, though traces of the former's pacifism and utilitarianism have found a permanent lodging place in the latter. The *Mâ Dying* in particular came to be half-forgotten, and it is hardly a century ago that fresh interest in it has tried to reconstruct and re-interpret its text.

3. DIALECTICS

We must now consider that school of philosophy that was "Enemy No. 1" of all the other schools, the "dialecticians" or *Byen Tyi Dya*.¹⁰

The origin of the school seems definitely to go back to the sixth century B.C., and its progenitor may well have been one Deng Hsi, about whom Lü Bu Wé says that he taught people how to win lawsuits. The resemblance of his unscrupulous method to that of the Greek Sophists is striking: being a lawyer, his whole aim was practical like theirs and averse to metaphysical enquiry. All he wanted was to gain his point in argument; what mattered was his brief, not the truth. Contemporary with Confucius or even anterior to him, Deng Hai evidently provoked the latter's

¹⁰ *Byen Tyi* may be translated "The Arguing-about-it" School.

cry for "a rectification of names." Himself he was the echo and product of the logomachies started in India in the seventh century B.C. The affinity between the dialecticians and Daoists has, in fact, ever remained unmistakable. Itself relativist and given to express itself in paradoxes, Daoism is prone to look upon the dialecticians as the *enfant terrible* of the family. In the following centuries we know, for instance, that the great Daoist Jwang Jou was a close friend of the great dialectician Hwé She, whose arguments he countered more in sorrow than in anger and whose death, the *Jwang Dze* (chap. 24) reports, he deeply lamented.

Hwé She belongs to the early fourth century and is a contemporary of both Jwang Jou and Mencius. None of his writings have survived; his famous "Ten Paradoxes" have been preserved for us only by the *Jwang Dze* (chap. 33), which endeavored to disprove them. Hsün Ching's judgment of both Deng Hsi and Hwé She was severe, if well deserved: "Refusing to acknowledge *li* and *i*, these men were subtle, but could not satisfy real needs; critical, but useless; expending much energy, but producing few results" (*Hsün Dze*, chap. 6). And in chapter 21 he says of Hwé She that "he was blinded by phrases and disregarded facts. A mere verbal consideration of the way will lead to nothing but argument." What the Confucians particularly deplored was that these arguments "deceived and confused the ignorant masses" and thus made orderly government impossible. The *Jwang Dze* (chap. 33) similarly calls the dialecticians men who tried to "throw a

deceiving glamor over men's minds, to change their thoughts. Yet they could only overcome men's words, but could not convince their minds. Hwé She considered himself the best debater: in reality he only contradicted people without really overcoming them. With all his talents, he merely wandered about without achieving anything; trying to shout down an echo or to race his own shadow."

A consideration of Hwé She's "Ten Paradoxes" will amply bear out these observations. They are as follows:

1. "The greatest has nothing beyond itself; the smallest has nothing within itself." Merely a paraphrase of a superlative.
2. "What has no thickness cannot be increased in thickness and yet in extent may cover a thousand miles." Truly linear measurement is two, and not three-dimensional.
3. "The heaven is as low as the earth, mountains are on the same level as plains." Everything is relative.
4. "The noonday sun is setting, a creature born is a creature dying." Another example of relativism.
5. "All things are similar in one respect and dissimilar in another."
6. "The south has no limit and has a limit."
7. "I go to Yüé today and arrive there yesterday."
8. "Connected rings can be separated." Meaning: everything changes.
9. "The center of the world lies in the north and in the south."
10. "Love all things equally; the universe is one." An attempt to base *samatva* on logic.

That such "paradoxes" should have created such a stir, shows how young the world of philosophical thought was when they were uttered. Anyhow, they make it very clear that Hwé She was a relativist. The same cannot be said of his opponent Lung.

Gung-sun Lung belonged to the latter part of the fourth century, but was also a contemporary of Jwang Jou. The *Jwang Dze* (chap. 17) reports him as saying of himself: "When young, I studied the *Wang Dao* and practiced *zhen* and *i*. Now I unify the like and unlike and separate the hard and white. I prove the impossible possible and affirm what others deny. I have controverted the wisdom of all the philosophies and refuted all arguments brought against me. I have come to think that I am the wisest of all." He certainly seems to have had "a good conceit" of himself. A small third-century work has survived, the *Gung-sun Lung Dze* which, if not of his pen, at least gives in six chapters his best known arguments. Chapter 1 says of him that, "dissatisfied with the divergence between and confusion of names and actualities, he used his peculiar talent to discuss the alleged inseparability of whiteness and thus to transform the whole world. He said: 'I gained my reputation with my discourse on the white horse. If you deprive me of that, I have nothing to impart.'"

This "white horse" discourse of his is given in chapter 2 and bears out his claim to that extent that he seems to have been actually the first in China to bring out the notion of universal ideas. He says there: "A white horse is *white + horse*. *Horse + white* is not *horse*. Therefore I say that a *white horse* is not a *horse*." What he means here by *horse* is what he calls *you ma zhu dyi er*, i.e., "horse in itself," the universal idea of *horse*. Such universal ideas chapter 3 calls *je* and contrasts with concrete particulars,

which it calls *wu*.¹¹ It then proceeds: "If there were no concrete particulars, one could not speak directly of ideas. If there were ideas, but no concreted ideas (*wu je*), one could not speak of what are not ideas, (i.e., concrete particulars). But how can ideas depend on particulars, so as to be [known to us] only, when they are associated with particulars (*yü*)?" Chapter 4 elaborates the paradox that universals and particulars associate: "The universal of a hen's leg is one; its particular legs are two: therefore a hen has three legs." Finally chapter 5 comes to the famous discourse on "Hard and White." It begins: "Hard, white, and stone are not three, but two. For sight perceives whiteness but not hardness, and touch perceives hardness but not whiteness. Sight and touch are separate [there exist for us therefore two percepts, a hard stone and a white stone]: but both hardness and whiteness are in the single stone. Yet, being general [ideas applicable to everything that is hard, and white, in the world], how can hardness and whiteness be in the [one, particular] stone?" The answer to this our author gives as follows: "Hardness is not hardness because of the stone and other particulars, but exists without a stone, in itself. Hardness in itself does not exist in the world, but lies there hidden." Hidden to whom? Our senses, we would say; but our author only vouchsafes the cryptic remark that "separateness is concealment." The *Jwang Dze* (chap. 33) quotes Lung Dze as saying, "Ideas do not reach, the reaching never ends," which seems to

¹¹ *Wu* means both "a thing" and "to distinguish by appearance"; *je* means both "to indicate" and "an idea."

mean that our sense perception indeed continually reaches out after ideas, but cannot attain them. Perhaps by "separateness is concealment" he meant that the very fact, that universals are separate in themselves and only associated in concrete particulars, proves that universal ideas are a world forever hidden to the prying senses.

Gung-sun Lung at all events had a firm grasp of universals, maintaining quite rightly that they are immutable. He therefore was a confirmed opponent of Hwé She who, as we have seen, was an exponent of the *panta rhei* ("everything is in a flux") of relativism. Whereas the latter consequently was an out-and-out relativist, maintaining "the unity of similarity and dissimilarity," Gung-sun Lung by his discourse on "the separateness of hard and white" proves himself rather an idealist. The pity is that, instead of trying to make his thesis and illustrations as plain as the Chinese language permits, he actually delights in expressing himself in paradoxes to stun his hearers and for this purpose is intentionally obscure and misleading: a feature common to the whole tribe of dialecticians, though one gladly admits that Lung Dze himself stands head and shoulders above the rest of them. The interesting point for our study of the development of human thought lies in this, that a Chinese dialectician stumbled on the discovery of universals in the course of his dialectics: but that, since his interest lay primarily in the latter, there was no advance from this to metaphysics proper; but the conception of a world beyond *mâyâ*, borrowed from India by both China and Greece, led in Greece through Ionian nature

philosophy, Plato's *ideas* and Aristotle's *forms*, to an ever-deepening insight into the very nature of being, because Greek curiosity was bent on puzzling out the truth, not burdened by yogic preconceptions, as was Indian, nor sidetracked by logic and politics, as was Chinese thought.

4. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MAGIC

The last remaining school of philosophical thought for us to consider is that called in Chinese the *Yin Yang Dya*. This term, however, overemphasizes the *Yin Yang* speculations, which indeed became paramount in this school since the Han dynasty, but which neither exhaust its teachings nor account for their origin. In reality the school represents all attempts made at systematizing and syncretizing the different forms of magic which were current from earliest times in China and at turning them into nothing less than a system of philosophy, both speculative and practical; the former part "explaining" the magical *nexus* between various objects, the latter teaching man how to conform to the magical order existing between different things.

The several strands making up this Chinese philosophy of magic may be distinguished as follows:

1. The earliest element is the practical one of divination by the cracks appearing in a heated tortoise shell and by the stalks of unequal length of the milfoil plant. During the early Jou period some literati were reducing the lines thus produced into writing and thus evolved the system of the eight trigrams already referred to by us. This

certainly simplified divination, since an officially fixed schedule could now be drawn up, giving the meaning of the eight alternatives, to which the artificially created cracks could easily be referred, the prognostications by this method becoming even more stereotyped. When eight alternatives did not seem to meet all contingencies, the combinations were raised to the number of 64 by using hexagrams ¹² instead of trigrams. An official guide to would-be diviners was drawn up under the early Jou dynasty, explaining the meaning of this magical concurrence of six broken and unbroken lines, and became known as the *Jou I*, a term that may be freely translated as "The Jou Method, or Divination Made Easy." ¹³ Each hexagram got a proper name and was said to stand for a certain idea: for instance, No. 12 meant being shut up, No. 23 decay, No. 51 movement, etc.

2. Upon this material the ideologies of the three basic civilization types of mankind operated. But they operated with this difference, that in China the agriculturist and pastoralist formed an amalgam, which for our purposes here must be treated as a single whole. It is this combination of the southern earth worship with that of the

¹² The forty-second hexagram, for instance, is made up of three broken and three unbroken lines, and looks as follows: —



¹³ The word *i* means both "ease" and "change." Hence *I Hsüé* means originally "easy to learn," but later became "the doctrine of changes"; "the Jou Easy Method" (*Jou I*) subsequently received the mystifying title of "The Classic of Changes" (*I Dying*).

northern heaven cult that produced the *Yin Yang* magic which has come to dominate Chinese magical thought. The dual aspect of contrast and conjunction of female-male was soon generalized into that of passive-active, soft-hard, moist-dry, dark-light, etc., contraries into which the whole of nature could seemingly be analyzed. The dualism of *Yin* and *Yang* evidently accorded well with that of the trigrams of broken and unbroken lines: the broken lines (\equiv) standing for *Yin*, the unbroken ones (\equiv) for *Yang*. In the working out of the *Yin-Yang* principle it was applied first to natural phenomena and next to family relationships, as appears from the significance attached to the basic eight trigrams:

1. — heaven	3. - - thunder ¹⁴	5. - - moon	7. — hills
—	- -	—	- -
— father	- - eldest son	- - middle son	- - youngest son
2. --- earth	4. — rainstorm	6. — sun	8. - - dales
---	—	- -	—
--- mother	- - eldest daughter	— middle daughter	— youngest daughter

3. Venatorial influences came from the Malayan seafarers settled along the coast, especially from the people of Chi (corresponding to modern Shantung), who were “noted for their fabulous and fanciful stories.” ¹⁵ Chi was the home of the geomancers (*fang she*), and the center of the five elements’ magic. The five elements (*Wu Hsing*) ¹⁶

¹⁴ Note the sequence from “heaven” to “thunder,” which so closely follows that from Ouranos to Zeus and from Varuna to Indra. Significantly enough, the name for the third trigram is *jen*, a word meaning “shake,” “terrify.”

¹⁵ Fung, p. 168. The use of tortoise shell fissures seems fundamentally also to belong to venatorial magic.

¹⁶ The literal meaning is “series of five.” “Element” is the customary, but rather misleading translation.

are earth, wood, metal, fire, and water, an original combination which obviously has no affinities at all with the *Yin-Yang*. It was only under the Han dynasty that these elements were forced into the *Yin-Yang* framework and that the *Yin-Yang* school then came to be referred to as "the school of *Yin-Yang* and the five elements." The speculative key to the magical meaning of the five elements is that each one of the series overcomes the preceding one and is overcome by the one succeeding it. Thus we have an infinite series: wooden instruments manipulating earth, metal instruments cutting wood, fire melting metal, water quenching fire, earth drinking up water, and so on and so on. Hence a person or event that can be magically connected with, say, fire, draws advantage from one connected with metal, but must beware of such other said to represent water. Its adaptability to soothsaying is evident, as is its derivation from the venatorial conception of totems and taboos. Moreover, it is interesting to note how, under the influence of Daoism, the meaning of *hsing* ("series") became that of "virtue" or "power" (*de*). The corresponding color series is yellow-green-white-red-black: a series in which black for water and yellow for earth are surprising, until one realizes how appropriate yellow is for the prevailing loess formation of the country. Applied to the five savors, the series runs: sweet-sour-acrid-bitter-saltish, a labored exegesis found in a late section of the *Shu Dying*, called the *Hung Fan*.

4. Finally there is an element of magic which by its astrological character betrays its Babylonian origin. A first-

century work, *The Book of the Former Han Dynasty* (chap. 30), says that, "noting the progressions of sun, moon, and the five planets, one ascertains the changes of the seasons and the manifestations of good and bad fortune." This, as indeed all magic, is of course based on the notion that natural phenomena, in this case the stars in their courses, are linked with human events: man therefore can foreknow the "decrees of the heavens" (*tien ming*). This is originally a purely astrological expression which in the milieu of Chinese pastoralist theism became "the will of God," but was liable to denote also "fate," as we have seen already. *Ling* similarly means both "command" and "season," and one of the earliest almanacs was thus called *Yüé Ling*, a term which therefore can mean both "the seasons of the moons," and "the monthly commands." These almanacs came into being with growing literacy at the same time that the *Jou Divination Made Easy* was composed. In these almanacs a fusion of astrology with the five-elements magic is evident, a syncretism which soon came to include also the *Yin-Yang* magic. The *Yüé Ling* shows that this fusion was not very easy. In assigning, for instance, to each of the four seasons one element, it was forced to drop out one (viz., earth) altogether: wood (vegetation) naturally was assigned to spring, fire to summer, metal to autumn, water to winter. Magic of course not only observes the analogies existing, but believes that, by performing an analogous act, man influences the phenomena to which this analogy refers. Thus green is the color for spring: therefore should the sacral king in spring

wear black (the color of water and winter), disastrous frosts and rains would follow. Therefore, says the *Gwan Dze* (chap. 40), "a sage king establishes government in accordance with the seasons and put himself into union with the movements of heaven and earth."¹⁷ From this is further derived the idea of "seasonableness" or "timeliness" (*she*), which we have found already in Confucius. This concept prevented him from being either a monoideic doctrinaire or yet a mere opportunist, and made for that sweet reasonableness, which recognizes that there must be change, but that the very changes must be made according to a fixed rule.

As regards the literature of this philosophy of magic, its classic is the *I Dying*.¹⁸ Hallowed by the ancient Jou tradition, it was not completely discarded by Confucius, but his references to this book are few and far between; Mencius never refers to it at all. As already pointed out, the *Divination Made Easy* had short explanations of the meaning of each hexagram, as, e.g., for the thirty-second: "If he is inconstant in his moral character, disgrace will come upon him." Such commonplaces, of course, are needed for the production of oracles, and Confucius did quote some of them, as, for instance, the one above mentioned, to illustrate a point he was making,¹⁹ but not at all for the purpose

¹⁷ Incidentally, this explains also the idea derived from sacral kingship, that the weal and woe of a country is ascribable to the wisdom or folly of its ruler: an idea once applied to China's "son of Heaven" emperor and until yesterday to Japan's "Heavenly Emperor," *Tenno*.

¹⁸ It is said to have been the only book which escaped the general ban put on writings at the Burning of Books in 213 B.C.

¹⁹ *Analects*, XIII, 22.

of divination.²⁰ A moral lesson was pointed by quoting from the mysterious *I Dying*. Hsün Ching was more prone to do so and illustrates a growing practice, which after his time led to the collection of much wider and more general applications of these oracles. This collection is known as *The Ten Appendixes* (*she i*).²¹

The Ten Appendixes was compiled during the early years of the Han dynasty. Though late, this work falls within our purview, as most of its sayings go back to the closing years of the *Jan Gwo* period. Appendix III explains the method of the *I* as follows: "The *I Dying* is a book which may not be put far away. Its method is by changing the lines of the hexagrams. They move and change, never remaining in the same position, drifting about into any one of the six positions of a hexagram.²² They ascend and descend, strong and weak lines change positions, so that no invariable rule can be established. The meaning changes as the change in position indicates." Its exegesis may be illustrated by a quotation from Appendix I on hexagram 32 ("movement in any direction will be advantageous"): "The way of Heaven and earth is constant. When there is an end, there is also a beginning. The four seasons, changing and transforming, bring things to perfection. When the sun goes, the moon comes. That which goes, contracts; that which comes, expands.

²⁰ The *Li Dyi* (chap. 200) contains the warning that, "if the *I Dying* is abused, reason is violated" (chap. 23).

²¹ The Chinese character for this title means literally "wings" or "to protect."

²² Hence the new name, "Classic of Changes."

By this dual movement of contraction and expansion all that is beneficial is produced."

Appendix II applies the hexagrams to politics; e.g., "No. 10 hexagram is formed by the trigrams *heaven* above and *dales* below. Accordingly the superior man will discriminate between high and low, and give fixity to the aims of the people." Similarly an application to ethics will be made: "The trigram *heaven* denotes vigorous activity. Accordingly the superior man will nerve himself to ceaseless action." Even history is perceived to be narrated by the hexagrams. Thus No. 59, composed of *wood* above and *water* below, is supposed to refer to the invention of "hollowed tree trunks to make boats, and shaped planks to make oars." Well indeed may Appendix III exclaim: "Wide is the *I* and great!" and sum up its fourfold use: "We should set the highest value on its explanations to guide us in speaking; on its changes to guide our movements; on its resemblances for the making of utensils; on its prognostications for divination."

Dzou Yen was a voluminous writer of this school, whose writings, however, are not extant. He lived about 300 B.C., and the *She Dyì* (composed in the first century B.C.) says of him that he "examined deeply the phenomena of *Yin-Yang* increase and decrease and wrote essays of more than 100,000 words about their strange permutations. His words were grand, if fanciful. He followed the great events in the rise and fall of ages and by their omens went back to a time when heaven and earth had not yet been born. He

traveled among the feudal lords and everywhere was received with signal honors" (chap. 74). In chapter 28 the *She Dyi* says of Dzou Yen's followers, that they "discussed and wrote about the cyclic revolutions of the five powers. They practiced methods to gain magical control over their bodies, which they made to vanish or to be transformed. The geomancers (*fang she*) transmitted Dzou Yen's arts, but were unable to comprehend them. Thus there arose many people skilled in performing prodigies, in flattery and deceitfulness, and in winning people by all kinds of evil means." Dzou Yen seems to have been at all events the first geographer of China: "He classified China's notable mountains, rivers, and valleys, its birds and beasts, and its natural products; and from this extended his survey to what is beyond the seas," says the *She Dyi* (chap. 74). In his geography of "what is beyond the seas," he seems to have been indebted to the fanciful Indian ideas of his time, regarding a series of concentric oceans and continents, *et hoc genus omne*. Dzou Yen's most famous work was entitled *Ju Yün* ("Mastering the Revolutions of Fate"), now lost like the rest of his writings.

The *Yüé Ling*, the oldest almanac, we have already mentioned. Its author is unknown. It now forms part, both of the *Li Dyi* (chap. 4) and of Lü Bu Wé's *Chun Tsyu*.

The *Hung Fan*, now a section of the *Classic of History*, means literally "The Standard Pattern of the Flood." Its composition is later than that of the *Shu Dying*, upon which it was subsequently foisted. It is noteworthy both on account of its theism, which sees divine punishment

in public calamities, and of its critical attitude toward the sovereign, whose possible deficiencies are enumerated with refreshing frankness. The following passage demonstrates well the peculiarly Chinese conception of an imperial absolutism, *dum bene se gesserit*: "The sovereign's gravity will be followed by seasonable rain, his regularity by seasonable sunshine, his intelligence by seasonable heat, his deliberation by seasonable cold, his wisdom by seasonable wind; but his madness by excessive rain, his insolence by excess of sunshine, his idleness by excess of heat, his haste by excess of cold, his ignorance by excess of winds." The fact that such passages could become and remain part of their "Sacred Books," explains well the keynote of democracy so evident in the Chinese people and their polity, however grotesque its magical setting may strike us.

CONCLUSION

Our survey of early Chinese philosophy has shown us that China has indeed made a substantial contribution to the emergence of human personality out of the matrix of tribalism in which it had lain imbedded, but that this contribution did not, as in India, lie in the direction of philosophy proper, but of politics. Although the first impetus to it came from Indian protophilosophy, Chinese thought during the upheaval following upon the collapse of sacral kingship concentrated more and more upon the urgent needs of elaborating the practical philosophy of ethics and politics, and turned away from pure theory and

speculation. The elements of individualism, egalitarianism, democracy, and capitalism first emerged in China. But if here their explosive character could be regulated and was actually made to harmonize with traditionalism, dominative rule, and paternalism, the merit very largely goes to the Master Kung, whose character and influence have so greatly contributed to the making of China, although naturally he did not work *in vacuo*, but only wisely guided historical forces at work in his country and people.

Similar ideas emerged in Greece, but there the course they took was altogether different. Democracy and despotism in Greece remained irreconcilable antinomies, as did individualism and traditionalism: with the result that the word "Hellas" has never stood for a political entity, however brilliant the ethos and civilization that go by its name and however great the contribution which the Hellenic spirit has made to the development of human thought. In China there has been a continuity and unity of autonomous existence unique in human history. The contrast is striking and perhaps not lacking in point to one who wishes to assess at its true value the place occupied by China in world history.

PART III

ISRAEL



IN the previous two sections we have tried to describe the way India and China—the one in the religious sphere, the other in the political—by their own unaided efforts caused human personality to emerge out of its stage of collectivist anonymity. The task of the present chapter is to narrate the politico-religious role played by Israel, as a purely instrumental cause in the hands of a divine person, who was to give to human personality a supernatural sanction and an eternal value, unattainable by merely human endeavors. Because of this, the story of Israel contains a wealth of lights and shades, not met with elsewhere. Potentially the story of supreme human achievement, it actually has become the supreme tragedy of human history.

Israel is a divine artefact, produced for the single, religious end of being *testis populis, dux gentibus*.¹ To this end what political means there were required had to be wholly subordinated. To this end, however, this chosen people refused to consent. They spurned the divine end and wished rather to subordinate it to the political means. As a result they lost both end and means, and have become a people, so poignantly described by St. Augustine, “sine rege, sine principe, sine sacrificio, sine altari, sine sacerdotio, sine manifestationibus.”²

¹ “A witness for the peoples, a leader for the nations.”

² *De civitate Dei*, XVIII, 28: “Without king, without leader, without sacrifices, without priesthood, without any further divine manifestations.”

To the historian who approaches its study, the supernatural character of the story is at once brought home by the unique character of the sacred scriptures of Israel. For is there a single people in the world whose sacred traditions, whether oral or written, hold up its own nation to execration, representing it as one basely faithless to its own national Deity and therefore chastised by it through the exaltation and victory of its secular enemies? What other national epos is there, that depicts the ancestral heroes of its nation as men woefully deficient in all the virtues, punished again and again by their own tribal god for their lapses? Where else, except in the Bible, could we expect to find the genealogy of the ultimate Deliverer traced through a pedigree, in which every maternal ancestor mentioned is notorious for a serious taint? ³ Such destructive criticism of themselves, such objectivity in national histories and biographies, remain to this day rare indeed. Before the coming of Christ, who set up a standard whereby to judge and measure everything human, such objectivity and self-criticism not only were non-existent, but inconceivable.

Like Israel itself, the Bible stands apart: the matter is human, the form divine. While, therefore, we must study the matter as properly subject to the human scientific methods of historical research, we also must never lose sight of the peculiar form, without which it is impossible to understand it.

The history of Israel may be divided into three stages:

³ Matt. 1. Tamar, guilty of incest; Rahab, a harlot; Ruth, a despised "native"; Bethsabee, an adulteress.

(1) the formative stage, during which the chosen people is created; a stage which comprises the patriarchal and the Mosaic periods and therefore stretches from Thare's departure from Ur in 1868 B.C. to the death of Josue in 1231 B.C.; (2) the prophetical stage, during which this people is tried, being guided by prophets of God, from the time of their first judges to that of their last kings, i.e., from 1231 B.C. to 586 B.C.; and (3) the Messianic stage, during which it is found wanting, from the time of its captivity to that of its last national rebellion, i.e., from 586 B.C. to A.D. 135: a stage including respectively a Persian, a Hellenistic, and a Roman period.

The three eras, formative, prophetical, Messianic, of 637, 645, and 721 years, total up to about two millenia. But it must be understood that the first part can be dated only by inference and that therefore this chronology is liable to many miscalculations. Certainty is reached in our dates only where the Assyrian records of contemporary events begin. The biblical chronology can unfortunately not be used literally either, since the meaning it is intended to convey is mainly symbolical: ⁴ "forty years," for instance, apparently means merely a lifetime; "seven" means "all"; "ten" or any multiple of ten means "many"; and so forth. As it is, we must do the best we can to synchronize events in the history of Israel with those of the nations around them.⁵

⁴ This use of figures (as of the figures themselves) is typically Babylonian. Cf. the figures regarding their antediluvian dynasties, for instance, *Protohistory*, p. 140.

⁵ For the whole of this section, I am much indebted to *Histoire Sainte par un professeur de séminaire* (scil., de Lille). Tours, 1924.

CHAPTER XIII

The Formative Stage (1868-1231 B.C.)

1. THE PATRIARCHS

THE biblical account of the events we mean to study begins with "the generations of Thare" (Gen. 11:27). Thare seems to have been a stray Aramean who settled in Ur, as did so many others of his race at that time. Three sons of his are mentioned, Abram, Nachor, and Aran, for all of whom "Ur of the Chaldees" was "the land of their nativity." Babylonia was the social environment into which they were born, and to such extent were they apparently imbued with Babylonian traditions that a later writer (Judith 5:6) called the Jews "the offspring of the Chaldeans." At a given time Thare and his family left Ur and removed to its daughter-city Haran, in the upper reaches of the Euphrates, where they dwelt until Thare's death (Gen. 11:32).

No reason is given for this departure from Ur, nor is any definite date assigned to it. In the Bible twenty-five years are counted from Abram's subsequent departure from Haran to the birth of Isaac (Gen. 12:4 and 21:5), and the age of Isaac is given as sixty (Gen. 25:26); Jacob's age on arrival in Egypt is said to have been 130 years (Gen. 47:9). The latter figure obviously means "a very old age"

and seems to have been used in order to bring the total time interval to 215 years, i.e., one half of the traditional 430 years spent by the children of Israel in Egypt. Substituting therefore 90 for 130 as a humanly probable age of Jacob on his arrival in Egypt, we get a total of 175 years, which, added to the historically known date of Apopi, Joseph's pharao (1665 B.C.), gives us 1840 B.C.⁶ as the date of Abram's departure from Haran. This would be thirty years after the Hittite raid which ended the first Babylonian dynasty; and these thirty years would allow comfortably for Thare's departure from Ur and for his residence in Haran. More important still, this chronology provides an excellent *raison d'être* for these events. Civilized government having ceased with the fall of the Babylonian dynasty, the king of the sea-country to the south of the Sumer began to ravage the latter, and those settled there, who could, would naturally try to flee northward. This Thare and his family apparently did, his original idea apparently being to get back to Aramea. But having once reached Haran and safety, he apparently preferred to remain in these familiar Chaldean surroundings, and there ultimately death overtook him.

This, we would say, is the historical, i.e., natural, setting for the altogether supernatural call that came to Abram on his father's death, when "the Lord said to Abram: Go forth out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and out of thy father's house" (Gen. 12:1). Here we have

⁶ The attempt to make Abraham a contemporary of Hammurabi (whose reign begins in 2067) has nothing to recommend it. The identification of Hammurabi with the King Amraphel of Gen. 14 is historically untenable.

the momentous call, the first in history, to be made to a person asking him to prescind from all his natural social ties, whether national, clannish, or even parental. To obey such a call today, when the world is full of *déracinés*, obviously would call for little comment: but to carry out for the first time an idea which had never been heard of before and which ran counter to man's most intimate and powerful instincts, that indeed required a heroic self-surrender, a faith willing to face blindfold the unknown terrors of an entirely novel form of existence, a faith, therefore, which has few parallels.

Who made this call, to which Abram responded with such total and absolute trust? The "One God of heaven," says the author of Judith 6:9. He was *El* in their language. To this name was usually added the adjective *Shaddai*, omnipotent: *El Shaddai*, God Almighty (Gen. 17:1), had called Abram. *Gratia non tollit naturam*,⁷ and God of course made use of existing material in his call of Abram. As we know, original monotheism remained less impaired in the pastoralist tradition than elsewhere: and it is to Abram's ancestral faith⁸ in the herdsmen's "God of heaven" that God could and did make His appeal. Without God's grace sustaining and uplifting him, Abram could of course not have entered upon nor persevered in the path of self-surrender: but neither could grace have operated *in vacuo*. There was a foundation of natural truth and goodness to build upon. But what a jungle of

⁷ "Grace does not take away nature": a principle of Catholic theology.

⁸ All three patriarchs were of course pastoralist nomads, who only occasionally and incidentally did a little agriculture.

perversions to clear away in the traditions and ideologies among which Abram had grown up to manhood, before he and his descendants could develop a directly God-inspired tradition and religion of their own!

The divine method employed was severe to the point of ruthlessness. For three generations the purely personal relationship with God was ensured by keeping the personality of the patriarchs separate, not only from national, but even from family influences. When Abram leaves Haran, he is accompanied by his childless wife, Sarah, and a nephew of his, Lot (Gen. 12:5). But very soon Lot and he part company (Gen. 13), and Abram dwells alone with Sarah. The latter being childless, he marries Agar; she and her son are cast out (Gen. 21). After Sarah's death he marries Cetura who bears him six sons—yet he “separated them from Isaac his son, while he yet lived, to the east country.” (Gen. 25:6). Isaac is thus kept rigidly isolated from any family tradition that might grow up: and at one point it looks as if even this slender family link might have to be snapped and Isaac himself be eliminated by making a holocaust of him to God in deed and not only in will (Gen. 22)—surely the most wonderful pre-Christian illustration of the principle that, “if any man come to Me and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple” (Luke 14:26).

What wonder that Isaac should have grown up in what was perhaps the closest conformity of all patriarchs with these mysterious designs of God? He had an only wife,

Rebecca, granddaughter of his uncle Nachor. She was sent for out of Haran and married to him, without his having ever set eyes upon her before: but she seemed barren and only in her old age bore him twins, Esau and Jacob, whose coming only led to domestic discord. Jacob had to flee from his brother's wrath and lived in exile for twenty years; Esau took to himself many wives and set up a separate establishment, which eventually led to his complete separation from the God-selected lineage, Isaac all the time remaining in pathetic loneliness at Bersabee, where also he died. It is only with Jacob's children that the weeding-out process stops for the time being. All twelve are allowed to remain together or at least to reunite in Egypt, where Joseph had preceded them by tortuous ways, which led out of a great evil to a still greater good. The isolation of the three patriarchs had lasted long enough for the children of Israel to grow up into nationhood, fully conscious of their distinction from the rest of mankind.

Hand in hand with this physical isolation of the chosen race went their moral reorientation which demanded a complete break with their ideological environment. The latter was dominated by the fertility cult of the archaic civilization: hence the divine emphasis on the old age at which the patriarchs begot children and the apparent sterility of their wives, in order to bring home to them, touching them in their sorest point, that progeny cannot be extorted by fertility magic, but that it is the free grant of God Almighty. Not an easy lesson to learn, especially for the womenfolk who clung to their figurines of the

mother goddess, as the story of Rachel hiding her "teraphim" in her saddle bags proves (Gen. 31: 30-35), as well as the long time it took Jacob to make his women give up all their idols and have them ceremoniously buried under a terebinth tree (Gen. 35:2-4).⁹ The substitution of a ram's for Isaac's sacrifice was incidentally also meant as a lesson against the human sacrifices so rampant at the time in connection with fertility rites.

Against the mother cult of the peasant civilization there was emphasized that of the God of heaven of the herdsmen; even so, features of the former were allowed to remain in the latter, if the connection had faded from people's consciousness. Thus altars are set up by Abraham to El at His house (Bethel), as well as at Bersabee, Sichem, and Mambre. Jacob erects steles and pours over them wine and oil, exactly as the Hindus still pour ritual water and oil over their lingams, blissfully oblivious of the phallic origin of the symbol (Gen. 28: 18; 35: 14). Then again there are the prophesies of Jacob regarding his twelve sons (Gen: 49): oracles cast in the Babylonian form of onomastic and astral allusions to the signs of the zodiac and relevant constellations,¹⁰ a fine example of the strength and perma-

⁹ The exact meaning of *teraphim* is unknown: the word has been connected with *rephaim*, "images." At Ras Shamra the Rephaim are attendants of Baal, who ensure the rains of spring and the dews of summer. (Cf. R. Dussaud, *Les découvertes de Ras Shamra et l'Ancien Testament*, p. 386.) In Israel this devotion continued to Exilic times: see, e.g., the story of Michol saving David by fobbing off his pursuers by putting her idol to bed instead of her husband (I Kings 19:13).

¹⁰ Eric Burrows, S.J., in his ingenious study, *The Oracles of Jacob and Balaam* (London, 1938). Take for instance the prophecy about Dan (Gen. 49:16 f.).

First distich: "Dan shall judge his people
Like another tribe in Israel."

nence of the Chaldean tradition as the material in which Hebrew thought expressed itself.

In the same way sacrifices were not only not done away with, but even the traditional methods continued to be employed. These were that of a sacrificial feast of the participants (Gen. 31:46) or as the setting of a covenant, the contractants having to pass "through" the sacrificial victims which are cut into two halves, between which a passage is left (Gen. 15:10). Even the form of swearing an oath on the phallus is still employed (Gen. 24:9): circumcision similarly is to be the sign of a permanent fertility covenant between God and His people (Gen. 17:7), Abram's original name "exalted father" on the occasion being changed into Ab-raham, "father of a multitude" (Gen. 17:5), while his wife's "My lady" (Sarai) ¹¹ is shortened to Sarah (lady) (Gen. 17:15).

All these features of course must not make us forget that they were mere accidentals and that their substance was an intense, vital, personal, realization of God Almighty. So intense was this relation of the patriarchs to God—not only subjectively as far as they were concerned, but also objectively on God's part, as proved by the frequency and

Play on the name, Dan = Judge.

Second distich: "Let Dan be a snake in the way,
A serpent in the path."

After the onomastic, the zodiacal motif: *Scorpio*.

Third distich: "That biteth the horse's heels
That his rider may fall backward."

Adjacent to and facing *Scorpio* is *Sagittarius*, who in Babylonian as in our uranography is a centaur archer (*ibid.*, pp. 28 f.). This distich leads on to the next blessing, that of Gad: "the Raider" (again a play on his name), who is imagined under the astral form of a mounted archer. And so forth.

¹¹ Because reminiscent of "Our Lady"?

regularity of His communications—that “the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob” has remained throughout Hebrew literature a stock phrase, to express the reality and living personality of God who had revealed Himself to them in so strikingly concrete a fashion. This revelation God granted not to a class or to a caste of professional priests and medicine men, but to specific, single, human persons, who received these revelations neither by way of any office held nor through the efficacy of any magical powers exerted by them, but gratuitously, spontaneously, freely. The divine self-revelation was not only intensely personal, it was also intensely transcendental: the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is God Almighty, who over-awes His creatures into the nothingness they would be but for His good pleasure that they should exist.

Here we have a human realization of God, compared to which there pales into insignificance all the religious insight of the nations whom we have hitherto considered. This torch of blinding truth could not have been lit without lighting up here and there the surrounding darkness: witness the two instances adduced by us (in *Protohistory*) in connection with Akhen Aton and Zoroaster. To these, I think, must be added the peculiar monotheism of the Bedouin tribes that developed out of the patriarchal side lines—the descendants of Aran and Nachor, of Ismael, Jesboc and Madian, and of Esau—a monotheism which remained latent in these nomads of northern Arabia, but flared up again into Islam at a later date under renewed impulses given to it by Judaism and Christianity.

2. MOSES

The ancestors of the race-to-be having been created, the next step was to create out of the children of Israel a people with a national ethos of their own. The person divinely selected as instrument for this purpose was Moses.

Moses' birth and exposure on the Nile show that he must have been born after the persecution of the Israelites in Egypt had begun, i.e., after 1354, if our Egyptian chronology is accepted.¹² The varying degrees of ferocity in the harassment prove that there was no continuity in the line of rulers: a feature which again would tally well with an interregnum, such as the one which occurred between the XVIII and XIX dynasties. Thus the new-born babe was placed in the river¹³ in accordance with one policy that apparently was already going into desuetude; and he was rescued by a lady of the pharaoh's family and brought up as her own son¹⁴ in accordance with another policy. After having been "instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians" (Acts 7:22) and come to manhood, he abruptly left Egyptian society and rejoined that of his own out-

¹² I.e., after the collapse of the Aton cult, consequent upon Akhenaton's death in 1356 B.C. The ensuing chaos of an interregnum (1350-1310) would provide the needed background to the prevailing xenophobia and to the particular resentment felt against the spiritual begetters of the "foreign" and "un-Egyptian" Aton cult, the Israelites, whom "the Egyptian hated and afflicted and mocked" (Exod. 1:13).

¹³ Exod. 2. The story of Moses in the basket of bulrushes is closely paralleled by a similar story told of the exposure and rescue of the future great king of Akkad and Sumer, Sargon.

¹⁴ *Moše* is an Egyptian word, meaning "child." Cf. such names as Amosis and Thutmose.

cast people (Exod. 2:11). This move was made presumably because there was yet another change at the *pero*, a change which we should say occurred when Moses was about twenty-four years old. Moses' Egyptian upbringing and the grievance he must have nursed on being suddenly outcast account for the high-handed manner in which he slew an Egyptian oppressor of his people. This manner was well in keeping with that of a haughty master-race, but strange indeed and ill-becoming in a member of a servile, outcast people. Realizing the perilous situation in which he had landed himself, Moses fled, and fled far into the desert country of Madian near Mount Sinai. There among what were almost kinsmen—for was the ancestor of the Midianites not one of the sons of Abraham by his wife Cetura (Gen. 25:2)?—Moses found a safe asylum and a new home. He married and had children and became part of a hitherto unfamiliar pastoral milieu which allowed him plenty of time for introspection and meditation in the open spaces of the desert steppes. The crowning event of this period was the tremendous self-revelation of God "in a bush," as Moses was feeding the sheep of Jethro, his father-in-law, the priest of Madian (Exod. 3).

What was the date of this great call? Since we are told (Exod. 1:12, 37) that the Israelites had to provide forced labor for the building of a new capital called Rameses after the founder of the XIX dynasty, we take it that this took place under Seti I (1308–1298), successor of Rameses I, while the actual expulsion of the Israelites from Egypt was an early measure taken by Seti's successor, Rameses II

(1297-1232).¹⁵ This would tally with the stele set up by Menerptah (1231-1223) in 1226, recording a victory over "Canaan and Israel": for, granting the traditional "forty years" sojourn in the wilderness, i.e., from 1296 to 1256, this would allow for an interval of thirty years (1256 to 1226) from the time of the Israelites' entry into Canaan to their fight with Menerptah's forces, an interval both reasonable and necessary to allow for.

At the time of Moses' call the children of Israel had lived in the Egyptian milieu for almost four centuries.¹⁶ They had increased and become a great multitude,¹⁷ but, though not exactly foreigners, they had remained strangers in Egypt, an ambiguous position, not very different from that of modern Jews the world over. Jacob and his descend-

¹⁵ "After a long time" of persecution "the king of Egypt died," says Exod. 2.23. How old was Moses in 1296? Judging humanly one would compute Moses' stay in Madian at about 20 years and say that he was about 24 when he took refuge with Jethro. If his call came before the year of the exodus, in 1297, and he was then 44, he must have been born in 1341, nine years after the interregnum between the XVIII and XIX dynasties had begun. Against such assumptions Exod. 7:7 says that Moses was eighty at the time of the exodus. But we take it that the 40 plus 40 plus 40 years of Moses' life (Deut. 34:7) merely express in the poetical language of the time the fact that Moses' life consisted of three distinct stages, each of which was long enough to fill an ordinary man's lifetime. (In fact the average life of the period was not 40, but about 27 years.)

¹⁶ Since we have accepted 1665 as the date when Jacob and his family emigrated to Egypt, the duration of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt would be 369 years, which is pretty close to the biblical computation of 400 years (Gen. 15:13) or 430 years (Exod. 12:40), though the purely arithmetical value of such figures must in any case not be pressed. (If 40 = a generation, and 10 = many, 400 = many generations.)

¹⁷ According to Exod. 12:37 there "went forward from Rameses about 600,000 men on foot, beside children, and a mixed multitude without number." Lesêtre (in *Revue Pratique d'Apologetique* of November 15, 1906) makes out a good case for reducing these poetical figures to a total caravan of 25,000 souls, of whom 6,000 males capable of bearing arms.

ants had been given the land of Gessen (Goshen) to colonize, a land neither exclusively agricultural nor pastoral, but a mixture of both. The Israelites had continued there to tend their herds, but on the whole had led sedentary lives and had learnt the arts of horticulture as appears from Numbers 11:5 and 20:5, and obviously this horticulture cannot have been the sole result of their culture contact with Egypt. But, whatever their position under the Hyksos, the Israelites remained for the native Egyptians a contemptible, uncouth folk of strange habits and a quite un-Egyptian mentality. On their part, the Israelites looked upon Egyptian civilization as something alien and the xenophobia which surrounded them cannot have tended to make them love it either. If one thinks how easily the children of Israel would have merged themselves in a familiar Chaldean environment, had they reverted to the banks of the Euphrates, one cannot but see a providential disposition in this most peculiar relegation of theirs to Gessen.

And of course to make them a "peculiar people of all the nations"¹⁸ was exactly the design of Providence, as they were to be told afterward again and again: a peculiarity that was unique at the time and has remained so ever since. Elsewhere we find also among the nations of the world competent sections differing ethnically and ideologically from their hosts; witness the modern problem of "minorities." But such ethnic minorities are not, like the Jews,

¹⁸ The expression is that of Deut. 14:2. In Exod. 19:5 f. they are called God's "peculiar possession above all people," "a priestly kingdom" and "a holy nation." (Holy = set apart for God.)

dispersed throughout all the nations, nor have any of them withstood assimilation for three thousand years. Gypsies and Brahmans, who come nearest to the position of the Jews, prove on closer inspection their fundamental difference: Gypsies, because they have never played any part in the national life of their milieu and because they have never gone beyond the shores of the Old World into all nations; ¹⁹ Brahmans, because they have become an essential part of the Hindu polity, though a strictly self-contained caste within the latter, and thus have assumed an exclusively national function.

The peculiarity of this people of Israel has been from the very beginning that they were to be a nation, but not one of the nations; that they were to possess a national consciousness but no national ambitions; that they should be content to be in the hands of God a national instrument for a supranational and indeed a supernatural purpose. If this is the final cause of the creation of this peculiar people, the history of Israel makes sense; if not, the "Jewish question" remains a question without a reply and an enigma without a solution.

The children of Israel grew up in Egypt, never feeling themselves to be of Egypt; they had a national consciousness, but for all that were merely a mob. To give them national coherence, they had to be organized as a nation, and for this purpose they had to leave Egypt and be absolutely alone—with God—in the desert. To turn a mob

¹⁹ Think by contrast of the five million Jews that have sprung up in the Americas, one third of the total number of Jews in the world.

into a nation, a chief wielding authority is needed. That chief was to be Moses, but his authority was to be exclusively God's. After his peculiar twofold preparation, first as an Egyptian townsman, then as a Midianite herdsman, Moses is called by God through a stupendous self-revelation of His to a work so difficult that he tries by every means to get out of it (Exod. 3 and 4).

3. THE LAW

God revealed Himself to Moses first of all—proceeding from the known to the unknown—as the God whom Moses' own father had worshiped and whom therefore Moses himself had known all along as the one God Almighty who, so the revelation went on, was the very God (El) of his ancestors, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob (Exod. 3:6).

The general concept of God, we may add, is expressed in all Semitic languages by *El*²⁰ which goes back to the Babylonian *ilu* (cf. modern Arabic *Allah*). In Hebrew the plural of majesty, *Elohim*, is also often used: the root-meaning is "The Strong One," *Ho Ischyros* in the Greek of the Septuagint. This general concept is often qualified by an adjective: thus "The Highest God," *El elyon* in Hebrew, an originally henotheistic expression;²¹ and par-

²⁰ A good example is furnished by the excavations made at Ras Shamra (or Ugarit), six miles north of Latakié, during the years 1929 and 1933 under F. A. Schaeffer. They confirm that El was the "High God" of the people and that the cult of Baal was subsequent: for in one inscription El's permission is asked for the building of a temple to Baal (= "lord"), whose real name was Hadad, god of thunderstorms and high peaks (= Indra). Cf. R. Dussaud, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

²¹ Cf. Gen. 14:18, where Melchisedech is called "priest of the most high God."

ticularly in Hebrew, "Almighty" (*El Shaddai*); or, "of hosts" (*Elohe Sebaoth*), "God of the angelic host." Now it is to be noted that all these words for "God" can be used indiscriminately in a monotheistic and a polytheistic sense, both for the gods of the pagan world and for the God of the patriarchs. The absolutely new revelation of Himself made by God to Moses provided an absolutely new name, whereby the chosen people were henceforth to know God, as He is in Himself, and not merely by names describing His activity. "If others should say to me," says Moses (Exod. 3:13), "What is His name? What shall I say to them?" Whereupon God Himself gives this wonderful revelation of His aseity: "I am who am. Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is (*Yahveh*)²² hath sent me to you" (Exod. 3:14). This final and unsurpassable revelation of His own substantial being God repeats subsequently to Moses: "I am the Lord (*Adonai*)²³ that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob by the name of "God Almighty" (*El Shaddai*), but my name *Yahveh* I did not show them" (Exod. 6:2 f.). Small wonder that reverential awe has kept the Jews ever since from using this name lightly: so much so that after the Exile the word was not pronounced at all, but that Hebrew tradition always pronounced "Adonai" wherever the group of consonants Y H V H occurred.²⁴ Still less wonder that the man,

²² From *howah* = "to be." Cf. the Sanscrit *Asura* (*asu* = "is," *ra* = "one who").

²³ From *dun* = "to judge," the equivalent of the Babylonian *Baal*, Greek *Kyrios*, and Latin *Dominus*, as previously mentioned.

²⁴ Hence the spurious word "Jehovah," product of combining the consonants written (of *Yahveh*) with the vowels pronounced (of *Adonai*).

selected by God for such unprecedented favor, should, until the coming of the Messiah, have been esteemed the greatest of all men, one to whom "the Lord spoke face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend" (Exod. 33:11), i.e., surpassing even in intimacy the relationship of the patriarchs to God.²⁵

This is not to say that Moses was a perfect instrument of God from the very start, nor even to the end. His own account ²⁶ does not gloss over his not infrequent fits of pusillanimity and hesitancy. He is fully aware of his own personality and not in the least interested in it. What matters is Yahveh: what matters for himself is to be the accurate mouthpiece of God; what matters for others is faithfully to carry out God's will. Here, with Moses, we have for the first time the majestic "Thus saith the Lord" which henceforth was to go on echoing through the corridors of Israel's history by the mouth of a long line of prophets. We shall revert to this fact in due course. The point here is that in the case of Moses' call the *terminus ad quem* was not, as in that of the patriarchs, the person called, but the nation. This fact is borne out by the new covenant now entered into, a covenant no longer between God and a single person, but the whole nation. Moses was merely the intermediary: he wrote down the terms of the covenant and, "taking the book of the covenant, he read it in the hearing

²⁵ Compare the relatively distant manner in which God revealed Himself to Joseph, i.e., in dreams.

²⁶ In the last four books of the Pentateuch. The first book deals of course with events which happened before his time.

of the people, and they said, All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do" (Exod. 24:7).²⁷

This solemn covenant was made at Mount Sinai, and an account of it is contained in the two books of Exodus and Leviticus, which describe the year spent by the Israelites in getting out of Egypt first into the Madianite country, Moses' former refuge, and then unto a mountain to become still holier than Mount Horeb of Madian: Mount Sinai, 8,000 feet high, where the covenant just described was entered into. Of the traditional "forty years in the wilderness," thirty-eight (another figure of mystic import) were spent by Israel round about the oasis of Kadesh; during the last two of the forty years they were led out into the very sight of the land that God had promised them, Canaan. The record of these last thirty-nine years is contained in the books of Numbers and Deuteronomy, which also record further elaborations of detail in "the Law."²⁸

These four books, together with Genesis, form the Five Books of Moses, the Pentateuch. Genesis differs from the subsequent four books, inasmuch as it gives an account of what happened before the author's time, whereas the last four books concern contemporary events. For that reason it is evident that Moses utilized different sources for the writing of Genesis, which for more than a century has been submitted on that account to a meticulous literary anal-

²⁷ The ritual, accompanying this entering of the two contractants (God and people) into a covenant, consisted in taking the blood of the sacrificial victims, pouring half of it over the altar (representing God) and sprinkling the people with the other half (Exod. 24:6, 8).

²⁸ *Torah* = the instructions, *scil.*, of Yahveh.

ysis. The very idea of torah, of a divine law which regulates all human relationship, is, for instance, demonstrably ²⁹ of Sumerian derivation, as so much of the ideological imagery employed. Seeing that the Israelites were descendants of Abraham "of Ur of the Chaldees," it would indeed be strange if that were not so. What so many of these "higher" critics (and especially of their popularizers) seem to forget is that this fact does not in the least militate against the evident fact that Moses is the single author of the Pentateuch, who made use of the material and imbued it with a "form," ³⁰ which has no more to do with the original sources than the clay determines the making of a vase or a drainpipe. As well say that there is no difference between a vase and a drainpipe, or that one is derived from the other, as contend that there is no essential (in philosophical language, "formal") difference between Genesis and Sumerian mythology.

The terms of the original Covenant are contained in Exodus, chapters 20 to 23, pride of place being given to the Decalogue written on two stone slabs, which, be it noted, were alone placed in the ark of the covenant. The whole Mosaic Law (Torah) consists of moral, civil, and liturgical precepts. However minute and bizarre much of this may strike a modern mind, the sublime spirit informing it all

²⁹ Cf. E. A. Speiser in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Baltimore, December, 1939 (Supplement, p. 28).

³⁰ Cf. Lusseau, Collomb: *Manuel d'études bibliques* (Paris, 1934), II, 96, 109-13, 399. That this "form" which Moses gave to the Pentateuch was caused by a divine *afflatus* is part of the dogma which the Vatican Council thus formulated: "The books of the Old and the New Testaments, having been composed under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have God for their author" (Denzinger, no. 1787).

is manifest: "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and serve the Lord thy God, with all thy heart and with all thy soul, and keep the commandments of the Lord and His ceremonies?" (Deut. 10:12 f.) And why? "Behold, heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven, the earth and all things that are therein: and yet the Lord hath chosen thee out of all nations" (Deut. 10:14 f.). God is not a tribal God of a single people: God of the universe, He has chosen this people, as He might have chosen any other or none, to be His instrument for a peculiar purpose. "The law" consequently, as promulgated by Moses, is not the traditional law of tribal customs, to be observed since otherwise one would lose one's tribal identity. The Torah expresses God's definite, explicit will and must be observed because of that will and for no other reason whatever. Incidentally all ceremonies emphasize that the people is "sacred," set apart, their purpose being largely the "ritual purity" which will keep them thus apart from all alien influences. Naturally the material elements of this law had to be something already known, something making an emotional appeal. Therefore much of the liturgical details are Egyptian (the high priest's costume, the temple, the tabernacle, the ark): but the *sanctum sanctorum* does not—what a fundamental difference!—contain a god, but provides merely a setting for the invisible God. Similarly the civil law is largely modeled on Hammurabi's Code: jurisprudentially inferior to it, the Mosaic Law rises far above it, because it is in the first place

a moral law, formulating, not man's rights, but his duties: duties to God, to his fellow men, to himself.

Emphasis in the Mosaic Law is certainly laid on exterior acts: but what elsewhere were taboos, observed on account of their inherent magical power, are here disciplinary rules, to be observed because commanded by God and not because the things prohibited were in themselves evil. The stress laid on exterior acts was obviously the only manner open at the time to train a people not yet interiorized to keep their animal nature in check. A perfectly interiorized and spiritualized person would of course connect all his acts with general moral principles: he would ask himself whether it was against justice or charity, to do this or that thing, not whether it was against a certain statutory regulation. But self-discipline on such a level was impossible at Moses' time. For all that, the Mosaic Law prepared the way to make discipline self-conscious and spiritual. This was an advance for which, for instance, the prophets pleaded so strongly, when they told the Israelites: "Do not fast as you have done until this day. . . . Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict himself for a day? Is not this rather the fast that I have chosen: to loosen the bands of wickedness, to undo the bundles that oppress?" (Isa. 58:4 ff.) Or when they pointed to the incongruity between exterior ritual acts and immoral conduct, saying, "Your hands are defiled with blood and your fingers with iniquity, your lips have spoken lies and your tongue uttereth iniquity" (Isa. 59:3). All this of course led up to and was fulfilled by the "New Law" taught by Christ, a law of the

spirit and not of the letter, a law of liberty, which consists principally in interior acts and therefore leaves to man the determination of such acts as are in themselves morally indifferent,³¹ and which adds to the old moral law new counsels. But Christ comes after Moses, and Moses was necessary at the time as a "schoolmaster," as St. Paul puts it,³² to prepare the people of God by the discipline of the Mosaic Law for the fuller life of the spirit.

Of the two tables, the first is devoted to man's duties to God. The first commandment (from which flows the whole Torah) prohibits the worship of false gods, a false conception of God being the starting point of all error and sin; the second aims at both the superstitious and the irreligious, guarding external worship against both excess and defect. The third commandment must have seemed the most revolutionary: the setting aside of one day out of seven for public worship and rest from all manual work. It was revolutionary because the religious regulation of rest and labor is an idea entirely unknown to paganism; but also how beneficial, since at one stroke it proclaimed the primacy of the spiritual over "business" and emancipated the mass of mankind from being mere beasts of burden and drudges in a treadmill of work. This fundamental charter of the dignity of man, as a being primarily intended for the service of God, which turned each seventh day into "a sabbath of the Lord" was further amplified in later instructions regarding a "sabbatical year" for the land to lie fallow and providing a sabbath of sabbaths for the inhabi-

³¹ Cf. *Summa theol.*, Ia IIae, q. 108, a. 1.

³² Gal. 3:24.

tants thereof every fiftieth year, "which shall be a jubilee to you, when ye shall return every man unto his possession and every man unto his family" (Lev. 25). This provision was a most remarkable curb on excessive capitalism with its tendency toward pauperism and slavery and mammon-worship.

On the second table of the Decalogue follow the precepts: first of filial piety, and secondly of justice toward all men, i.e., of rendering to each his due; failure of which is traced to the common root of all forms of injustice: covetousness.

Though the position of woman in Israel, owing to the pastoralist tradition, was inferior to that in Chaldea, the *patria potestas* was strictly limited in regard to children, as was the power of a master over his slaves. Especially noteworthy were the provisions regarding "strangers."³³ Humane behavior toward them is urged again and again, as, for instance, in the magnificent passage (cf. Deut. 10:17-19): "The Lord your God is the God of gods and the Lord of lords, a great God and mighty and terrible, who accepteth no person nor taketh bribes. He loveth the stranger and giveth him food and raiment. Do you therefore love strangers, because you also were strangers in the land of Egypt." Indeed, strangers could become naturalized, so to speak, if they submitted to circumcision, showing again that the true selection of a "chosen people" had

³³ How deeply the experience of being "a stranger in a foreign country" (*Gersam*) had seared Moses' heart is evidenced by the name he gave to his eldest son (Exod. 18:3); the sense of utter helplessness having made him place his sole confidence in God "Who is my helper" (*Eliezer*, name of his second son).

nothing racial about it: the ruthlessness shown toward Ammonites, Moabites and Canaanites on account of their evil influences is paralleled by that with which the golden-calf apostasy was visited on the Israelites themselves, when Moses commanded the Levites to "go through the camp and let every man kill his brother and friend and neighbor" (Exod. 32:27). Similarly with the Canaanites there was to be, not on racial, but on cultural grounds, no contact whatever: "Beware thou never join in friendship with the inhabitants of that land, which may be thy ruin; but destroy their altars, break their statutes and cut down their groves. Adore not any strange god and make no covenant with the men of those countries, neither shalt thou take of their daughters a wife for thy son, lest they make thy sons to commit fornication with their gods" (Exod. 34:12-16).

Concluding these brief observations on the Torah, we would emphasize that, though the law given to Israel through Moses contained provisions of the ceremonial and civil law no less than of the moral law, yet the human elements contained in the former only serve to bring out the divine character of the latter. The very permanence of the moral precepts contained in the Decalogue show that they were not the product of a people or period, but a divine standard set up for all time and for all nations.

4. THE PROMISED LAND

Under the leadership of Moses and through the authority of the Torah, the former mob of Israelitish refugees in

Egypt had become a nation. A whole lifetime had they to spend betwixt and between their former home and a land promised to them as their very own; and only after the old generation that had known Egypt personally had passed away, were the members of the new-born nation permitted to take possession of the promised land of Canaan. In fact they were only a nationally organized conglomeration of a dozen or so pastoralist tribes, to be yet welded closely together by offensive and defensive warfare against common foes. After their first military exploit, when they discomfited the Amalecites under the leadership of Josue (Exod. 17:8), came a serious defeat at the hands of these Amalecites at Horma (Num. 15:45), which taught them the futility of a frontal attack on Canaan and the necessity of outflanking the strongholds of Palestine,³⁴ by first attacking and ultimately taking Transjordan.

Even this was not to be undertaken any more by Moses himself, but by the faithful chief assistant of his, who had been trained by him, during a long period of close companionship and collaboration, and who bore the programmatic name of Josue ("Yahveh is my salvation").³⁵ "And Josue the son of Nun was filled with the spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands upon him. And the children of Israel obeyed him and did as the Lord commanded Moses" (Deut. 34:9.), and said: "As we obeyed Moses in

³⁴ The presence in Canaan of Nordic invaders "of a tall stature" is attested by the scouts sent to spy out the land (Num. 13:33).

³⁵ He was of the Joseph clan: hence the special care he gave to his ancestor's bones. Cf. Exod. 13:19 and Jos. 24:32. His original name was Osee (cf. Num. 13:17).

all things, so will we obey thee also; only be the Lord thy God with thee, as He was with Moses" (Jos. 1:17). Josue's rule thus seems merely a prolongation of Moses' rule, wherefore also the Book of Josue is often treated as an appendix to the Pentateuch and included with it under the name of Hexateuch. The length of time that Josue's leadership lasted is mentioned only by a later tradition which speaks of about a quarter of a century, a figure that we may well accept and that would bring the hexateuchal period to a close in 1231 B.C.,³⁶ the beginning of Menerptah's reign.

Under Josue the promise was fulfilled, and Canaan became henceforth the home of the Israelites: "a land of wheat and barley and vineyards, wherein fig trees and pomegranates and oliveyards grow; a land of oil and honey; where without want one may eat one's bread and enjoy abundance of all things; where the stones are iron and out of the hills are dug mines of brass" (Deut. 8:7-9). Such this land had seemed to the hungry Bedouin leading a precarious existence in a thirst-smitten country; and such it had proved to be indeed. It was a great country and one too large, in fact, for the comparatively few and ill-equipped Israelite tribesmen to occupy at one fell swoop. Even at the end of Josue's time only the hill-country had become Israelite, and even that not completely, for we are told that "a very large country was left" (Jos. 13:1) still in native possession. The land indeed was closely settled, and room for the incoming Israelites was found either by ex-

³⁶ Moses 1341-1256; Josue's leadership, 1256-1231.

terminating the actual occupants, as was done at Jericho (Jos. 6:21 and 24), or by enslaving them, as in the case of the men of Gibeon (Jos. 9:27). Anyhow, at the end of this period a good beginning had been made, a home had been found for the homeless people, on whom it now depended what they would make of the opportunities granted to them. Would they be content to remain Yahveh's instrument, pure and simple, or would they develop national ambitions of their own?

Before his death Josue assembled the people in a solemn assembly and put the choice clearly before them. Did they prefer, either "the gods which your fathers served in Mesopotamia, or the gods of the Amorites, in whose lands you dwell" (Jos. 24:15); or did they "fear the Lord and would they serve Him with a perfect and most sincere heart?" (Jos. 24:14.) And the children of Israel answered and said: "God forbid we should leave the Lord and serve strange gods" (Jos. 24:16). Three times they repeated: "We will serve the Lord, for He is our God" (Jos. 24:18); "We will serve the Lord" (v. 21); "We will serve the Lord our God and we will be obedient to His commandments" (v. 24). Thus the covenant was renewed at Sichem, the center of Josue's own clan, Ephraim, and Josue took a great stone and said to all the people: "Behold this stone shall be a testimony unto you that it hath heard all the words of the Lord" (Jos. 24:27). And so Josue died and an era came to an end.

CHAPTER XIV

The Prophetical Stage (1231-586 B.C.)

THE children of Israel were to have been "a peculiar people of all the nations." They had to be a people, though a peculiar one; but their *raison d'être* was not a political one, as was the case with all the other nations, but a religious one. They were to have been carriers of the one true religion of Yahveh and to have continued in a unique personal relationship to Him, until the time was fulfilled for the Incarnation. And indeed the whole subsequent history of this peculiar people, from their first settlement in Palestine under "judges" of their own to their final political extinction in A.D. 70, shows how unwaveringly on God's part this design, this "covenant," was adhered to; it also shows, however, how false to it His chosen people proved to be. They almost at once developed political ambitions, to which they promptly subordinated their religious ideals. God called them again and again back to the very purpose of their national existence and did everything, short of overriding their free will, to frighten or coax them into observance of the covenant of their fathers. But from first to last they were fickle in their loyalty to Yahveh, capricious in their observance of His "instructions," and vacillating in their spiritual orientation.

1. PROPHETISM

The method whereby God remained in touch with His people and tried to guide them was that of raising up "prophets" unto Himself. We shall therefore first of all have to explain this prophetic method, before we can usefully engage upon a consideration of the history of the people to whom these prophets were sent.

The word "prophet" is derived from the Greek *prophēnai*, meaning "speaking before," i.e., "predicting," a meaning which is that of current English use. But although the biblical term *nabi* does not exclude this sense, the meaning is accidental to it. *Nabi* means simply "a spokesman":¹ and from the first time it is used in the Bible (Exod. 7:1, "Aaron shall be thy prophet"), it stands essentially for this. The Latin *propheta* similarly means "speaking for another" (*pro-fari*, not *prae-fari*). To express the function of a clairvoyant or seer, the Hebrew Bible uses the words *roeh* or *hozeh*, the Latin *videns*, as when Saul is asking for the address of Samuel (I Kings 9:11), a passage where also (v. 9) it is explained that, "when a man in time past went to consult God, he said, 'Come, let us go to the seer': for he that is now called a prophet, was then called a seer."

These "seers" were professional soothsayers, who had to be feed for their services: Saul proposes to pay Samuel twenty-five cents in the passage just quoted. Such profes-

¹ As it still does in Arabia, where it is used as a synonym for *rasul* ("messenger").

sional soothsayers, "wizards, charmers, fortune tellers, who observe dreams and omens, who consult pythonic spirits or seek the truth from the dead" (Deut. 18:10 f.), were of course part and parcel of the archaic civilization. The spiritual exaltation and inducement of trances, so typical of the whole agricultural civilization, was a "matter" which was not altogether refused admittance into Hebrew ideology, but rather one to be "informed" by a new spirit. "The nations whose land thou shalt possess," we read in Deut. 18:14, 18, "hearken unto soothsayers and diviners, but thou art otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God, who will raise up a prophet out of the midst of their brethren like unto thee: and I will put my words in his mouth and he shall speak to them all that I shall command him." There were "prophets" of the Baalim and of Astarte, distinct from the priesthood of these cults (cf. IV Kings 10:19), just as the "prophets" in Israel were exercising a quite distinct function from that of priests and Levites. In both cults there were regular "schools of prophets" (cf. IV Kings 2:3); in both, these prophets were given to ecstatic trances which in the case of the pagans often led to self-mutilation (cf. III Kings 18:28), but in that of the prophets of Yahveh too induced wild ejaculations and dances, such as the one that shocked David's queen (II Kings 6:16). That these prophetic trances were at first psychoses that were often infectious, is illustrated by the famous occasion when Saul willy-nilly "stripped himself also of his garments and prophesied with the rest before

Samuel and lay down naked all that day and night. This gave occasion to a proverb: What! is Saul too among the prophets?" (I Kings 19:24.)

Out of these at first sight so unpromising origins has arisen the wonderful line of later prophets, who have set the divine impress so lastingly on God's chosen people. If at first "prophesying" meant mainly the positive charisma of singing praises to Yahveh, it soon assumed the negative form of public admonition. With the increasing entanglement of Israel in political preoccupations, the prophetic office, which at first had been of a purely religious nature, assumed more and more political functions. The "formal" and "final" causes, which so sharply separate the Hebrew prophet from a mere yogin, are to recall Israel from apostasy to their true vocation. The prophets of course fulfill incidentally the high ethical function of castigating vice—witness the incomparable parable of Nathan charging David with the murder of Urias (II Kings 12)—but all this is only incidental and subject to their main function, which is in so many words described as "the Lord testifying to Israel and Juda by the hand of all the prophets and seers, saying: Return from your wicked ways, and keep My precepts and ceremonies, according to all the law which I commanded your fathers, and as I have sent to you in the hand of My servants the prophets" (IV Kings 17:13). Israel's apostasy of course works itself out also in the private crimes and sins of the people at large; but the prophet's office is not that of a

father-confessor ordained for the healing of individuals, but of a public monitor and accuser of kings and of their people as a whole.

Publicly to proclaim the truth against one's own king and people: that is the specific *differentia* which fundamentally and essentially places the Hebrew prophet in a category of his own.² We shall frequently have to revert to this innovation in another connection; here we merely trace its supernatural emergence out of a natural ideological material, ready at hand at the time. We note, then, that the prophet of Yahveh differs *toto coelo* from the prophet of the Baalim and other imaginary deities; but we must also make a distinction between the true and the false prophets of Yahveh. Indeed, to base their own actions on the support of the latter was one of the methods employed by recalcitrant kings to counter the opposition of the true prophets: witness the story of Achab's court prophets versus Micheas in III Kings, 22. There were other methods of course: the assassination of the inconvenient critic being the most obvious, though awe of the supernatural powers one ran up against proved in this case a salutary check on

² To us, brought up in an old tradition of democracy, the public indictment of governments is a matter of daily occurrence made so familiar by the press as to be taken simply for granted. But try to imagine how such accusations on the part of some *quidnunc*, some private nonentity, would strike the man-in-the-street of Chaldea or Egypt or indeed any country of, say, three thousand years ago. Nurtured in an atmosphere of uncritical tribalism and to us almost unimaginable servility to his ruler, the people of that time would have found such conduct of ours simply incomprehensible. If there were persons who behaved in such a strange manner, no one could have seen in it criticisms, since such a mental attitude, which implies the calling of public affairs before the bar of private judgment, did nowhere exist at all. Such utterances could only be the consequence of some divine *afflatus*, as indeed they were.

otherwise current methods of liquidating opponents. These and other details we shall develop in connection with the history of general events of the period. To this history we shall now turn.

The history of Israel divides naturally into the period of the so-called judges (1231-1033); that of the single kingdom of Saul (1033-1012), David (1012-973), and Solomon (972-933); and that of the separated kingdoms of Israel (933-721) and Judah (933-586) until their "captivity" in Assyrian and Babylonian hands.

2. THE TIME OF JUDGES

With the passing away of Josue, a single central authority for the whole of the twelve tribes also ceased to exist. Silo indeed remained the religious center (I Kings 1:3), but this bond which ought to have been paramount, became weaker and weaker, as what had originally been nomad adventurers became sedentary townsmen and peasants, who in the course of events assimilated more and more native cults.³ The Book of Judges bears eloquent testimony to the progressive religious deterioration in Israel and tells us of the people's sacrilegious covenant⁴ with Baal entered into at Sichem, at the very stele set up by Josue to Yahveh-berith. The Israelites served the Baalim and Astaroth and the gods of the Philistines and others (Judg. 10:6) and the haphazard way in which everybody "did that which seemed right to himself," is well de-

³ Jos. 15:63; 16:10; 23:12 f.

⁴ Hebrew "berith." Cf. Judg. 8:33; 9:4, 46.

scribed in the account of the idol and shrine set up by Michas, to provide a living for one of his sons (Judg. 17:4-6).⁵ Finally, the Philistines came and took captive the very ark of the covenant (I Kings 4:4, 17, 22), when indeed it became manifest to all that "the glory had departed from Israel."

The two centuries of "judges" in Israel coincide with the period of Nordic invasions from the north which overwhelmed the whole Aegean region. The whole fertile belt of coastal plains was occupied (in 1190) by Pulasati and Zakkara, men whose classic Greek features are preserved to us on Egyptian monuments and whose remarkably tall stature, compared with that of native Asiatics, lives on in the story of Goliath and David. Moreover, these Pulasati or Philistines were no ephemeral feature of the country where they settled, but maintained their separate existence there for centuries and so strongly impressed themselves upon it that, strangely enough, to this day it is called, not after the people of God's choosing, but after themselves, Palestine.

For all that, the Philistines (who hailed from western Crete, and were called Pulasati in Minoan and Phalethi in Hebrew) and the Zakkaru (the men from the east coast of Crete, whose capital was the still existing Zakro) changed in nothing the Canaanite civilization; they added nothing to it and adopted, not only the religion, but the language of the conquered Canaanites. The Cerethites

⁵ The lament over the daughter of Jephthe (Judg. 11:40) seems to be a thin disguise of the current "summer lament of Ishtar" over the loss of her lover.

(or Kerethi) of I Kings 30:14 were Cretans settled in the Negeb, Gaza being the capital of *negeb ha-Kreti*. ("Crete" itself was called Kaphtor in Hebrew after its Egyptian name, *Keftiu*). Hence the Israelites never occupied Palestine proper, i.e., the coastal strip under Philistine domination, but only its hinterland; the so-called "judges" being military chieftains, arising *ad hoc*, where booty beckoned or where attacks had to be repulsed. The Book of Judges indeed provides an episodic and somewhat disjointed story of these times, when the Israelites were mainly on the defensive and when the increasing separation and particularisms of the various clans added materially to the difficulties of the defense.

While traditionally the twelve tribes persisted, the Israelites *de facto* began to be composed of two unequal parts, a division caused by the jealousy and rivalry between Ephraim and Juda. Josue already referred to the people as composed of Ephraim, Juda, and the rest (Jos. 18:5 f.). That among Jacob's sons Joseph was the one favored above all others by God and man needs no proof; that of Joseph's two sons again Ephraim was the picked choice of God, Gen. 48:5, 20, makes abundantly clear.⁶ But this paramount position of Ephraim was already at the time of the "judges" seriously challenged by Juda, which, less favored in the productivity of its hill country than the northern and eastern tribes centering around Ephraim,

⁶ "Ephraim and Manasses," says the aged patriarch, "shall be reputed to me as Ruben and Simeon." And he blessed them at that time, saying: "In thee shall Israel be blessed and it shall be said, God do to thee as to Ephraim and Manasses." And he set Ephraim before Manasses. Cf. also Ps. 79:2 f.

looked more to war as a source of tribal income and consequently became more compact and more authoritarian in its organization. Two episodes are recorded—from the time of Gedeon and Jephthe respectively—which show very clearly how “touchy” Ephraim was getting on any matter that seemed to infringe upon its own predominance. Gedeon was of the tribe of Manasses: yet when he had won a signal victory over the Madianites, “the men of Ephraim chid him sharply and almost offered violence, and said; What is this that thou wouldst not call us when thou wentest to fight against Madian?” (Judg. 8:1.) With the Galaadite Jephthe things did not end in humble apologies and appeasement; on the contrary, the victor over the Ammonites “called to him all the men of Galaad and he fought against Ephraim and there fell at that time of Ephraim two and forty thousand” (Judg. 12:4, 6). Its very size made the confederation headed by Ephraim unwieldy, while Juda, geographically kept apart from it, naturally tended to unitarian homogeneity. We shall presently see the efforts made by the institution of kingship to counteract fissiparity: but one would here draw attention to the fact that even the successor of the archcentralizer, Solomon, still had to go to Sichem in Ephraim to be made king of all Israel (III Kings 12:1).

The idea of choosing a king to supply the needful spear-head of a strong central authority against the enemies of Israel, was of course one which the example of all the nations of the time readily suggested. Why had Israel been refractory to it for so long? The answer is stated in so many

words in I Kings 8:6 f.: "And the Lord said to Samuel, In that the people say, Give us a king, they have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them." In willing the children of Israel to be a people, God had of course willed them to have a central authority: but the whole point of this people's peculiarity was to have been just this, that such central authority was not to have been of a political, but of a religious nature. Yahveh should have provided the sole and sufficient rallying point. After the many examples of pagan theocracy, so woefully gone astray through the unsubstantiality of their deities, this Israelitish theocracy of Yahveh might have been a beacon to light up the shadow of death in which a whole world groaned. God permitted this primary design of His to be overridden by the self-will of His chosen people. Gedeon is still true enough to the original vocation of Israel to say to those who ask him to rule over them, and his son and son's son after him: "I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you, but the Lord shall rule over you" (Judg. 8:23). But others, after Gedeon's time, were not so proof against the glamor of kingship: Abimelec for one, who was king in Israel for three years (Judg. 9:6, 22), an event which provided the occasion for the delightful parable of the trees choosing, *saute de mieux*, the bramble to reign over them (Judg. 9:8-15), a parable the biting sarcasm of which shows clearly the contempt in which kingship was held by the sacred writer.

Within a century the desire for a king as visible rallying point of the nation had become general. With God's

adaptation to human free will, all the more amazing because customary, He acquiesced in the people's desire, as a *pis-aller*, but as a method still capable of carrying out God's design, though beset by far greater difficulties. Intrinsically it was possible for a king so to identify his authority with that of Yahveh as to forget all about political aims, or rather to turn them scrupulously into nothing more than means to religious ends. David, as we shall see, came nearest to the ideal of being a perfect *patesi* of Yahveh. But how many more kings arose there in Israel, who rather forgot all about their call to be Yahveh's *patesi* in their devouring passion of being a *lugal*, a grand king after the fashion of the pagan world surrounding them!

3. UNIFICATION BY KINGSHIP

Yahveh's instrument in this change-over to kingship was the prophet Samuel. Prophets there had been before him throughout the two centuries of "judges"—including even a notable prophetess, Debbora⁷—but their intervention seems to have been mostly transitory, unimportant, and even infrequent: witness the remark (I Kings 3:1) that before Samuel "there was no manifest vision, and the word of the Lord was precious in those days." Samuel, in the second half of the eleventh century, may be said to be the forerunner and herald of the line of great prophets commencing with Elias in the ninth century. He was from

⁷ Cf. Judg. 4:4 f. An interesting instance this of the connection of prophetism with the matriarchal features of the agriculturist type of civilization. Note also the theme of Debbora's canticle (*ibid.*, chap. 5), the exploits of another *mulier fortis*, Jahel, the wife of Haber, who slew Sisara.

youth "a faithful prophet of the Lord" (I Kings 3:20), whose main message it was, for the people to put away all their false gods and to serve Yahveh alone (I Kings 7:3). He is also the kingmaker, who instituted Saul and, after Saul's failure, David, as kings whose kingship will endure only as long as the voice of the Lord is obeyed. For "as thou rejectest the word of the Lord, the Lord rejecteth thee from being king" (I Kings 15:23). Saul's sorry reign lasted twenty years (1032-1013).⁸ It opened brilliantly with the overthrow of Philistine suzerainty over Israel, but ended disastrously with a sweeping victory of these enemies and the slaying of Saul himself. One of his surviving sons, Isboeth, succeeded him as king for two years, which were filled by civil warfare between himself and the coming man, David, whose partisans murdered Isboeth in the end and thus made David sole ruler in Israel.

David, originally a henchman of Saul's, had been too successful against the Philistines, slaying his ten thousands, where Saul had only slain his thousands (I Kings 18:7): with the result that he had to go into hiding to escape the king's murderous jealousy. In the cave of Odolam the young captain automatically drew to himself not only his kinsmen, but "all that were in distress and oppressed with debt and under affliction of mind, about 400

⁸ I.e., half a generation, which is of course again a symbolical figure, expressing disapproval of this reign, while the full generation (40 years) is assigned to the reign of "good" kings like David and Solomon. It is only from the time of the schism (933) that Hebrew chronology becomes historically certain through the dating of contemporary Assyrian events. The period from the death of Josue (1231) to that of Solomon (933) is therefore liable to internal readjustment.

men, whose prince he became" (I Kings 22:2): a graphic description of the rise of a guerilla chief, destined to carve out for himself a "power kingdom." Hard pressed by Saul, David promptly offered his services to the Philistine king of Geth, who gladly accepted them and for whom David harried the tribes of the desert. Residing near Bersabee, he was in fact a Philistine vassal: but after the signal victory of the Philistines over Saul, an exploit in which he took no part, David went to Hebron and there was made king of Juda. He continued to reside there even when, after the death of Isboseth, "all the tribes of Israel came to David in Hebron and anointed David to be king over Israel," as well as over Juda (II Kings 5:1, 3).

The Philistines, alarmed at David's accession to power, tried a preventive war to check it, but were so unsuccessful against the seasoned and well-disciplined Judean army that the tables were completely turned against them. But so far from resenting their defeat, the Philistines, who knew and obviously liked David, accepted the new position David offered them, namely, of becoming his own vassals or allies, 600 warriors from Geth even joining his army outright, a regiment of Royal Guards being formed, consisting exclusively of Philistines and other Cretans,⁹ whose loyalty to David's person stood him in good stead during the palace revolts which disfigured the end of David's reign. Another master stroke of David's was the conquest of the strip of Canaanitish territory which had all along separated Juda from Israel, the Jebusite country

⁹ The "Cerethi and Phelethi" of I Par. 18:17.

centered upon Jerusalem, and the choice of this neutral zone for the building of a new capital for the united kingdom of Juda and Israel. From 1012 to 1006 David had reigned from Hebron; from 1005 to his death in 973 he now reigned from Jerusalem. His writ ultimately ran from Dan to Bersabee; Philistia and Transjordan (Moab, Amon, and Aramaea) were his vassals; the king of Tyre his ally. His military successes were all the more remarkable since his army included neither horsemen nor war-chariots, and as the king's main preoccupation lay in anything but military affairs.

Indeed King David's chief interest was religious. Killing as such was no pleasure to him, as his recurring acts of clemency amply prove: his wars had been necessary to weld the whole chosen race into a single nation, but his heart was not in the wars. He was wholly dedicated to the cult of Yahveh, and his entire reign was directed to effect a similar dedication on the part of his people, the children of Israel. David was and is above all the royal Psalmist: witness, for instance, his canticle of II Kings 22, which so perfectly shows his wholly religious outlook. His mind was set on making Jerusalem not merely his own capital, but the focal point of the cult of Yahveh, an end which he certainly achieved. Until David's time offerings to Yahveh could and were made in any high place: ¹⁰ from now on, all temple worship was to be centralized in and monopolized by Jerusalem. The ark of the covenant, which after its capture by the Philistines had suffered many peregrina-

¹⁰ For instance, "the hill of God" (Gedeon) mentioned in I Kings 10:5.

tions, now found its permanent resting place in Jerusalem (II Kings 6:17); only the Tabernacle, which from Silo had been moved to Nobe and from there to Gabaon, still attracted Yahveh worshipers to the latter place.¹¹ The building of a permanent temple to take the place of the nomadic tabernacle was to have completed the king's liturgical program. But he died in the midst of preparations for it and had to leave its execution to his successor.

King David was a saint in the true sense of the word, i.e., a man self-dedicated to God. This of course did not exclude the waywardness of human passions, of which the biblical account makes an ample record. He had a weakness for the fair sex in particular, the consequences of which darkened the last ten years of his life. The intrigues of his wives to secure the succession for their own respective sons resulted in the palace revolts of two of his sons, Absalom and Adonias, and in consequent civil wars, which made latent jealousy between Israel and Juda flare up afresh (II Kings 19:41-43). Two prophets are mentioned as guiding David's conscience: Gad (II Kings 24) and Nathan (II Kings 12; II Kings 1), the latter also ensuring the succession of Solomon. As St. Ambrose (in chap. 4 of his *Apology of David*) so finely says: "For kings to sin, is common; for them to repent like David, rare indeed." With his repentance, his clemency toward enemies, his zeal for God, his human friendships, his great qualities as a ruler, King David remains one of the most winsome and forceful characters of the Old Testament.

¹¹ Cf. Solomon's sacrifice there (III Kings 3:4).

With the reign of his son Solomon (972-933) one breathes at once a different atmosphere. Solomon was chiefly a successor and as long as he was faithful to his father's testament things went well. He was able to build the great temple of Yahveh, dreamt of by David; but, having spent seven years in doing so, he promptly spent twelve more years in building other great edifices, *inter alia* a palace for the Egyptian queen he had married. Both numbers are symbolical, and significant.¹² Twice he was favored by visions of God (III Kings 9.2): but the political interest ran very close to and ended in overshadowing the religious one. The difference in religious temper between himself and his father manifests itself respectively in that of the Psalms and of the sapiential literature which goes by the name of King Solomon, though only parts of it were really written by him. Court writers and historiographers naturally formed a feature of his reign, as of that of contemporary Oriental despots, and the books of Josue, the Judges, and Samuel, perhaps begun in his father's time, were completed in his own.

King Solomon was mainly determined to safeguard the unity of his realm, established by his father. For this purpose he divided the country on lines running athwart the old clan divisions (III Kings 4:7). He got himself horses and chariots galore ¹³ and, though styling himself a prince of peace, apparently believed in the adage of *si vis pacem para bellum*. Solomon (as David and Saul be-

¹² Ultimately he even built temples to Moloch and Chamos (III Kings 11:7).

¹³ III Kings 4:26; 9:19; 10:28 f.

fore him) was fortunate in living at a period when the Great Powers of the time were under an eclipse: Babylon had ceased to be a power in 1039; Egypt in 1085; Assyria had suspended animation from the death of its King Tiglath Phalasar I in 1093 to the accession of Adad Narari II in 911. There was therefore no real need for Solomon to nurse any political preoccupations: but he did and from the first got entangled with the kings of Tanis.¹⁴ Throughout Solomon seems to have suffered from an inferiority complex, which stimulated him to prove to himself and to the rest of the world that he was as good as any of his "brothers," the kings of the surrounding nations, and in fact even grander than they. His ostentatious luxury, his delight in impressing a queen of Saba (Sheba), his grand manner, his royal absolutism: all seem to bear out such an explanation of this spoilt child of fortune.

After the manner of "the nations," Solomon saw in his own people, the Israelites, a ruling caste lording it over a subject people of serfs—"Amorrhites and Hethites and Pherezites and Hevites and Jebusites, that are not of the children of Israel" (III Kings 9:20-22): a pretty conceit, which, however, was not born out by the numerical proportion between lords and serfs. As his ambitions and ostentation grew, their financing became impossible without laying heavy burdens, such as forced labor, even on the allegedly ruling caste, with the result that the latter began to hate the megalomaniac king and all his works. They

¹⁴ The traditional XXI dynasty of Egypt (1085-950). It was followed by the XXII dynasty which maintained itself at Bubastis (likewise situated in the Delta) from 950 to 730.

hated his absolutism, his centralistic regimentation, his ever fresh demands not only to keep up a scale of living which included the upkeep of 700 queens and 300 royal concubines (III Kings 11:3), but to engage in new spectacular enterprises, such as naval expeditions to Ophir (III Kings 9:28) and Tharsis (III Kings 10:22) to provide himself with gold, ivory, apes, and peacocks and similar expensive vanities. The exceptionally gifted monarch grew into an old voluptuary, the great temple builder for Yahveh became an eclectic devotee of Astarte, Moloch, or whatever deity the harem favorite of the moment fancied (III Kings 11:4-7). The perfect peace time of his reign when "Judah and Israel dwelt without fear, every one under his vine and under his fig tree, from Dan to Bersabee" (III Kings 4:25), petered out in the raising up all around of enemies against him. Such were Adad of Edom, Razon of Damascus, Sheshhonn of Egypt, founder of the XXII dynasty, who had overthrown the XXI and therefore naturally was hostile to any allies of it, such as Solomon. It was Sheshhonn who subsidized Adad of Edom, and who welcomed to his court the man who was to wrench five-sixths of the kingdom out of the hands of Solomon's heir. Like a grand display of fireworks, Solomon's reign was very magnificent to look at while it lasted, but when it ended nothing remained but smoke and ashes.

4. DISINTEGRATION AND EXTINCTION

God in His patience had accommodated Himself to His people's cry for a king: but it did not seem as if the kings

were going to accommodate themselves to their purely religious *raison d'être* as instruments in the hands of Yahveh. If, however, the kings existed only for themselves, why should the people continue to exist for them? Solomon's son and heir, Roboam, was at once on his accession faced by this popular demand for a relaxation of royal absolutism: a demand to which, *more dictatorem*, he could think of no better reply than that his little finger was thicker than his father's thigh, and that, where the latter had scourged the people with whips, he could scourge them with scorpions (II Kings 12:14). Thereupon "Israel revolted from the house of David, to this day" (v. 19) and "King Roboam made haste to get into his chariot and fled to Jerusalem" (v. 18), "and there was none that followed the house of David but the tribe of Juda only" (v. 20).

Thus was begun the disintegration of the chosen people, their scission into the two separate kingdoms of Juda and Israel and the total extinction of the latter in captivity; a small remnant only of Juda was eventually to be saved up and in due course brought out of its Babylonian exile for the carrying out of God's plan. The history of the intervening two centuries of the kingdom of Israel (933-722) and three and a half centuries of the kingdom of Judah (933-586) makes sorry reading indeed. The small area of Palestine during this time was filled with tiny principalities (Philistian, Judaeon, Israelitish, Phoenician, Aramean), all hovering between the two opposed centers of attraction, Egypt and Assyria, and each appealing now to the one, now to the other, for protection against its rival.

As we know now, Egypt's day of power had passed and its only use lay in its nuisance value.¹⁵ Assyria on the other hand had reawakened to power and world-domination during the two centuries and a half which synchronize to a large extent with the period of Hebrew history under review. The political intrigues between all these rulers, backed up by military action, completely fill the period, crowding out the religious motif. Apostasy from Yahveh provides the recurring refrain of it, closely matched by a general moral degeneration. There is little point in a minute description by us of all the events that took place as recorded in Holy Writ. We shall content ourselves with the general lines of the story as a background to the activities of the prophets who have given to this time the impress of the prophetic age par excellence.

The scission between Juda and Israel made manifest to all with eyes to see, that the children of Israel had not been chosen for any political future or other. Henceforth national ambitions in any but the religious sphere had clearly been rendered impossible. Israel now became simply a militaristic principate, which went to the most successful military leader of the moment. Of the 19 separatist kings, 8 were assassinated, and together they belonged to no fewer than 7 dynasties. Though far larger than Juda in area and population, the kingdom of Israel ¹⁶ lacked internal cohesion owing to the particularism of its several

¹⁵ Sheshonk II took his opportunity in 930 to invade Palestine and sack Jerusalem. The booty obtained there was used to finance not only his own needs, but also those of his immediate successors. Cf. III Kings, 14:25 f.

¹⁶ Bethel was its southernmost city and Laish (in Dan) its northernmost.

clans. It was only fifty years after the schism that the founder of the third dynasty, Amri, definitely welded them into a homogeneous whole, building a new capital, Samaria (III Kings 16:24), with a temple to Yahveh in it, to counteract the attraction to Yahveh worshipers of the temple at Jerusalem: a glaring example of making religion subservient to politics. He was a most efficient organizer in the worldly sense, and Israel indeed came to be known to the Assyrians as "Amri's country": the stele of Mesha, king of Moab, also mentions him wistfully as a formidable foe. He allied himself with Ethbaal, king of Tyre, whose daughter Jezabel married Amri's son and heir, Achab.

Achab continued his father's policy most successfully. Under him Juda was reduced to a state of vassalage, and one of their kings, Joram, was married to Athalia, a daughter of Achab and Jezabel. Both queens,¹⁷ Jezabel in Israel and her daughter Athalia in Juda, had a most sinister influence by doing their best to introduce the cult of their Phoenician deities in place of the worship of Yahveh. It is in this connection that there arises about 870 B.C. suddenly and almost abruptly (III Kings 17:9) the great prophet and wonder-worker Elias, who for twenty years, i.e., the whole of Achab's reign, was to stand up against this apostasy and ultimately to re-establish the supremacy of Yahveh in the consciousness of the people of

¹⁷ An example of the matriarchal reaction of the archaic civilization against its supersession by the patriarchal ideology of pastoralism?

Israel. With his inexorable "Thus saith the Lord" he would again and again confront the King and, to his face and in the sight of his people, denounce him (and especially his queen), and this when "there was no nation or kingdom whither the King had not sent to seek him" (III Kings 18:10), to take his life. In this amazing duel we have the first historical example of royalty being attacked by one of its own commoners, and militarist might by the categorical imperative of truth and justice. Never before had there been such an audacious challenge; never before such a striking vindication of the spiritual and its supremacy over the merely temporal, however highly exalted by men.¹⁸ With this the tremendous problem is being unrolled of how to reconcile public authority and

¹⁸ To realize the enormity of the challenge and its audacity, let the reader consider such a passage as III Kings 21:17 ff., in the light in which it must have struck contemporary thought: "And the word of the Lord came to Elias the Thesbite, saying, Arise and go down to meet Achab king of Israel who is in Samaria: behold he is going down to the vineyard of Naboth to take possession of it. And thou shalt speak to him saying, Thus saith the Lord: Thou hast slain, moreover also thou hast taken possession. And after these words thou shalt add, Thus saith the Lord: In this place, wherein the dogs have licked the blood of Naboth, they shall lick thy blood also. And Achab said to Elias: Hast thou found me, thy enemy? He said: I have found thee, because thou art sold to do evil in the sight of the Lord. And of Jezabel also the Lord spoke, saying: The dogs shall eat Jezabel in the field of Jesrahel.

"And when Ahab had heard these words, he rent his garments and put hair-cloth upon his flesh and fasted and slept in sackcloth and walked with his head cast down. And the word of the Lord came to Elias the Thesbite saying, Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me? Therefore, because he hath humbled himself for My sake, I will not bring the evil in his days, but in his son's days will I bring the evil upon his house."

Cf. Eccus. 48:1, 6: "And Elias the prophet stood up as a fire, and his word burnt like a torch; who brought down kings to destruction and broke their power in pieces. He feared not the prince and no word could overcome him (vv. 13 f.): thus was Elias magnified in his wondrous works" (v. 4).

private judgment, a problem further developed four centuries later by Socrates but only meeting with its final solution at the hands of the Church founded by Christ.

With the passing of Elias and of Achab's dynasty and with the succession of Eliseus and Jehu, the undisputed supremacy of Yahveh had been established in Israel. If afterward idolatry ever again lifted up its head, it was not as a rival religion, but as a superstition recognized as such in popular estimation. In the event the conflict changed from one between monotheism and polytheism to one between religion and irreligion. The immediate result was that the prophet was no longer the enemy of the king, but his counselor, who is welcome at the court and highly esteemed there. Jehu's dynasty as a consequence lasted longer than any other in Israel, its century forming, at least externally, the golden age of the kingdom. Juda had been reduced to further insignificance: Jerusalem had been sacked by the Damascene in 800 and by King Joas of Israel in 790. Jeroboam II was even able to reduce the formidable Aramean kingdom of Damascus to vassalage. It is true that this conquest was owing to its prior defeat (in 773) at the hands of Salmanasar IV of Assyria; the rising power of which in a previous reign Jehu had already deemed it prudent to propitiate by generous offerings of tribute to its King Salmanasar III. Altogether Jeroboam II ruled effectively over the whole of southern Syria: suzerain, not only of Juda, but of Philistia, Damascus, Amon, Moab, Edom, and Amalec as well. "He restored the borders of Israel from the entrance of Emath [i.e., the

Anti-Lebanon] unto the sea of the wilderness" (IV Kings 14:25), i.e. the Dead Sea, and "the torrent of the desert" (Amos 6:15), i.e., the Egyptian frontier.

However, internally the kingdom did not present a picture of equal splendor. Recent excavations at Samaria and Jericho have brought to light palaces which amply bear out the charges of luxury, leveled by the prophets of the period against the magnates of both Israel and Juda. Usury, corruption, and violence abound: "the poor man is sold for a pair of shoes" (Amos 2:6); "the son and the father have gone to the same young woman" (*ibid.*, v. 7); the great men "sleep on beds of ivory and are wanton on their couches, they drink wine in bowls, and anoint themselves with the best ointments, they are not concerned for the affliction of Joseph" (*ibid.*, 6:4-6); they crush the poor in deceitful balances, they increase the shekel and lessen the measure (*ibid.*, 8:4 f.). The same moral corruption prevailed in Juda, of which Isaias says: "Why do you consume My people and grind the faces of the poor?" (Isa. 3:15.) "Woe to you that draw iniquity with cords of vanity and sin as the rope of a cart; that call evil good and good evil; that put darkness for light and light for darkness" (*ibid.*, 5:18, 20). "Woe to them that make wicked laws to oppress the poor, and write injustice to rob the fatherless and make widows their prey" (*ibid.*, 10:1 f.). "There is no truth and there is no mercy and there is no knowledge of God in Israel" says Osee (4.1). "Cursing and lying and killing and theft and adultery have overflowed, and blood hath touched blood" (*ibid.*, v. 2). "What shall I do to

thee, O Ephraim, and what shall I do to thee, O Juda? I have hewed them by the prophets, I have slain them by the words of My mouth" (*ibid.*, 6:4 f.).

Though Elias (who died in 851 B.C.) was deemed the most famous prophet, neither he nor his successor Eliseus (who died 759 B.C.) has left any writings of their own behind, as was also the case with Oded, whose prophecies were prominent 734–733. Of "The Prophecy of Jonas" it is rather a question whether the title is not programmatic rather than indicative of its authorship.¹⁹ If so, the only writings of the prophets of Israel would be those of the two "minor" prophets Amos (d. 760) and Osee (750–725), all the remainder of the prophetic books of the Bible having as authors prophets of Juda. This circumstance points to the high and permanent Messianic value of the recorded sayings of the prophets of Juda, whereas those of Israel, however important otherwise, were in the first instance meant for their own generation.

When the voice of the prophets of Israel was stilled, that of the prophets of Juda was lifted up. In this eighth century B.C. there arise Isaias (745–685), the greatest of them all; Joel; Micheas (740–700); and Abdias. The main theme of the prophets of the ninth century had been to recall Israel from its apostasy and to offer it a last chance. But the keynote of the later prophets is to prepare a remnant of the people for punishment and purgation: "Blow ye the trum-

¹⁹ "The Prophecy of Jonas" seems rather to be a parabolical discourse on a problem of divine government, much like the Book of Job. In that case "Jonas" would not designate an author, but a program. The prophet Jonas' life is computed to fall between 785 and 744.

pet in Sion, sound an alarm in My holy mountain . . . because the day of the Lord cometh . . . a day of darkness and of gloominess" (Joel 2:1). "Sanctify ye a fast, call an assembly . . . and cry ye to the Lord: Ah, ah, ah, because the day of the Lord is at hand and it shall come like destruction" (*ibid.*, 1:14 f.); "Before the face thereof a devouring fire, and behind it a burning flame; the land is like a garden of pleasure before it, and behind it a desolate wilderness; neither is there anyone that can escape it" (*ibid.*, 2:3). And yet for all this prediction of woes without number, there is always coupled with them a glorious vision of some future when, purged of all dross as by fire, Jerusalem shall "arise and shine, O Jerusalem, for thy light is come and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee. For behold, darkness shall cover the earth and a mist the people: but the Lord shall arise upon thee and His glory shall be seen upon thee" (Isa. 60:1 f.). The end for which God has chosen His people cannot be frustrated by their apostasy; it will be accomplished yet, for all their sins and for all the desolation and destruction these sins entail. There will come through a small remnant, which will be "in the midst of many people as a dew from the Lord, and as drops upon the grass, which waiteth for no man, nor tarrieth for the children of men" (Mich. 5:7).

In the meantime the end of the kingdom of Israel had come with the accession of Tiglath Phalasar III of Assyria (745-727). Israel had first become a vassal of Assyria in 738; five years later it revolted, with the result that in 732 it was smashed up completely and reduced to the

status of an Assyrian province, a puppet king (Osee) being set up, whilst large numbers of the people were "carried captive into Assyria" (IV Kings 15:29). Not enough with this, Sargon (722-705), finding that the puppet regime was not sufficiently "sincere," made altogether an end of Israel, taking Samaria in 721 and, as his Chronicles record, sent 27,290 of its inhabitants into captivity, both to Assyria and Media: "he placed them in Hala and Habor by the river of Gozan, in the cities of the Medes" (IV Kings 17:6). "And the king of the Assyrians brought people from Babylon, and from Cutha and from Avah and from Emath, and from Setharvaim and placed them in the cities of Samaria instead of the children of Israel" (*ibid.*, v. 24). These newcomers mixed with what had been left of the Israelites, thus producing the race of "Samaritans," who in later days were so heartily detested by the Jews. Of the Israelites taken to Assyria and Media, nothing further is heard; apparently they were completely absorbed by their hosts. But this was not without giving a tremendous impetus to the theism of the Medes and quickening the latter's religion into what was to become that of Zoroaster.²⁰

With the eclipse of Israel, Juda likewise had become a vassal of Assyria. King Achaz of Juda (733-727) was a vas-

²⁰ The Book of Tobias gives a good picture of the life of the Israelitish captives in Assyria and Media. The latter country apparently became quite a second home to them, those settled in Assyria also moving there after the fall of Ninive. Tobias we are told ended his days at Ecbatana (or Ragae?) and "saw there his children's children to the fifth generation. And all his kindred and all his generation continued in good life and in holy conversation, so that they were acceptable both to God and to men, and to all that dwell in the land" (Tob. 14:15, 17).

sal of Tiglath Phalasar III, Ezechias (726-688) a vassal of Sargon. The latter's successor, Sennacherib (705-681), scented Ezechias' treasonable collusion with his rebellious Babylonian vassal, whereupon he sacked Jerusalem in 701, carrying away 200,000 people into captivity.²¹ However, Ezechias did not learn the lesson: for in 690 he allied himself with Egypt, and this revolt brought Sennacherib again before the walls of Jerusalem (in 690). But a plague broke out in his army and he went home, without taking the city. The next king of Juda, Manasses (687-641), the traditional slayer of the prophet Isaïas, did homage to Assarhaddon in 673 and to Ashurbanipal in 667, but in 652 joined a conspiracy against the latter, with the result that an Assyrian army came and took him away captive to Babylon: which marks the second deportation (of 648). The prophets of this period were Nahum, Habacuc, and Sophonias. While foretelling the doom of Assyria, "Woe to thee [Ninive], city of blood, all full of lies and violence" (Nah. 3:1), they are no less emphatic regarding that of Jerusalem: "The great day of the Lord is near, it is near and exceeding swift . . . a day of wrath, a day of tribulation and distress, a day of calamity and misery. . . . Neither shall their silver and their gold be able to deliver them in the day of the wrath of the Lord; all the land shall be devoured by the fire of His jealousy, for He shall make even a speedy destruction of all them that dwell in the land" (Soph. 1:14, 18).

With this we have reached the last act of the Judean

²¹ According to the Assyrian records. The Bible is silent on this deportation.

drama: a period which forms the background to the towering personality of Jeremias, perhaps the most remarkable of all the prophets. Remarkable to be sure, since from the moment of his vocation Jeremias was called to be in opposition to all established authority, civil and ecclesiastical, royal and popular: "And the Lord said unto me: Gird up thy loins and arise, and speak to them all that I command thee. Be not afraid at their presence . . . for behold I have made thee this day . . . a pillar of iron and a wall of brass over all the land, to the kings of Juda, to the princes thereof, and to the priests, and to the people of the land. And they shall fight against thee and shall not prevail, for I am with thee, saith the Lord, to deliver thee" (Jer. 1:17-19). Born about 650 and called to prophecy in 626, Jeremias remained a pathetic solitary figure all his life. He never married; his own people hated and persecuted him as a herald of evil, as a defeatist and as one who "on purpose weakeneth the hands of the men of war and of the people; who seeketh not peace to this people, but evil" (Jer. 38:4). His advice bore on political, as well as on religious, matters: both were spurned, and all the calamities that he foresaw, not only came to pass, but made it impossible even for him personally to escape them. Head of the Babylonian party, in fierce opposition to the royal Egyptian party, he lived to see the final triumph of Babylon, only to be dragged along by his blinded compatriots into Egypt, where he ended his days in utter spiritual isolation.

The beginning of Jeremias' activity coincided with the reign in Juda of Josias (639-608), who with unparalleled

zeal "broke down before him the altars of the Baalim and demolished the idols that had been set upon them; and he cut down the graven things and the groves, and burnt the bones of the priests on the altars of the idols, and he cleansed Juda and Jerusalem; and in the cities of Manasses and Ephraim and of Simeon, even to Naphthali, he demolished all" (II Par. 34:4-6). But this frightfulness, however well-intentioned and showy, lacked the body of popular support. There were even revolts against these measures and, when King Josias died, all the liturgical reforms of his died out too, and the people went back to their old ways. How far the paganization even of Juda had gone, can be gauged by the fact that the discovery and public reading of a copy of Deuteronomy came with the shock of an entire novelty to both king and priests (IV Kings 22: 8-11). Josias' reign also coincided with the last years of Assyria's declining power and its end in 609. With this the Neo-Babylonian empire arose,²² as did the hopes of the Egyptian "pharaohs" of Sais,²³ for regaining independence. The last kings of Juda, against the dictates of all common sense and the counsel of Jeremias, persisted to the very end in hitching their destiny to the waning star of Egypt, instead of accepting the *fait accompli* of Babylonian suzerainty. The result was that Nabuchodonosor II (604-562) sacked Jerusalem in 604 and took a first lot of captives to Babylon (third deportation of Judeans). The Judean king of the time, Joakim, tried to wreak his venge-

²² Eleventh dynasty of Babylon, 625-538.

²³ The so-called twenty-sixth dynasty of Egypt.

ance on Jeremias, a book of whose writings he burnt: but his command to arrest the prophet could not be carried out, as "the princes said to Baruch, Go and hide, both thou and Jeremias, and let no man know where you are" (Jer. 36:19). Nabuchodonosor could not deal with his rebellious vassal until 597, when Jerusalem was once more sacked and a fourth deportation of captives took place. He instituted a son of Josias king of Juda and gave him the name of Sedecias, who was destined to be the last of the Davidic dynasty and of Judean royalty.²⁴

Sedecias had to choose between the advice of the Egyptian party, headed by the prophet Hananias, and that of Jeremias (Jer. 28). Instead, he hedged for a long time: until the blandishments of a new pharaoh, Hophna, completely won him over in 588, when he "revolted from king Nabuchodonosor who had made him swear fealty by Yahveh" (II Par. 36:13), and who now came swiftly to take vengeance. Jeremias this time was suspected of joining the Chaldeans and "the princes were angry with Jeremias and beat him and cast him into prison and he remained there many days" (Jer. 37:14 f.). And when the prophet said: "Whosoever shall remain in Jerusalem shall die by the sword and by famine and by pestilence" (Jer. 38:2), the princes said to the king, "We beseech thee that this man be put to death, for he weakeneth the hands of the people" (v. 4). "And they let down Jeremias by ropes into a dungeon, wherein there was no water, but mire" (v. 6). Out

²⁴ Basing themselves on Jer. 29:2, many believe that a further deportation (the fifth) took place in 596.

of this death by starvation Sedecias rescued the prophet, who was taken into the "entry of the prison, where he remained to the day that Jerusalem was taken," (v. 28); for Sedecias had secretly consulted Jeremias, who told him of the inescapable doom of Jerusalem and advised him to surrender to the Chaldeans. But the King was afraid of his pro-Egyptian princes, whose virtual prisoner he had become himself: and when, after a siege lasting two years, Nabuchodonosor ultimately took Jerusalem in 586,²⁵ Sedecias was taken in chains to Babylon, all his sons were slain before his eyes, and after this last sight his own eyes were gouged out. Thus ended kingship in Israel.

Jeremias of course was set free by Nabuchodonosor, who also appointed him counselor of the governor he had set over the conquered province, one Godolias. The Jews, however, revolted against Godolias in 583 and, on the approach of Nabuchodonosor's army, fled into Egypt, taking Jeremias with them. In 582 the last deportation of captives took place, the seventh from Juda, but it was not until 568 that Nabuchodonosor found time for a campaign against Egypt, about the result of which we know nothing, anymore than we do about the last days of Jeremias.

²⁵ Simultaneously the sixth deportation of captives took place.

CHAPTER XV

The Messianic Stage

1. THE BABYLONIAN CAPTIVITY (586-538)

WITH the leading into captivity an age closes, an age which we have called prophetic, because it was to these spokesmen of Yahveh that God had entrusted the direction of His people toward the goal which was their *raison d'être*. Not as if there had been no more prophets after 586.¹ Indeed two of the four "major prophets," Ezechiel and Daniel, were sent on their mission only after their own deportation to Babylon, Ezechiel's in 597, Daniel's in 605; and of the twelve "minor prophets," three (Aggeus, Zacharias, and Malachias) prophesied even later still: the first two under Darius (521-486) about 520, and Malachias about 450.

But the destruction of the Temple and the consequent cessation of the sacrifices enjoined by the Law completely changed the situation, to which the prophets had to address themselves. For with that catastrophe the covenant between Yahveh and His people, of which the sacrificial law dictated to Moses had been an integral part, had apparently come to an end, since the national cult of Yahveh had now been rendered impossible. The covenant at an end: but who had put an end to it? "Marduk," said the

¹ Note that prophets continued in Juda after 586, but not in Israel after 722.

Babylonian conquerors, "is stronger than Yahveh: therefore Marduk's servant Nabuchodonosor has prevailed over Yahveh's servant Sedecias and his people." But it was not only the Babylonians who drew what seemed such an obvious conclusion: many of the stricken people of Judea said so too and went over to the side of the victorious god, becoming merged in and assimilated to his people.² It was to stem such an apostasy that the prophets of the Exile were called by God. Yes, they said, sure enough, the Old Testament has come to an end: but an end was put to it, not by Marduk, but by Yahveh Himself. For your sins He ended it; for your castigation He terminated it. But if you repent now and accept this just punishment as well deserved, Yahveh will have mercy upon you and enter into a new covenant with you. He will lead you back out of this captivity and you shall return to Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple more glorious than ever and all things will be restored to you, a small but faithful remnant, that has "escaped the sword among the nations and been scattered through the countries" (Ezech. 6:8). For "thus saith the Lord God: I Myself will take of the marrow of the high cedar, and will set it. I will crop off a tender twig . . . and I will plant it on a mountain high and eminent; and it shall shoot forth into branches and become a great cedar, and all birds shall dwell under it and every fowl shall make its nest under the shadow of the branches thereof" (Ezech. 17:22 f.). For this were the prophets of the Captivity sent, to help saving up this little remnant, to keep

² Cf. P. Heinisch, *Das Buch Ezechiel* (Bonn, 1923), p. 9.

alive the sacred flame of hope in their breasts and to prepare for the time when "yet one little while, saith the Lord of hosts, I will move heaven and earth, the sea and the dry land, and I will move all nations, and the Desired of all nations shall come" (Aggeus 2:7 f.).

The work of restoring and building was clearly to be a purely religious work: the work of rebuilding the Temple, and of restoring the practice of the Law, both in its liturgical detail and in its moral precepts. All eyes were riveted on that future; and the more glaring the contrast between the actual helplessness of the exiles and the glory that was to be, the more it became evident that the longed-for peripety could be brought about only by divine intervention, which might most appropriately take the form of a General Judgment, punishing the persecutors of the Jews at the same time as ushering in the New Jerusalem. The leading idea was that of justice: a just God had punished them, and a just God would redress the balance: tribulations of a prostrate Israel at the hands of victorious Gentiles leading to a future glorification of a victorious Israel over their former enemies. "The Day of Yahveh" would surely come. The expression had first been used by Amos (5:18), but mainly for that of a special judgment, of Ashur (Isa. 10:12-19), or of Edom (Obed. 16), or of Egypt (Ezech. 30:3); now the concept became that of a general judgment between Jews and all Gentiles.

And to usher in this Day of Yahveh, He would send His people a new king, a stern judge to punish the heathens in justice and to vindicate His chosen people: as in former

times the kingship of a Saul and David had been instituted to deliver Israel from the Philistines and from all its other enemies. A "King of Justice," an "Anointed One":³ for this latter expression was originally a mere synonym for "king," since in Israel a king's title to authority lay neither in his divine descent nor in any monarchical tradition, but solely in the fact that he had been selected by Yahveh and in token thereof been anointed by Yahveh's spokesman, one of God's prophets.

2. THE PERSIAN PERIOD (538-332)

Surprisingly enough, when the Day came, the Anointed One (Isa. 45:1) was found to be the Persian king, Cyrus⁴ (558-529), who indeed seemed to be judging the nations that had oppressed Israel and who on the morrow of his victorious entry into Babylon issued in 538 his famous edict, which called upon the Jews of the Captivity to "go up to Jerusalem in Judea and build the house of the Lord the God of Israel, who is the God that is in Jerusalem: for the Lord, the God of heaven, hath given to me all the kingdoms of the earth and hath charged me to build Him a house in Jerusalem which is in Judea. Who then is there among you of all His people?" (I Esdras 1:2 f.).

But the first enthusiasm among the Jews was short-lived. Back in Palestine, they found themselves face to face with

³ In Hebrew *Mashiah*, in Aramaic *Meshiha*, and in Greek either transliterated as *Messias* or translated as *Christos*. Cf. J. M. Lagrange, *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris, 1909), p. 213. "King of Justice" = Melki sedeq.

⁴ He overthrew the Neo-Babylonian Empire in 539 and founded the Persian world empire. Cf. *Protohistory*, pp. 343 ff.

the mixed population in actual possession of the land and therefore frankly hostile to them. King Cyrus had died in 529 and successive intrigues of rival cliques at the royal court had held up his scheme for a Jewish restoration, so that it was only with the accession of Darius the Great (521-486) that fresh orders were given "that the temple of God be built by the governor of the Jews and by their ancients" (I Esdras 6:7) and that in 520 a further big batch of Jews from Babylon arrived in Palestine under strong leaders, Josue the high priest and Zorobabel the prince, whom the prophet Zacharias (4:14) refers to in his vision as "the two sons of oil" (i.e., "the anointed ones"), one, "the priest of justice," the other "the king of justice."⁵

Under such new leadership the rebuilding of the Temple was at last completed in 516, seventy years after its destruction by the Babylonians (cf. Dan. 9:2): but the end of the tribulation had not come yet. A poignant account of events under Artaxerxes I (465-424) is given to us by one Nehemias of Susa, a courtier of the King, who heard that "they that have remained and are left of the Captivity there in the province are in great affliction and reproach; and the wall of Jerusalem is broken down and the gates thereof burnt with fire" (II Esdras 1:3). Whereupon he obtains the King's permission to go to Jerusalem himself, to put things aright. From the last of the prophets, Malachias (ca. 450), one gains indeed a rather depressing picture of the not so very "faithful remnant" that had resettled in Palestine. The city of Jerusalem had not yet

⁵ Cf. Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

been rebuilt, though the Temple had: and the priesthood officiating at the Temple were lax, if not downright corrupt. The high priest was naturally coming to be looked upon by the Persian government as the responsible head of his people, as "prince" or "king" was a word with a challengingly political flavor: but the high priests of the period were a poor lot, to say the least.

The squalid and sordid conditions of the time brought it home to the people of Yahveh that the prophets who had so unanimously foretold the coming of a Messiah could not have meant only Cyrus. That was a partial fulfillment, no doubt, but the real, great, final "Day of the Lord" was yet to come; for come it would, since Yahveh could not break His promise. And with this there came into the world of human thought the "Messianic idea," the optimism of a thwarted minority trusting in the justice of God, who will vindicate it in His own good time, come what may in the meantime. This was an optimism, completely at variance with the prevailing pessimism of Oriental thought, which concludes that existence is so dolorous that the only hope is non-existence.⁶ No, say the Jews; the Messiah will come, there will be an ultimate triumph of God over sin and a final fulfillment of His eternal designs. The Indian quailed before suffering; the Jew surmounted it by faith in a just God.

The amazing thing surely is that this Jewish optimism should have prevailed in the world, as it manifestly has:

⁶ The reader is reminded that Aggeus and Zacharias (ca. 520) were actually contemporaries of Çâkyamuni (563-483) and of Mahâvîra (539-467).

for it is this Messianic hope which has inspired humanity ever since and which alone explains its ever-growing preoccupation with "world-improvement," secularized though this optimism, founded on faith in God, has become, so that the Revolution of 1917 actually could proclaim a Messianism without a Messiah.⁷

Messianism, however, was not the only new trend of thought forced upon the Jews after the Exile. In 398 the last and largest convoy ⁸ of exiles had arrived from Babylon under Esdras, who introduced strictest discipline in the observance of the law. Esdras is called "a ready scribe in the law of Moses" (Esdras 7:6) and with him may be said to begin that line of "scribes and doctors of the law," whose rigoristic expounding of the minutiae of the Torah came to take the place of the charismatic office of the prophets. Since the destruction of the Temple, the Jews of the Captivity first, and of the dispersion thereafter, had formed the habit of coming together in synagogues, there to listen to the Law and the exposition of some point in it: an exegesis which naturally fell to a priest or Levite, who under the circumstances was precluded from offering up

⁷ Victorian progressivism of course went with a vague deism, but more and more the most "progressive" optimists dropped the idea of God and, as the century wore on, replaced trust in Him by trust in a machine and in "science." And today? H. G. Wells, the popular prophet of progressivism, has discovered "Mind at the end of its tether"; at the end of World War II he frankly disavowed man's eternal progress. His trust in the benevolence of "science" had been shattered by the atomic bomb; without a God there remains for him but the expectation of "spinning swiftly into the vortex of extinction." He, its foremost prophet, has certainly come to see that this easy optimism is a snare and a delusion, that optimism is not easy and that, without belief in God, it is simply nonsense.

⁸ Numbering 50,000 souls, tradition says.

the sacrifices, for which the Mosaic law had originally destined him. With this practice arises the new trend to "rabbinism," and it is easy to see how fundamentally this development affected Jewish religion and how psychologically it prepared the way for the ultimate abandonment of the Temple sacrifices.

3. THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD (332-63 B.C.)

In the meantime Jerusalem remained the religious center for all Jews, whose religion made it incumbent upon them to share in the Temple sacrifices at least once a year. An attempt of making a temple on Mount Garizim the rival of that on Mount Zion was undertaken about 350: it became the center of a schismatic Yahveh cult by Samaritans and other mixed races, outcast by the race-purists of the Esdras type. A more subtle danger arose soon after through the overthrow of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great, who made himself master of Syria in 332, and through the consequent spread of Hellenistic influences. On the death of the world conqueror in 323, his empire was divided up among his generals and their successors, Egypt going to the Ptolemies and Mesopotamia to the Seleucids. Palestine, as usual, was claimed by both: but, without going into details, one may say that on the whole Palestine was Egyptian until 199, when it became part of the Syrian kingdom of the Seleucids. During this first, Ptolemaic, period (332 to 199),⁹ the Jews were treated

⁹ Corresponding to that of the Maurya dynasty in India (320-184).

with great benevolence by their Hellenist rulers. Being like themselves strangers in the midst of an alien population, the Hellenes were prepared to look upon the Jews as akin to themselves¹⁰ and often conferred on them even rights of Greek citizenship. Jews swarmed into Egypt, but also into all the other parts of the Hellenist world, so that in the end there remained no important Mediterranean city where a Jewish colony could not be found. If this meant that Jews and Jewish ideas permeated Greek thought, it also meant that Jewish life became strongly colored by Greek customs and culture. This liberalizing tendency would have ended in a complete absorption of Juda in its Hellenistic circumambieny, just as Israel had become merged in its Median environment, had there been no countervailing forces. How strongly Hellenized Jewry had become, is illustrated by the fact that "the Law and the Prophets" had to be translated into the language they all spoke, the Greek *Koiné*, out of the original Hebrew, which had become the monopoly and happy hunting ground of "scribes and doctors." In Jerusalem itself, as in Babylon, Aramaic had become the current language: and the last books to be added to the Bible were thus already written either in Aramaic (Tobias and Judith) or in Greek (Wisdom, II Machabees).¹¹ Greek cities with their gymnasiums and hippodromes abounded in a Palestine which even in its Jewish settlements was becoming thoroughly Hellenized.

¹⁰ Cf. the letter sent to Sparta by Jewish high priests (I Mach. 12:21).

¹¹ Ecclesiasticus and I Machabees were written in Hebrew, the former about

Against the liberal, i.e., Hellenizing, Jews, who seemed to carry everything before them, there arose a natural reaction on the part of orthodox Jews who, small in number, constituted themselves a pious elite (*Hassidim*) by contrast with the "impious" multitude and their leaders, the high priests, who still constituted the highest civil as well as religious authority of the Jewish people. With the change-over to Seleucid suzerainty in 199, this orthodox minority was to gain a quite unexpected increase of influence. The immediate cause was the chronic impecuniosity of the new rulers, which made them cast longing eyes on the riches accumulated in the Temple treasury in Jerusalem. Demands for handing over these funds to their Syrian ruler began in 172 and were complicated by rival high priests, some of whom were eager to comply with them, while their opponents considered this sacrilegious. The latter's opposition thoroughly incensed the Seleucid then ruling, Antiochus Epiphanes (174-164), whose pride resented more and more this Jewish superiority complex and aloofness, and now resolved to teach them a lesson. To end the anomaly of an unassimilated Jewish state within the state and to break the Jewish spirit, he not only sacked Jerusalem in 168, but in 165 went out of his way to profane the Temple systematically, with unlooked-for results.

For Epiphanes' challenge to the very essence of Jewish nationhood was taken up in 168 by a zealous priest, Matha-

190, the latter about 125; the Septuagint translation had been made a century earlier.

thias, who started an armed insurrection, called Machabean after his son, Judas Machabeus,¹² who became its soul and successful leader until his death in 161. This heroic war of independence fanned the embers of dormant nationalism to burst into a vast conflagration, which at one moment seemed successful in purging the whole of the Promised Land of its Gentile usurpers. The ancient Messianic prophecies seemed on the point of being fulfilled. Especially the mysterious visions of Daniel were eagerly scanned, presaging as they did the ruin of one empire after another, until one of these pagan kings, mightier than the former, "shall speak words against the High One and shall crush the saints of the Most High: and he shall think himself able to change times and laws." But then "judgment shall sit, that his power may be taken away and be broken in pieces and perish even to the end. And that the kingdom and power and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven may be given to the people of the saints of the Most High: whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all kings shall serve Him, and shall obey Him."¹³

But once more this brave dream was destined to fizzle

¹² "Machabee" meaning "hammer," is probably an eponym. The family name was "Hasmonaeon," i.e., "people from Hesmon," a township in Juda, mentioned in Jos. 15:27.

¹³ Dan. 7:25-27. The "Book of Daniel" apparently had been rather neglected in the meantime. Its extant fragments were evidently collected together and worked over, or at least edited, in the second century B.C.: the book consists on the one hand of episodic stories of Daniel's court life, narrated in the third person (chapters 1-6 and 13-14); and on the other of an account in the first person of apocalyptic visions (chapters 7-12). Chapters 13-14 of the text are in Greek, 2:4 to 7:28 is in Aramaic, and the remainder in Hebrew. Cf. J. Goettsberger: *Das Buch Daniel*. Bonn, 1928.

out in a rather inglorious anticlimax. Judas Machabeus, who was slain in battle in 161, was succeeded by his brother Jonathan, whose martial exploits however were helped not a little by the fact that at Antioch contests for the royal crown had become endemic among rival factions in the royal family. Hence the Jewish leader could always play one of those competitors against the other and, as time passed, these political intrigues became of even greater importance than feats of arms. Especially under the leadership of Simon (142-135),¹⁴ success crowned this double game, so that at one time he was duly acknowledged as practically independent ruler under the style of "Ethnarch of Judea."¹⁵ Although there is no point in entering into all the details of these petty and rather sordid tergiversations and combinations, mention must be made of a further complication of the intrigue through the fact that Rome, which all the time was pressing the Seleucids hard, was called in by the Jews to help them in their war against the common enemy. Judas Machabeus already had sent an embassy to Rome in 161; in 128 John Hyrcanus¹⁶ entered into a regular treaty of alliance with this new Power which had begun to cast its shadow over the East. The easy descent into the nether world of nationalism reached bottom during the reign of Judas Aristobulos—note the doubling of a Jewish by a Greek

¹⁴ The youngest surviving son of Mathathias, who succeeded Jonathan in 143 on the latter's assassination.

¹⁵ Note the irony of the Jews, fighting *ex hypothesi* to be not assimilated to the *ethnoi*, ending by being ruled by an *ethnarchos* of their own.

¹⁶ Son of Simon. He ruled from 135 to 104.

name become customary at this time—who in 104 exchanged the title of *ethnarch* for *basileus* and prided himself on being called a “Philhellene.” In him we behold a high priest of Yahveh, who based his authority on a regiment of guards, composed of pagan mercenaries.

The change-over in title from mere “national ruler” (*ethnarchos*) to “king” (*basileus*) is in fact symptomatic of more than mere vanity. The high priest in the role of Messiah seemed a concept fitting in with “the Anointed One slain” of Dan. 9:26, which passage was taken to refer to the high priest Onias III who had been slain in 170.¹⁷ This concept seemed to bear out the curious prophecies of Isaias (42:1-4; 49:1-6; 50:4-9; 52:13—53:12) concerning a suffering Messiah. But there was a serious obstacle to this interpretation: namely, that the prophets, all the prophets,¹⁸ had always unanimously stated that the Messiah would be of the kingly, Davidic line. And the Hasmonaeans of course were of priestly, Levitical lineage. Did Judas Aristobulos hope to get over the difficulty by having himself called “king”? If so, his hope was bound to come to nothing. The less these rulers measured up to the heroic caliber of the original Machabean patriots, the less likely were they to get their public to ignore the clear promises made to a descendant of David. The common conclusion was made that, after all, the Messianic reign promised could not yet have come, but must still lie in the future.

¹⁷ Cf. II Mach. 4:34.

¹⁸ Cf. Isa. 9:1; Jer. 23:5; Amos. 9:11; Osee. 3:5; Zach. 12:10.

The apocalyptic visions of Daniel had provoked imitators, who from the middle of the second century B.C. onwards catered to the wish-fancies of a miraculous *deus-ex-machina* like appearance of a Messiah who would punish the Gentiles in the grand scale fireworks of a General Day of Judgment.¹⁹ But this apocalyptic literature led nowhere: it lacked all truly religious and ethical elements and, with the collapse of the Machabean revolt, lay dormant for a century, until the coming of the Romans. It was rather that, as the Machabean expectations diminished, the sorely tried people searched the more intently the genuine Messianic prophecies of yore. And then it was found that the Messianic Day promised would see a reunion of Israel and Juda under a descendant of David;²⁰ that there would be a complete regeneration of the chosen people;²¹ and even a conversion of the Gentiles, who would come up to Jerusalem and worship Yahveh.²² None of these things had come to pass yet, evidently: and with this recognition there came a new evaluation of the Mes-

¹⁹ What remains of this literature is by internal evidence usually assigned to the following dates: *The Book of Jubilees* and the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, to the middle of the second century B.C.; the *Psalms of Solomon* date after the entry of Pompey into Jerusalem in 63 B.C. In the first century of our era, but before the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 were written *The Assumption of Moses* and *Henoch*. From after A.D. 70 date some of the *Sibylline Books*, the *Apocalypse of Baruch* and the *Testament of Abraham*. The *Ascension of Isaias* was written about A.D. 100 and has Christian interpolations. As for their value, Lagrange (*op. cit.*, pp. 133-35) says that "they contributed but little to keep alive the Messianic hope. They mark a definite set-back in the religious sentiment of the great prophets and psalmists; in particular, their Messias' only function is to judge, not to save."

²⁰ Jer. 3:18; 23:6; 30:10; Isa. 11:12; Ezech. 16:35 ff.

²¹ Ezech. 36:25-27; Jer. 33:8; Isa. 4:3.

²² Isa. 2:2-4; 45:20 ff.; Mich. 4:2.

sianic reign as one which, instead of being a judgment between Jews and Gentiles, was now rather regarded as implying one between the just and the wicked: and with this the accent changed over from one on a spectacular Messianism to one on proselytism. Thus reconsideration was forced upon a reluctant people of the old prophecies of an Isaias and Jeremias, who had tried to lead them out of their blinkered nationalism and tribalism into a universalist and personalist outlook. "As I live," said the Lord God through His servant Ezechiel (chap. 18), "this parable, 'the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the teeth of the children are set on edge,' shall be no more a proverb to you in Israel. The soul that sinneth, the same shall die: the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, and the father shall not bear the iniquity of the son. The justice of the just shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. And when the just turneth himself away from his justice and committeth iniquity, he shall die therein; and when the wicked turneth himself away from his wickedness and doeth justice, he shall save his soul alive."

We have already seen how Elias broke through the shackles of tribalism to vindicate the primacy of the spiritual, and how Jeremias had braved his own people and his king, to proclaim the truth however unpleasant. But it had needed the bitter lessons of the Captivity, the disappointment of the exiles' return to Palestine, and again the disillusionment following the Machabean bid for a Messianic reign, to make at least some of God's people understand

that, since the Old Covenant with the nation had been ended, God's new covenant would no longer be a collective, but a personal one: "This shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord: I will give My law in their bowels and I will write it in your heart," as the same prophet had already told their fathers. But what else is such New Covenant between God and each individual soul, superseding the Old Covenant of their tribalist existence, and shattering its nationalist selfishness and egocentricity, but the emergence of human personality, almost the divine forcing of this supreme human boon upon a recalcitrant people? One thinks of the groping that elsewhere, in India, went on at the same time, as yogic trances issued in an upaniṣadic philosophy; and of the subsequent peerless formulation of it in pure thought at the master-hands of a Plato, leading to precise notions of the individual and of the autonomy of the human person. But what contrast! In the former case there issues the proud isolation of the human monad in *Kevalatvam*; in the latter, the contrite heart which by the poignancy of its suffering has found a new relationship to God and thereby has awakened also to a new sense of man's personal dignity.²³ The Indian ascetic, starting with his soul, vainly tried to realize God; the Jewish prophet, starting with God, came to a full realization of his own soul.

All this had further startling results in Israel. The whole

²³ Cf. Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 56, who suggests that Platonic ideology could never lead to a true human brotherhood, which can be based only on a recognition of the common origin of all souls in God.

question of the resurrection had been placed in a new light. Though the immortality of the soul had always been believed in, the place of the dead had hitherto been held to be Sheol, a land of shadowlike existence, aptly summed up by Ecclesiastes (9:4) as one of which it could only be said that "a living dog is better than a dead lion"; a concept identical with that of Hades in Greek thought. With Isaiah and his prophecies of a judgment and of retribution there came the recognition of a Gehenna, to which the damned would be consigned: "gathered into the pit and shut up there in prison" (Isa. 24:22), where "their worm shall not die and their fire not be quenched" (Isa. 66:24). "Resurrection" had hitherto been a term applied to the nation, which would rise again out of the Exile: thus in Ezekiel's vision of the plain full of dry bones (chap. 37); thus in Osee's, "The Lord will strike and He will cure us, He will revive us after two days; on the third day He will raise us up and we shall live in His sight" (6:2 f.). Now, during and after the Machabean persecution its victims realized that the words of the prophets had a personal, rather than a collective, meaning and that the resurrection of the just, and of the unjust, was to be a personal one.

The persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes had been atrocious. Capital punishment had been decreed for the crime of observing the Mosaic Law: and not death only, but death after excruciating tortures, such as are vividly depicted in chapters 6 and 7 of the Second Book of Machabees. Death and tortures inflicted, not for personal or

political reasons, but for purely religious ones: a martyrdom inflicted, but also almost joyfully borne as a witness to the supremacy and eternity of God's law: martyrdom. Two millennia of Christian sufferings have so accustomed the Christian to such acts of religious heroism, that he is apt to forget that they have not always occurred, but had their beginnings in circumstances of time and place; in fact, that they came into being only with the concept of a suffering servant of Yahveh. Let us remember that religious martyrdom is quite alien to paganism. There city-ruler and city-god are not distinguished, and if one city's god conquers another city's god, the obvious result is for the citizens to honor the prevailing deity which has proved the stronger one. Attachment to one's old deity might lead one to continue offerings half-heartedly and half-secretly, much as one would frequent a friend fallen into disgrace at court. At bottom all these deities are much of a muchness, six of one and half a dozen of the other: a moral criterion does not exist and could not be applied to any of them, even if their devotees were aware of such a one. Hence there is no conception of a categorical imperative; hence also none of martyrdom. For the pagans persecuting the Jews, the latter's resistance to death was just so much incomprehensible, perverse obstinacy; for a pagan the Jewish rising was not conceivable except as a nationalistic and not as a religious one, since for him religion was merely an ideological expression of one's nationality.

To sum up. Out of the renewed suffering of the Machabean period there had come for the faithful remnant a new

understanding of the Messianic prophecies. No longer nationalist judge between Jew and Gentile, the Messiah was seen to be a universal judge between just and wicked; the resurrection, his reign promised, was not of the nation, but of the souls of the just; the suffering Servant of Yahveh was not the chosen race as such, but the faithful witnesses, the holy martyrs of God. The transformation of a purely national into a truly personal call had been clearly sounded. How many had ears to hear?

4. THE ROMAN PERIOD (63 B.C. TO A.D. 135)

The Hasmonaeans, initiators of the great war of liberation and saviors-to-be of the Jews for their sacred mission, had by the first century B.C. become the rallying point of an aristocratic elite which loved, first and last, power, ease, and wealth, and for which the office of the high priest and the cult of Yahveh had become mere means to that end. Such a betrayal by the leaders of the *quondam* pious Hassidim against the impious Liberals led naturally to a reaction within the body of Jewry. It is from about this time that, using new labels and exchanging roles, two new parties emerged: the Pharisees,²⁴ who like the former Hassidim preached rigoristic segregation from polluting contact with the pagan world; and the Sadducees,²⁵ who as *beati possidentes* thought compromise a small price to pay for maintaining their position. Unfortunately this Phari-

²⁴ *Parashim*, "separated," *scil.*, "from the Gentiles."

²⁵ Sadduqim, "justice party."

see opposition, most praiseworthy in itself, was vitiated and soon became completely stultified by the intellectual and spiritual pride of its rigorism. This turned faith in God and His Law into an abominable prigishness which, by its literal observance of the minutiae of the Mosaic Law, felt complacently entitled to a reward for its own "holiness." As timeservers, the Sadducees survived the fall of their leaders, the Hasmonaean dynasty. This was most appropriately ended by that Roman power which they had themselves first called in. In 63 B.C. Pompey entered Jerusalem, liberated the Greek cities of Palestine by attaching them to the Roman province of Syria, and reduced the Jewish high priest to the rank of an ethnarch ruling over Jerusalem and a small strip of surrounding country. The last Hasmonaean, Antigonus, trying an intrigue with the Parthians against Rome, was successful as Parthian puppet-king for three years (40-37), after which the Romans came, took Jerusalem, expelled the Parthians, and executed Antigonus.

In the meantime an astute usurper, Herod, had gone to Rome and was there, in the year 40, proclaimed King of Judea. Entirely Rome's creature, he maintained himself for forty-five years as their king of the Jews, crowning a long life of crime and profligacy by the murder of his own sons. He and his successors did not care two figs for religion, and were Jews merely in name. They never even tried to be themselves high priests, but appointed each by royal fiat, as they would any other official. By way of ostentation Herod "the Great" rebuilt the Temple, more re-

splendent than it had ever been, not forgetting at the same time to endow Jerusalem with a grand amphitheater and hippodrome. By no longer appointing high priests for life, Herod gained the great advantage of having at his disposal in them men whose only interest lay in currying favor with the usurper, so as to maintain themselves in office. In the same way the Sanhedrin ²⁶ became a packed assembly of Herodian appointees. Though cleverly maintaining himself thus in power, Herod was universally detested on account of his scandalous life and of the heavy taxation which he imposed to pay for all his extravagances. When he died in A.D. 6, Judea and Samaria became part of the Roman province of Syria and were placed under an imperial district officer (*procurator*) who resided at Caesarea.²⁷ Two sons of Herod were tetrarchs of Galilee (4-39) and Transjordan (4-34) respectively. But for a grandson of his, Agrippa, the dynasty petered out completely, the further descendants becoming pagans pure and simple, and disappearing as such altogether from sight. Agrippa had a flashy success, owing to his intimacy with Emperor Claudius (41-54), who restored to him for a short four years (41-44) the Herodian kingship over Palestine. "Basileus megas, Philo-Kaisar," he died prematurely, the last "king of the Jews."

²⁶ The *Synhedrion*, closely resembling the Greek *gerousia*, was an assembly of ancients, which had grown up in the third century as an advisory body to the high priest. It functioned as a senate under the Hasmonaean dynasty and included ever more doctors of the law and scribes. It ended by being the Supreme Court of Justice, presided over by the high priest.

²⁷ The fifth incumbent of this office, between 26 and 36, was one Pontius Pilate.

As Roman puppet-kings, the Herods of course could not have aspired to play as nationalistic a role as that of the Messiah was popularly still believed to be. They preferred to be kings by the grace of Rome rather than by the grace of God, and their people consequently knew full well, by the time the execrable Herod had succeeded to the throne, that no Messiah could ever be expected from that quarter. The disillusioned multitude, ever more excitable as time passed in vain expectations, listened all the more readily to any voice claiming to be that of the long delayed deliverer from the Roman yoke and restorer of all things to Israel. Tacitus in his *History* (V, 13) records that the Jewish Scriptures foretold that the East would at this time have the better of the West and bring the Jews to universal power; Suetonius (in his *Vespasian*, 4) repeats the same opinion; Josephus (in his *Jewish War*, VI, v, 4) similarly explains the rebelliousness of his people against Rome at the turn of the Christian era by their belief that one of them was about to arise and subdue the whole world. Within a century a dozen pseudo-Messiaes can be counted, who, suddenly emerging, as suddenly perish, in the meantime having misled a credulous people into yet another vain revolt. The country was full of impostors and brigands: ²⁸ not a year passed that it was not rumored, Lo, the Messiah has appeared in the desert! or Lo, behold him in the city! (Matt. 24:26.) Short-lived revolts followed

²⁸ One of whom the Roman police officer thought he had caught, when he arrested St. Paul: "Art thou not that Egyptian who before these days didst raise a tumult and didst lead forth into the desert 4,000 men that were murderers?" (Acts 21:38.)

one another, which, drowned in the blood of dupes and knaves, a contemptuous Rome had no difficulty in squashing as soon as started.

The best known of these guerilleros is Judas Galilaeus, head of a party of "zealots," who instigated a rebellion during the reign of Archilaus (4 B.C. to A.D. 5) on account of the institution of a Roman "procurator" of Judea and Samaria. Until then the Jews had only had to deal with a Roman governor of the province of Syria in far-away Antioch: a circumstance which left them with a good deal of factual autonomy. Even so, the educated classes, divided though they were in the rival parties of Pharisees and Sadducees, were united in a desire to put up with Rome's imperial rule and avoid further bloodshed. The Pharisees stressed the pacific nature of the true Messias, since for them war went with the regal power and ostentation of the Herodians, whom they detested. The "Psalms of Solomon," written in 48 B.C., are interesting in this connection: for they break completely with the Machabean interpretation of Messianism, rather taking it back to its source, Nathan's prophecy to David (II Kings 7:12), and to the setting given to that promise by Isaias (chap. 11), who saw in the "rod out of the root of Jesse" a Judge, but one who "shall strike the earth with the rod of His mouth, and with the breath of His lips shall He slay the wicked"; who would usher in a time when "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the lion shall eat straw like the ox, and they shall not hurt nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain, when the earth is filled with the knowledge of Yahveh, as

the covering waters of the sea.”²⁹ More and more the leaders of the Jews were appreciating the benefits of the *Pax Romana*, some even going so far as to identify—as did the famous historian Josephus—the promised Messiah with the Roman Caesar. That Josephus was not alone in this idea is evident from the fact that, when the great popular rising broke out that was to end in the final destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, Vespasian gave safe asylum at Lydda and Jamnia to the many Jews who had refused to join in the fight. On the other hand Titus, who took over the campaign from his father when the latter was proclaimed emperor, ordered not only the destruction of the Temple, but the killing of all possible descendants of David, with the avowed purpose of scotching any recurrence of Messianic pretensions. But yet further Messianist revolts broke out under Trajan in Egypt, Cyrene, Cyprus, Mesopotamia, put down in A.D. 118 by the Roman general Lucius Quintus; only to flare up under Hadrian once more in the final Palestinian revolt under Bar Kokhba (“son of the star”) of the years 132–135, which was finally put down by Julius Severus. Jerusalem was built over as a Roman city, Aelia Capitolina, access to which was forbidden to all Jews on pain of death, and thus an end made of all Jewish political ambitions by ending the political existence itself of the Jewish people, who for seventeen and a half centuries, from Bar Kokhba to Herzl, have perforce had to resign themselves to the role of a religious sect and not of a political entity.

²⁹ Cf. Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

Messianic thought had run a curious course in Israel. On the one hand there was the Messianism of an unlettered and turbulent populace, for whom it had come to mean vengeance on their pagan oppressors, all the material advantages imaginable for themselves, and all this radical change brought about without any effort on their own part, simply by the magic of the Messiah and his angel hosts. These wish-fancies naturally evacuated the Messianic hope of all its spiritual content: at best idle day dreams, they mostly became the means of confirming the people in gross materialistic aspirations and ruining their last chances for the fulfillment of God's designs for them. Purely nationalist, this Messianism had come simply to mean that there would soon be "a good time" all-round for every Jew.

The lettered leaders of the people on the other hand rejected Messianism, not because it was nationalistic, but merely because they realized that fundamentally Messianism was a universalist and not a nationalist concept. Rabbinism concentrated on the Torah with its purely nationalistic precepts, brushing aside the prophets who had increasingly sounded a universalistic note, beginning with a morality of the spirit, applying to all men, as against a morality of the letter, applying only to Israel. The Pharisees saw clearly enough that the observance of the Mosaic Law in its minutiae was the only bulwark against the complete disappearance of Israel as a nation.³⁰ In their origin, as an opposition party to the Hasmonaean high

³⁰ Cf. M. J. Lagrange, *L'Évangile de Jésus-Christ* (Paris, 1930), pp. 456-72.

priests, they had been anti-sacerdotal, and the destruction of the Temple only confirmed them in evacuating the religion of Israel of its sacrificial contents. Their nationalism had forced them now also to reject all the charismatic elements of that religion, side-tracking the prophets and exchanging the spirit of grace for a legalism as rigoristic as it was priggish.

5. THE GREAT REFUSAL

Such was the state of religion, such the conception of Messianism, when there appeared the true Messiah, Jesus the Christ, who was so gloriously to fulfill all the prophecies made about Himself and thereby to fulfill also the *raison d'être* itself of His people. He had to refuse on the one hand the acclaim of the multitudes, who saw in Him a king (in their own grossly nationalistic meaning of that term), and on the other hand was met by the opposition of the leaders who rejected His claim to kingship because it was not nationalistic. Both sides looked upon Him first with astonishment, then with suspicion, and finally with exasperation. He came, "the Just, the Savior, poor and riding upon an ass" (Zach. 9:9). "But who was there to believe His report and to whom was the arm of the Lord revealed? He grew up as a tender plant and as a root out of a thirsty ground; there was no beauty in Him nor comeliness; we saw Him, but there was no glamor that made us desirous of Him. Despised and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, we esteemed Him not. All we, like sheep have gone astray, everyone

hath turned aside into his own way: and the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all" (Isa. 53:1-6). Thus came the Messias "unto His own, and His own received Him not; He was the true light, but the light shone in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not; He was in the world and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not" (John 1:5, 10 f.). A little wavering, this way and that, a little short-lived enthusiasm, but in the end both people and leaders made their final choice between Jewish nationalism and the kingdom of God, between their own fancies and eternal Truth. The people chose Barabbas, the leaders Caesar: but both united in refusing Christ.

"And Pilate saith to the Jews: Behold your king. But they cried out, Away with Him, away with Him, crucify Him! Pilate saith to them, Shall I crucify your king? The chief priests answered, We have no king but Caesar" (John 19:14 f.). "And Pilate saith to the Jews: I find no cause in Him. But you have a custom that I should release one unto you at the Pasch: will you therefore that I release unto you the King of the Jews? Then cried they all again, saying: Not this man, but Barabbas" (John 18:38-40). "And Pilate, seeing that he prevailed nothing, but that rather a tumult was made, taking water, washed his hands before the people saying, I am innocent of the blood of this just man; look you to it. And the whole people answering said, His blood be upon us and upon our children" (Matt. 27:24 f.).

List of Chinese Terms

ba	(usurper)	霸
ba gwa	(the 8 trigrams)	八卦
ben	(elopement)	奔
bu dung hsin	(imperturbable)	不動心
byen tyi	(disputation)	辯者
cheng	(perfect)	成
cheng	("sincere")	誠
chi	(instincts)	氣
Chin	(a country)	秦
ching she	(Secretary of State)	卿士
Chu	(a country)	楚
Chun Tsiou	(Spring and Autumn)	春秋
chüan	(balance)	權
chüan sheng	(the perfect life)	全生
da hsüé	(higher studies)	大學
da ti	(the higher mind)	大體
dao	(way)	道

Dao De Dying	(Classic of Way and Power)	道德經
de	(power)	德
Deng Hsi	(a name)	鄧析
di	(earth)	地
Di	(Ruler)	帝
ding	(cauldron)	鼎
dya	(family)	家
dyen ai	(to love equally)	兼愛
dying	(a classic)	經
dying	(quiescence)	靜
dying	(a well)	井
dying hsüé	(the classical education)	經學
dyü dze	(great master)	鉅子
dzâ wang	(yoga)	坐忘
Dzeng Dze	'(a name)	曾子
Dze Se	(a name)	子思
Dzin	(a country)	晉
Dzou Yen	(a name)	騶衍
dzun	(a bumper)	尊
er	(two)	二
fa	(law)	法
Fa Dya	(Legalist School)	法家
fan	(reversion)	反

fang	(region)	方
fang she	(glomancer)	方士
fen	(distinctions)	分
Feng Meng	(a name)	彭蒙
fu dze	(master)	夫子
Gao Dze	(a name)	告子
gu	(chalice)	觚
Gung Sun Lung	(a name)	公孫龍
Gwan Dze	(a book title)	管子
Gwan Jung	(a name)	管仲
gwé	(ghostly)	鬼
hai	(injurious)	害
Han Fé	(a name)	韓非
Han Gao Dzu	(first Han emperor)	漢高祖
Han zhen	(the Han people)	漢人
he	(agreement)	合
he tung	(to harmonize)	和同
Hou Tu	(Earth Queen)	后土
hsin jai	(purgation of mind)	心齋
hsing	(name)	姓
hsing	(nature)	性
hsing li hsüé	(metaphysics)	性理學
hsü	(empty)	虛

hsüan	(mystery)	玄
hsüé	(learn)	學
Hsü Hsing	(a name)	許行
Hsün Ching	(a name)	荀卿
hsyao	(filial piety)	孝
hsyao	(small)	小
Hsyao Dying	(Classic of Filial Piety)	孝經
hsyao ti	(the lower mind)	小體
Hsyen Yün	(Cimmerians)	獫狁
hun	(marriage)	婚
Hung Fan	(title of a book)	洪範
Hwang Shang	(emperor)	皇上
Hwang Tien		
Shang Di	(God)	皇天上帝
Hwé She	(a name)	惠施
i	(basin)	彝
i	(change)	易
i	(righteous)	義
i	(wings)	翼
Jan Gwo	(The Warring States)	戰國
je	(idea)	旨
je	(indicate)	指
je	(straight)	直

jeng	(govern)	政
jeng	(straighten)	正
jeng je	(upright)	正直
jeng ming	(rectification of terms)	正名
Jou	(a dynasty)	周
Jou	(a tyrant)	紂
jün	(aristocrat)	君
jün dze	(the superior man)	君子
jung	(equitable)	忠
jung	(middle)	中
Jung Yung	(Book of the Golden Mean)	中庸
Ju Yün	(title of a book)	主運
Jwang Jou	(a name)	莊周
Kung Jung Ni	(Confucius)	孔仲尼
Lao Dan	(a name)	老聃
Lao Dze	(a sage)	老子
li	(advantage)	利
li	(customary law)	禮
li	(reason)	理
li	(tripod)	豐
Li Dyi	(The Record of Customs)	禮記
Li Er	(a name)	李耳
ling	(to enjoin)	令

Lin Bang	(a name)	劉邦
lun	(reasoning)	論
lun li	(logic)	論理
Mâ Di	(a sage)	墨翟
Mâ Dying	(title of a book)	墨經
Meng Dze	(Mencius)	孟子
Meng Ke	(Mencius)	孟軻
ming	(a mandate)	命
ming	(name)	名
nung	(the peasantry)	農
se ma	(marshal)	司馬
se kung	(superintendent of lands)	司空
se tu	(superintendent of menials)	司徒
sha	(to kill)	殺
Shang	(a dynasty)	商
shang tung	(agree with one's superior)	尚同
Shang Yang	(a name)	商鞅
she	(ballads)	詩
she	(earth spirit)	社
she	(gentleman)	士
she	(murder)	弑
she	(power)	勢
she	(real)	實

she	(ten)	十
she	(time)	時
She Dyi	(Historical Records)	史記
She Hwang Di	(First Imperial Ruler)	始皇帝
shen	(spiritual)	神
Shen Bu Hai	(a name)	申不害
shen ti	(the body)	身體
shen je wé	(in itself)	生之謂
shu	(history)	書
shu	(indulgence)	恕
shu	(state craft)	術
Sung Keng	(a name)	宋堽
Tai Bao	(Grand Protector)	太保
ti	(the body)	體
Tien	(Heaven)	天
Tien Dze	(Son of Heaven)	天子
tien gwan	(natural senses)	天官
Tien Hwang	(Jap. Tenno, emperor)	天皇
tien jün	(natural ruler)	天君
Tien Ming	(Heaven's decree)	天命
Tyen Han Shu	(History of Former Han)	前漢書
tu	(earth)	土
wang	(king)	王

wang dao	(the kingly way)	王道
wé	(to cause)	為
wé	(training)	偽
wé wǎ	(myself alone)	為我
wen	(cultured)	文
wu	(five)	五
wu	(non-being)	無
wu	(thing)	物
wu	(warrior)	武
wu	(witch)	巫
wu hsing	(the Five Elements)	五行
wu wé	(inactive)	無為
Yang Ju	(a name)	楊朱
Yang Sheng	(a name)	陽生
Yin Wen	(a name)	尹文
Yin-Yang	(male-female principle)	陰陽
you	(existence)	有
you ma zhu dyi er	("horse" in itself)	有馬如己耳
yü	(jade)	玉
yü	(the particular)	與
yüé	(moon)	月
yüé ling	(the lunar behests)	月令

Yüé She	(Scythians)	月氏
zhen	(cruel)	忍
zhen	(humane)	仁
zhen	(man)	人
zhen	(terrify)	震
zhu	(like)	如
zhu	(scholarly)	儒

Notes

Note A (to page 2)

PLACID Tempels¹ has well brought out the extent to which Bantu thought considers each individual person as merely a knot, a plexus, in a cosmic reference system of vital forces. For the Bantu the causal nexus between father and son, between ancestor and descendant, between chief and subject, is also an ontological nexus of vital forces arranged in an irreversible hierarchy: so that it is quite inconceivable to members of a less developed civilization, like the Bantu, for the inferior individual to act against a superior vital force, since by doing so he would not diminish the superior vital force, but only his own, inferior, vital force. By exercising his own vital forces in strict conformity with the hierarchy of forces within his clan, each member of the clan knows that he is also increasing the vital forces of the whole clan; this increase by reflux causes an increase in the vital forces of his own person. Such rationalization of tribalism incidentally shows that men living in a pre-critical stage for that reason do not live in a prelogical stage.

Note B (to page 4)

It is therefore evident that I do not use the word "self-consciousness" in the sense intended by some authors, who

¹ In his *La philosophie Bantoue*. Elisabethville, 1945, p. 109 and *passim*.

consider that its absence is marked by an identification of "fantasy and reality" and who believe that primitive people cannot distinguish between waking and dreaming.² This of course is nonsense: the very fact that all peoples have a different word for "dreaming" proves that they make the distinction. To be sure, they may evaluate dreams in a manner differing from our own, but that is quite a different question. Again, primitive man is not "unable to distinguish himself from the world." He does so quite well and as a matter of course, but again he may evaluate the relation between the two in a manner different from the one we learned. Finally, the distinction between thinking and imagining is one constitutionally hard for man to make, seeing that all our ideas are abstractions from material supplied by the senses: man has needed a long apprenticeship to acquire the art of utilizing his innate capacity for abstract thinking.

"Self," the dictionary tells us, is "the person as object of introspection"; "self-consciousness," therefore, is "the faculty of self-contemplation": and it is in this sense that I naturally use the word.

Note C (to page 5)

L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*. Paris, 1913.

Note D (to page 17)

For details, see the author's *Protohistory*, pp. 265 ff.

² Cf. V. D. Macchioro, *From Orpheus to Paul*. London, 1930, pp. 4 ff.

Note E (to page 23)

But that Persian (and Ionian) influences continued at least on the Persian border and certainly in Gandhâra has recently (1945) been confirmed by the find, on the site of the earliest city of Taxila, of a hoard of silver coins and gems. The coins are of the bent-bar type, such as Omphis, king of Taxila, presented to Alexander in 326. They were discontinued after the reign of Omphis and with the advent of Čandragupta. The gems discovered bespeak Ionian work of the fourth century B.C. and are very likely the stock of an Ionian craftsman who "in distant Taxila naturally would be following a style and tradition current in the Mediterranean two to three generations earlier."³

Note F (to page 35)

See *Protohistory*, pp. 108 ff. "That philosophy in oldest India is rooted in magic has long been a belief of mine," says Franklin Edgerton of Yale (*Journal of the American Oriental Society*, October–December, 1948, p. 200) in a book review of Walter Ruben's *Philosophie der Upanishaden* (Bern, 1947), who on his part says that "only in India can one follow in detail the birth of philosophy out of magico-mythical proto-philosophy." And he adds that "either one derives Greek philosophy from India or one supplements the pre-Socratics by analogy with Indian sources." If I am in entire agreement with the Ankara professor on these two points, I should however not be taken as opposed to the Yale professor's evaluation of the former's

³ G. M. Young in an article in *Ancient India*, no. 1, p. 33.

book as “presenting a merely worthless and harmful caricature of the Upanishads.”

Note G (to page 41)

The death from which the Vedic hymns pray to be delivered is the premature death before old age (*jarâ*). Atharva Veda 2.28.4 indeed implores for a child the boon of *jarâmṛtyu*, death in old age. Cf. Sten Rodhe, *Deliver Us from Evil* (Lund, 1946), pp. 84, 86. Rebirth similarly in the Ṛg means just being reborn in one's offspring (RV. 6.70.3). Aitarîya Brâhmaṇa (7.13) similarly says that “the husband enters the wife and, having become a germ, gets in the womb a new existence.”

Note H (to page 52)

The same manner of expressing the *Ding-an-sich* is still found among the Bantu of the Congo, who say: “In each thing there is another thing; in each man there is a little man.” Where we are inclined to fraction man into soul and body, more primitive thought more truly expresses the essence of man as the essence of man as a whole, as “the little man, hidden behind the perceptible appearances,” in the words of Placid Tempels, *La philosophie Bantoue* (Elisabethville, 1945), pp. 34 f.

Note I (to page 138)

Hsian is the modern name. In Imperial days it was Chang-an. In Jou times it was Dzung Jou or Gao Dying.

Note J (to page 140)

What these *Ba* aimed at was to make themselves absolute rulers of their territory: having denounced fealty to their king, they naturally also had to rid themselves of their fellow nobles. They consequently appear somewhat in the role of a Greek *tyrannos*, basing themselves on the common people against the aristocracy, though being aristocrats themselves. Hence they also had to denounce the old customary law (*li*), on which the old order had reposed and to substitute for it statute laws (*fa*) of their own, issued and based on their power of enforcing them. As in Rome before the writing of the Twelve Tables, so also in ancient China, the aristocracy had a monopoly of the magic formulas of the customary law and the discretionary power of interpreting the latter. When therefore Dze Chan of the Jeng State in 535 caused the laws henceforth to be enforced by him to be engraved on iron plates, for all and sundry to read and know them, he dealt a fatal blow at the power hitherto wielded by his rivals. As the *Dzo Jwan* comments, "the ancient rulers were content to institute penalties in order to deter malefactors, but they would not institute penal laws, fearing the rise of a litigious spirit. When people know a penal law, the nobles are no longer held in awe. Appeal is made to the written text, and their hopes repose in argumentation." ⁴ We revert to this, when we speak of the legalist school of philosophy. ⁵

⁴ Marcel Granet: *La Pensée Chinoise*. Paris, 1934, p. 461.

⁵ See p. 215.

Note K (to page 141)

The metal mirror came to China in the seventh century B.C. and is but a variant of the Scythian mirror; just as the short Chinese sword which appears at the same time is plainly derived from the Scythian *akinakes*. Though Chinese borrowing from the Scythians had started much earlier, it was done with particular zest in this sixth century.

Another innovation in Chinese art dating from the same century is the representation of man in plastic isolation. These earliest statuettes all represent, awkwardly, a kneeling human figure with outstretched hands.⁶

Note L (to page 173)

But it must be recognized that Mâdi's protest against clannishness was as timely as it was courageous, and that he always linked *dyen ai* ("universal love") with *dyen li* ("universal benefit"). In fact, his utilitarianism did not aim at the private, but the common, weal.

Note M (to page 226)

Granet⁷ distinguishes among them those who have been led to logic by political and moral, if not forensic, considerations; and those who got there through rhetoric and eristic. The former, he thinks, represent an old native type of logic; of the latter "he believes—though there is no

⁶ L. Bachhofer, *A Short History of Chinese Art*. New York, 1944 (Pantheon), pp. 46, 50, 55.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 432.

means of proving it—that they represent an originally foreign tradition, which in fact has never succeeded in getting acclimatized in China.” We venture to suggest that the former received their impetus from India, and the latter from Hellas.

Note N (to page 231)

Granet⁸ suggests that the separation, of e.g., “hardness” from “whiteness,” spelt the ruin of the whole conceptual world of ancient China, which was built on the indissoluble connection and magical correlations between certain properties (as e.g., “hot” and “red”): *li* being the art of doing the appropriate thing (e.g., donning a red robe in summer) and thus maintaining the harmony of the universe. “The dialecticians tended to ruin a venerable system of classifications and correspondences and sapped etiquette at its base. Hence the scandal they created and the poor success they had.”

Note O (to page 246)

“It is possible to detect the reflection of Egyptian and Mesopotamian beliefs in many episodes of the Old Testament, but the overwhelming impression left by that document is one, not of derivation, but of originality.” Henri Frankfort in *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*. Chicago, 1946, p. 367.

Note P (to page 248)

Both Ur and Haran were centers of the Moon cult. It is therefore also striking that in Phoenician mythology the

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 445.

Moon-god is called Yareah or Terah; Terah being the Hebrew of what our version of the Bible renders Thare. Cf. R. Dussaud, *Les religions des Phéniciens et des Syriens*. Paris, 1945, p. 367.

Note Q (to page 289)

The father of Solomon's Egyptian queen (III Kings 9:16) seems to have been Psusennes II (984-950), last pharaoh of the XXI Dynasty.

Note R (to page 303)

The so-called XXVI Dynasty of Egypt (663-525) fills the interval between the conquest of Egypt by Assyria in 663 and that by Persia in 525. The founder of the Dynasty, Psamtik I, was of Nordic descent and leaned heavily on Greek support. Both his army and his navy were mainly composed of Greeks, and Greek traders swarmed into the Delta. His successor, Nekau (609-594), sent a Phoenician fleet to circumnavigate Africa, in search of fresh commercial ventures (cf. Herodotus, IV, 42). According to the same writer (II, 177) it was Amasis, the penultimate king of the line, who invented the income tax. The foreign policy of the dynasty was directed against the Neo-Babylonian empire, with which it vainly contended for the mastery of Syria. Cyrus of Persia put an end to that empire in 539, and his son Cambyses to that of Egyptian independence in 525.

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
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